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Foreword 
The then incoming Norwegian ambassador to Tanzania – Mr. Jon Lomøy – approached Mr. 
Alf Morten Jerve in 2007 about his wish to have a study made of Norway’s involvement in 
Rukwa Region. To Jerve, this was an exiting opportunity to reflect on the achievements and 
failures of a development aid intervention to which he was intimately familiar. In 1986, Jerve 
assumed the position as the first Coordinator of the Rukwa Integrated Rural Development 
Programme, better known as RUDEP. In April that year he started sharing an office with five 
planning officers of the Regional Planning Office – Mipango – with the mandate to assist the 
Regional Development Director build a new multi-sectoral programme financed by NORAD. 
Mr. E.J.K. Ntemi was among the planning officers, having selected Rukwa as his first posting 
when he graduated as regional planner in 1980. 
 
However, Jerve was not at all the first Norwegian to the Region. A project for securing safe 
drinking water to villages in the Region was in full swing, and he joined a sizeable 
community of Norwegians living in the “NORAD Compound” in Sumbawanga. By the time 
he left Rukwa, in 1989, the expatriate community in Rukwa had further increased. It consisted 
not only of Norwegians and numbered close to fifty with family members. There was even a 
Norwegian primary school.  
 
Lomøy himself has also been part of this history, first as a member of the planning mission 
that in 1984 outlined the first concept of a multi-sectoral aid programme, and subsequently as 
Programme Officer with the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam having RUDEP as one of 
his responsibilities. When Jerve raised the issue of whether his personal involvement with the 
programme would disqualify him from doing this study, Lomøy responded that he regarded 
prior knowledge of the Region and RUDEP as invaluable to be able to assess the longer-term 
impacts of a programme that ceased in 1996. In the same vein, it was suggested that Jerve 
teamed up with Ntemi since he had been closely involved with RUDEP from the start, 
including as Coordinator (from 1993 to 1995). 
 
Hence, this is not an independent study in the conventional sense, but with the time that has 
past we believe it has been possible to have a rather unbiased view of what we were once part 
of. In addition, to have also an outsider’s view on the RUDEP legacy, an Arusha-based NGO 
experienced in participatory research – RECODA, with no prior involvement in the Region, 
was contracted. The RECODA team carried out its own field work prior to Jerve and Ntemi, 
and have submitted an independent report which is a major source for what is presented 
below. 
 
This Study commenced with a planning visit to Dar es Salaam in June 2007 by Jerve, 
involving archival search at the Norwegian Embassy, and a reconnaissance visit to Rukwa in 
September by Ntemi and RECODA. November 16-17, 2007 a ‘RUDEP Impact Assessment 
Workshop’ was held at Kibaha with 25 participants of whom 20 came from Rukwa 
representing government departments, NGOs and the private sector. The rest were former 
RUDEP project officers now working elsewhere. RECODA did its fieldwork in January 2008 
and a follow-up visit in June 2008. Besides interviewing people with knowledge of RUDEP, 
the team visited four rural areas where RUDEP was active, namely Mwimbi and Muze 
Divisions in Sumbawanga District, Namanyere Division in Nkasi District, and Mpimbwe 
Division in Mpanda District. In each area attempts were made to compare a village with a 
concentration of RUDEP activities to a village that had not received similar benefits. Did 
people recognise differences in impact and how did they relate the development situation 
today to past interventions of RUDEP? In the absence of any statistical baseline information 
at household level, and with limited resources, it was decided to not to carry out a formal 
survey and to rely on personal and group interviews only. 
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Jerve and Ntemi visited Rukwa three weeks in April-May 2008 and partly covered the same 
ground as RECODA. They interviewed key informants in Sumbawanga, Nkasi and Mpanda 
districts, and visited villages in Mwimbi, Mpimbwe, Kirando and along the roads 
rehabilitated by RUDEP – Sumbawanga-Mwimbi-Ulumi, Mwimbi-Kate, Ntendo-Muze, and 
Chala-Namanyere. They also visited Msanzi village (regarding an irrigation project), the 
Mbizi forest reserve (which is the catchment area for the water supply to Sumbawanga) and 
potato growing villages close to the former Nkundi agricultural research station. 
 
 
The authors at the Regional 
Block in Sumbawanga – once the 
location of the RUDEP Office 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the study and main questions to be answered 
From 1978 to 1996 – a period of 18 years – a close link existed between one of Tanzania’s 
least developed regions and Norway. This unlikely relationship, backed by a development aid 
policy to reach “the poorest of the poor”, resulted in a total of 400 million Norwegian kroner 
(NOK), or about 70 million US dollar (USD), being invested in Rukwa Region directly or 
through equipment and foreign experts.1 A large number of Norwegians, and other foreigners 
paid by Norway, worked and lived in the region and an even larger number came by road or 
plane to see what was going on. What became known as the Rukwa Integrated Rural 
Development Programme, or RUDEP in short, was for a period a Norwegian showcase 
attracting high level visits, until the tide turned against the programme and the aid concepts 
upon which it had been founded. In 1994, NORAD2 announced its decision to terminate its 
engagement in Rukwa as from July 1996, long before what had been envisioned at the start. 
Twelve years have passed since, but it is still not too late to reflect on what the Norwegian 
involvement achieved. Has anything passed the test of time?  
 
 
A group of Norwegian 
parliamentarians visited 
RUDEP in 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
In the wake of any 
planned development 
intervention, by 
government or private 
initiative, follows the 
unavoidable question: 
did it work? Politicians 
and sponsors want to 
know, and so would the 
intended beneficiaries as 
well as the people 
entrusted with the implementation. But the answer is never straightforward. One may disagree 
on what results to look for, and in any event there is rarely a direct causal relationship 
between a particular intervention and social and economic change at large since many other 
factors will also play a role. The easiest part is to look at the immediate outputs. Did the 
project achieve its targets in terms of kilometres of roads or water supply schemes 
constructed, people trained or trees planted? The next question is whether these achievements 
were sustainable. Are the roads maintained and generate traffic today? Do people continue to 
benefit from clean water? Was the training put into good use? Are the trees maturing?  
                                                     
1 For easy reading we use the term aid rather than the more official term ‘development assistance’. 
2 At the time of RUDEP the Norwegian Agency for International Development, later called Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation, was responsible for managing Norwegian bilateral aid. The official acronym was 
‘NORAD’, and we use this form in our report. This role was changed in 2004, when the agency, with its new 
acronym ‘Norad’, was turned into a technical advisory body for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now managing 
bilateral aid. 
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In this study we attempt to answer such questions, but we also want to address the overall 
question: did Norwegian development aid to Rukwa contribute to long-term improvement in 
people’s living standard? This was the overall goal. Our answer is not a simple yes or no, and 
we are not in the position to quantify any such impacts. What we do in this study is to trace 
links between what Norway supported and development outcomes as they are observable 
today. An important part of this analysis has been to inform ourselves about the context 
within which Norwegian aid operated, the way it was designed and managed and what has 
happened in the region after RUDEP ended.  
 
The broad goal of Norwegian aid to Rukwa Region was to improve the material well-being of 
the people. It started in 1978 with the planning of a programme to secure safe drinking water 
to all villages, which led to a Water Supply and Sanitation project from 1982. RUDEP started 
on a small scale in 1986 as a multi-sectoral programme, and became the umbrella for all 
Norwegian aid to Rukwa from 1988 to 1996. In its peak years from 1990 to 1994 the annual 
budget hovered around NOK 25 million – or almost USD 4 million3, excluding costs of 
expatriate personnel.  
 
What were the results? To what extent was this successful? Are current livelihood conditions 
in Rukwa in some way related to the investments of RUDEP, more than 10 years after the end 
of the programme?  
 
To answer these questions we have to distinguish between what happened when RUDEP was 
active and what took place in the years that followed. We also have to select relevant 
indicators of well-being. We make the analysis by combining two perspectives: 
 
Firstly, in Chapter 2, we look at how the region has changed from the 1970s, 
when NORAD came in as a donor, until today. This gives us an understanding 
of the circumstances that influenced strategies and the content of RUDEP, and 
the conditions under which the programme was implemented. We will dwell 
in particular on the situation in the early 1990s when the programme was at its 
peak, and see what has happened since then. Although there is no well 
developed database for the Region, by combining information from different 
statistical sources, coupled with peoples’ own statements, we have been able 
to assemble a picture of change, or lack thereof.  
 
Secondly, in Chapter 3 we move the focus to the RUDEP approach – i.e. the 
principles guiding the programme and challenges faced in implementation. In 
Chapter 4 we look at the outputs created in the main areas of RUDEP and 
what the situation is today with respect to these outputs. Have they been 
sustainable, or did the sudden withdrawal of Norwegian aid in 1996 make 
certain activities grind to a halt?  
 
With this information at hand we discuss in Chapter 5 the question of impact. The figure 
below (Figure 1.1) illustrates our analytical approach. It must be noted that this is not an 
evaluation in the sense that we judge the extent to which RUDEP achieved stated objectives 
and planning targets, nor is it an attempt to measure cost-effectiveness – or whether the same 
results could have been achieved at lesser costs. Our aim is to analyse impacts more broadly, 
including aspects not emphasised in planning documents at the time. We have looked at the 
following types of impacts: 
 
                                                     
3 The average exchange rate for the period 1986-1995 was 1 USD= 6.70 NOK. For the period 1990-1994 the 
average rate was 6.60. 
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- Social and economic impacts at household level: Did RUDEP contribute to improving 
living standards, health condition and income opportunities of villagers, especially the 
poorest? In which areas? In what way? 
- Impacts on gender relations: Did RUDEP succeed in promoting the role of women in the 
development process, which emerged as a key objective of Norwegian aid at the time? 
- Impacts on the economic growth of the Region: Did RUDEP stimulate growth in the 
agriculture sector, trade and manufacturing? 
- Impacts on the environment: Did RUDEP succeed in arresting the process of 
deforestation and environmental degradation? 
- Impacts on public institutions: Did RUDEP increase capacity, competence, and quality 
of work of government institutions? Where these improvements sustainable? 
- Impacts on private sector: To what extent did RUDEP or, more generally, the injection 
of Norwegian funds in the region, stimulate private sector development?  
- Impacts on private organisations/NGOs: This increasingly became a priority for 
NORAD. To what extent was RUDEP able to stimulate sustainable NGO activities and 
involve NGOs in the programme? 
- Impacts on policy in terms of lessons learned: Did lessons from RUDEP or Rukwa in 
this period in any way contribute to development planning and policy making in 
Tanzania? Or with Norway as a donor? 
- Impacts at the individual level in terms of human resources development: Many received 
valuable work experience and training through RUDEP. How were these skills used in 
peoples’ individual careers? 
 
The figure below illustrates how we have organised the analytical approach. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Analytical framework 
 
 
Specific 
investments 
by RUDEP  
A 
The RUDEP 
ideas and 
approaches to 
development 
(Chapter 3) 
 
B 
The results created in 
terms of services and 
immediate benefits and 
the situation today of 
theses services/benefits 
(Chapter 4) 
The political 
and economic 
context of 
RUDEP 
 
 
(Chapter 2) 
Changes taken 
place in Rukwa 
since RUDEP 
was active – 
about 1990 
 
(Chapter 2) 
How are these 
changes in 
Rukwa related to 
A and B above? 
(Chapter 5) 
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1.2 Rukwa Ruka – a promise not yet fulfilled 
Rukwa Region has been and remains one of the least developed areas of Tanzania, located in 
the western part of the country (see Map 1). The area, administratively formed as a region in 
1974, is today made up of four local government administrations: Sumbawanga District, 
Sumbawanga Municipality, Nkasi District4 and Mpanda District (see Map 2). The area is 
about 70,000 km2 (i.e. the size of Sri Lanka or nearly twice as big as Denmark). The total 
population is about 1.4 million, which makes it among the least populated regions in 
Tanzania. It borders Kigoma Region in the north, Tabora in the east and Mbeya in the east 
and south. To the southwest is Zambia, and there is close contact between Mambwe speaking 
people on both sides of the border. Lake Tanganyika forms the remaining of the western 
border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) only a short boat trip away.  
 
 
 
Learning geography from the walls of Chala 
Primary School 
 
 
 
 
 
The Region composes five rather distinct 
ecological zones (see Map 3). There are 
the narrow shores of the Lake 
Tanganyika with little cultivable land, 
the Katumba plain and the Lake Rukwa 
valley. The latter two are characterised 
by vast acacia and miombo forests, 
historically with a low population density 
partly due to the tsetse fly. But in recent 
decades there has been a major influx of 
not least Sukuma pastoralist. The rugged 
Mwezi highlands bordering Kigoma 
Region is a fourth zone, also with a small 
population. The Ufipa plateau at an 
altitude of about 2000 metres above sea 
level between the two lakes is the zone with the highest population density, mainly inhabited 
by Fipa speaking people. It is largely deforested due to centuries of human activity in the 
form of slash and burn cultivation and iron making. All of these zones have natural riches 
which potentially can support enhanced economic development.  
 
The much touted remoteness of the region is a product of recent history and not of geography 
or topography per se. The region is in fact located on ancient trading routes linking the East 
coast and central Africa (the Congo), and the Southern African highlands and the Lake 
Region. The Fipa has a long history of making and trading in iron tools. According to Willis, 
“the Fipa built up a society based on domestic industry and the progressive development of 
exchange relations within and without”. An English missionary in 1880 described Ufipa as 
“the land of plenty”.5 A mere glance at the map would find that Rukwa in fact is quite 
centrally located.  
 
                                                     
4 During the time of RUDEP the official name was Nkansi District.  
5 Willis, Roy (1978), p.3.  
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Nevertheless, historical developments placed Rukwa in the backwaters. Whereas the German 
colonial rulers invested in a transport network, involving the Tabora-Mpanda railroad and 
ports along Lake Tanganyika – including Kasanga where the Germans had its military and 
administrative stronghold in Rukwa called Fort Bismarck, during the British colonial rule the 
area was seen primarily as a labour reserve for commercial plantations in other parts of the 
country. Further investment in transport infrastructure was neglected, and Sumbawanga 
received its fame as a punishment station for colonial as well as local civil servants. In 1952, 
the British even deported members of the Maumau uprising in Kenya to Rukwa. 
 
In the 1970s, in the wake of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and the Villagisation policy, the 
government, encouraged by the donors, saw the need to address the country’s regional 
imbalances. Regional Development Directorates were installed to spearhead this policy and 
Norway signalled its commitment to target aid to Rukwa and Kigoma regions.  
 
The Norwegian involvement was rooted in a combination of Tanzanian and international 
policy trends. Domestically, the Tanzanian Government raised the slogan “Ruka Rukwa” 
(which literally means “Make Rukwa Fly”) and declared its intent to build a strong regional 
administration capable of stimulating economic and social development. Internationally, rural 
development was the focus of attention fostering ideas such as the “basic needs approach”, 
“integrated development” and “bottom-up”. These trends took their toll in the 1990s with the 
shift towards liberal economic policies and democratic decentralization. Regional 
programmes were no longer the solution. Popularly elected local governments (i.e. district 
and municipal councils) and the private sector and the market mechanism were envisaged as 
the new drivers of rural development. The results of these new polices – after 1995 – are 
mixed, as were the results from the approach prior to this, with Norway as the main 
development partner of the Region. By and large, citizen of the Region are still waiting for the 
“flying” to begin, and feel they have not been heard by the Government in their call for 
special support to make the take-off a reality.  
 
This study is about the achievements during the RUDEP-period as well as the lack of results, 
and it is about what happened to these achievements in the period that unfolded after 
Norway’s pull-out. In other words, we seek to identify any lasting impacts of the programme 
and to better understand why some investments by RUDEP turned out more sustainable than 
others. 
 
Writing 2009, the international development community has again raised the concern for 
revisiting rural development policies. The liberal policies of the 1990s have not delivered as 
hoped for. Rural poverty has continued unabated and Tanzania, Rukwa in particular, is no 
exception. The pendulum has again started swinging towards government interventions and 
area focused approaches. Looking at lessons of the past would be a good way to start 
reforming current policies. There is no shortcut to development progress and the search for 
quick-fix approaches has mostly proven a failure. 
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Map 1: Tanzania 
 
 
 
Source: http://geography.about.com/ 
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Map 2: Rukwa Region (main RUDEP areas)  
 
 
 
 
Source: Regional Administrative Secretariat 
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Map 3: Ecological zones in Rukwa Region 
 
 
 
Source: German Development Institute (1989) 
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2. Development trends of Rukwa Region 
2.1 Frequent changes in policy  
Norway’s involvement in Rukwa was not incidental, as described in more detail in Chapter 3, 
and it came at a very difficult time in the country in response to political visions at the time. 
Marked by the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania had decided to consolidate its political 
and economic system along the lines of the then socialist states under the labels of ‘African 
socialism’ and ‘self-reliance’. Ambitious goals were set for bringing developmental benefits 
to all Tanzanians, and many donors, Norway included, responded positively to the 
development rhetoric of the Nyerere regime. Optimism and confidence in planned 
development prevailed, but by 1970 it was becoming clear that formal statements and 
programmes were not enough to promote what was called a socialist transformation. “To 
achieve socialist development the development machinery had to move physically closer to 
the people”.6 In a matter of only five years Tanzania embarked on two drastic and ambitious 
reforms, which in a major way set the stage for RUDEP to come.  
2.1.1 Regionalisation 
The first reform was to make regions the centres of development management. Ironically, the 
philosophical and professional stimuli to this process did not only come from Soviet Union 
and China. The World Bank contracted a US consulting firm, McKinsey, to assist the 
government in reforming the public sector with the aim to strengthen the regional planning 
machinery. Its recommendations profoundly influenced the 1972 reform. Local governments 
ceased to operate and were replaced by a two-tier system of regional and district 
administrations, where the latter received its budget and instructions from the region. Senior 
and skilled personnel were moved from central ministries to man the new decentralised 
administrations, with the correspondent ambition of genuinely transferring powers down the 
system. The number of civil servants in the regions more than doubled during 1972-83, 
without shrinking the central bureaucracy however.7  
 
Furthermore, the intension was to instate a system of development planning that should start 
from the village and move upwards within the party structure. Not only was this 
reorganisation met with a lot opposition from those who were affected, but numerous 
practical problems unfolded delaying the process. Budgetary allocations only marginally 
shifted in favour of the regions. Three years into the reform all regions combined (districts 
included) still received only 14 percent of the development expenditures, up from 8 percent in 
the first year. Resnick in his analysis of the reform states that “to a large extent 
decentralization was … the embodiment of McKinsey’s version of moving decisions from 
powerful to small bureaucrats, from the centre to the regions. They did not see, or perhaps 
were not interested in, the fact that decisions made by minor bureaucrats are not choices made 
by peasants and workers; and that development projects in the regions do not constitute 
regional development”. 8  
 
Although hailed as a decentralisation reform, critiques argued that the relationship between 
common people and the government and Party in fact deteriorated. Yeager argued that the 
reform created regional cadres of self-seeking elites. Not only were the powers of the 
Regional Commissioner far reaching, being a presidential appointee combining both Party 
                                                     
6 Resnick (1981), p. 236. 
7 The number increased from 75,000 to 175,000 according to Semboja and Therkildsen (1994).  
8 Resnick (1981), p. 246. 
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and central government powers, but both he9 and most of the senior staff of his administrative 
apparatus – the Regional Development Directorate – came from outside the region where they 
served and had only temporary assignments. Hence, allegiance and loyalty to the local 
population were week. Critiques also accused the policy “of having turned the central 
government ministries into operationally meaningless organizations whose essential function 
is merely to attract donor funds”.10 It is important to understand that RUDEP was conceived 
within the framework of the 1972 reform, with the aim to make the Regional Development 
Directorate more people oriented and more effective as a development agency. It goes without 
saying that the challenges in a remote and newly created region like Rukwa were formidable. 
2.1.2 Villagisation 
The second reform was the so-called villagisation implemented from 1968 to 1976, based on 
the ujamaa doctrine arguing the need to resettle people in villages to provide better access to 
educational and health services, water supply and government extension services, and to 
institute collective farming systems. The initial approach based on voluntarism, political 
agitation and economic incentives did not have much effect in many areas, including Rukwa. 
Hence, in 1973 Nyerere announced the Great Move: “to live in villages is an order”. In 
Rukwa, the effects were devastating. Officially, close to 346,800 had been relocated by 1975, 
which constituted about 77 percent of the population.11 The villagisation programme was not 
only poorly planned, but also implemented with force. People were uprooted from ancient 
family lands and moved into settlements where no public amenities had yet been provided, or 
existing settlements were expanded. In Rukwa, new villages were often located near existing 
roads, water supplies and mission stations on lands that were less fertile than the areas people 
had to vacate. People tried to continue farming their traditional farms, but many had to give 
up because of the distance. The government’s attempt to redistribute land and introduce block 
farming was by and large resisted by the Fipa. As a result, agricultural production fell. 
 
But gradually social services improved. The most visible, and successful, symbol of the 
ujamaa villages was the primary schools. Tanzania received international acclaim for its crash 
programme, Universalisation of Primary Education, which started in 1974. The efforts to 
expand primary education brought fruits. Enrolment rates soared. Between 1974 and 1979 the 
number of students in Sumbawanga District as well as teachers tripled.12 The quality of 
teaching however was generally poor. With donor assistance investments in primary health 
care and water supply also started picking up, but in Rukwa it took until mid 1980s before 
results of Norwegian aid started showing off.  
 
However, the psychological effects of this dramatic experiment in social engineering were not 
mitigated by these improvements in social services. The effects are still felt today, and 
probably more so in Rukwa than the more advanced regions at the time. The forced 
resettlement, combined with the abolition of local governments and cooperatives, led to 
apathy and a dependency syndrome in people’s psyche: development was the responsibility of 
the central government. A widespread distrust in bureaucrats and politicians had sunk into 
people’s mind. Private and communal initiatives were stifled. A study of land use in Mwasye 
village (Mwimbi Division, Sumbawanga District) from 1988 describes a ‘tug-of-war’ 
between the peasants and the state and silent opposition: “I found a society ridden with 
conflict and tension. There were incidences of fighting, threats and sorcery accusations. There 
was a tug of war between groups of peasants and between the peasants and the authorities…. 
Land and land use was what the tug of war was all about”.13 
                                                     
9 Only a few women have been appointed Regional Commissioner, and never for Rukwa Region. 
10 Yeager (1982), p. 110. 
11 Official figures from the Prime Minister’s Office reproduced in Mascarenhas (1979).  
12 Maro (1990). 
13 Johnson, H.F. (1991), p. 4. 
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2.1.3 Economic policy failure 
At the same time the economy gradually moved into a downward spiral, fuelled by a global 
economic recession and an oil crisis, but amplified by unrealistic domestic policies. Priority 
was given to basic industries at the expense of agriculture. Focus was on import substitution – 
self-reliance – and most public investments went into inefficient state-owned industries 
producing well below capacity (some estimates say at only 10-20% of capacity). 
Paradoxically, smallholder agriculture, the lynchpin of Nyerere’s ideology about African 
socialism, was neglected. Most of the public investments went into a few parastatals. One 
example is the National Milling Corporation (NMC). In 1981/82 the official retail price of 
maize (TShs 2.50 per kilo) was only about half of what NMC needed to break even, while 
farmers were paid only TShs 1.50 per kilo.14 In fact, agricultural prices were held low to 
offset demands for higher salaries and political unrest in urban areas. Declining export 
earnings and growing food imports led to a foreign exchange deficit that caused critical 
shortages of fuel and spare parts. For instance, much of the fertilizer to Rukwa in 1984 arrived 
too late.15  
 
Another policy doctrine surfacing was regional specialisation. Within the planned economy 
framework Rukwa was designated a role as national food basket. In 1976, the National Maize 
Project, with support from USAID and the World Bank, was launched. Rukwa was central in 
this programme and farmers on the Ufipa plateau received highly subsidized seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides. The performance of the programme was quite tremendous in terms of tonnage 
of the crop, earning the four regions Iringa, Mbeya, Ruvuma and Rukwa the name of the “Big 
Four”. In line with this, the only major aid programme besides NORAD’s in the early and mid 
1980s was the Food Security Project financed by West Germany (GTZ) supporting maize 
export from the Region (through transport and building of warehouses).  
 
Although this maize drive enabled households to increase their harvest which they sold and 
reserved some for food, the sold crop did not earn them enough money. So with an aim of 
getting more money some farmers sold even their food reserves resulting in food insecurity 
and malnutrition. With these problems, the Region continued to lag behind other regions 
despite its high agricultural potential. The aim of RUDEP was to address this problem by 
promoting crop diversification and food security, and reduce the reliance on exporting maize. 
2.1.4 Public sector in crisis 
Public sector employment continued to grow; at a rate of 10-15 % annually by the end of the 
1970s. The wages, however, did not keep pace with raising prices and civil servants were not 
able to live from their incomes. The result was growing absenteeism, deteriorating working 
morale and outright theft and corruption. In this climate of declining public sector efficiency, 
donors increasingly responded by creating by-passing arrangements. Aid projects became 
directly managed by the donor agencies or consultants hired by them. The regional 
development administration, officially entrusted to manage foreign aid, did neither have the 
capacity nor the political clout to coordinate development aid. Government had virtually no 
domestic resources for the development budget, as most went into recurrent costs – mainly 
salaries. To Rukwa, it made matters even worse that most qualified civil servants would try 
their best to prevent a transfer to the Region. The Region itself had produced very few 
graduates, and people from other parts of the country were also scared by the image of the 
Fipa as masters of witchcraft. 
 
                                                     
14 World Bank (1982).  
15 Eriksen, J., J. Lomøy and T. Refsdal, (1984). Prefeasibility study for a rural development programme in Rukwa, 
p.14. 
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It is in this context that NORAD first agrees to finance water supply as a typical donor 
managed project, and then subsequently turns the argument around and decides to make 
RUDEP part and parcel of the government system anchored in the Regional Development 
Directorate as the implementing agency. “The Project must not be allowed to live a life on its 
own in isolation from the Government and the Party”, the planning group reiterated.16  
 
Prior to RUDEP, plans for a regional development programme had been made in the 1970s 
but funding had not been forthcoming; dissimilar to several other regions that were supported 
by donors that had agreed with Government on a regional division of work.17 The pressure 
was upon Norway, but NORAD was advised against embarking on an ambitious investment 
programme based on a blueprint plan, and decided to adopt a gradual approach focusing on 
learning by doing. As this approach started, again major policy changes emerged in Tanzania.  
2.1.5 Dramatic policy shifts from mid 1980s 
From 1986, the decision to liberalise the economy was effected. Tanzania had for several 
years resisted pressure from IMF to devalue the Shilling and undertake other reforms, and 
from 1982 IMF and World Bank had frozen their relations with Tanzania. The Nordic donors 
continued their support, however, but in 1985 they also decided to fall in line with IMF’s 
pressure for reform. Nyerere willingly stepped down the same year leaving it to his successor 
– Ali Hassan Mwinyi – to bring the country into the free market era. He even in is farewell 
speech candidly said: “I failed. Let’s admit it”. The reforms soon improved the availability of 
imported commodities. After a few years the private sector started picking up also in Rukwa, 
and private traders were allowed to buy directly from farmers. 
 
In 1984, a Local Government Act reinstituted local authorities. District and municipal 
councils were no longer puppets-on-a-string with budgets controlled by the region, which 
now was supposed to assume an advisory role, and they were empowered to collect taxes. The 
implementation of this reform was slow, however, and RUDEP was caught in the middle of a 
tug-of-war between regional departments struggling to retain resources and influence and 
local government agencies building their new autonomy.  
 
The political reforms of the early 1990s also radically changed the political context within 
which RUDEP operated, culminating in the first multiparty elections in 1995. Although the 
former ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), still has all Members of Parliament from 
Rukwa, the new political system seems to have had the effect of boosting the role and 
influence of politicians in general. Bureaucrats can no longer manage development 
programmes largely undisturbed by local politicians, whether district councillors or MPs. The 
reform also stimulated the formation of NGOs. A new spirit of mobilisation is emerging 
gradually replacing the dependency syndrome, but RUDEP did not live long enough to 
benefit from such trends; although not for want of trying, as we shall see below. 
 
The 1990s also brought changes in the relationship between Tanzania and its major donors. 
From being branded a poor performer with bad economic policies and governance, by end of 
the decade she had emerged as one of the so-called ‘donor darlings’. This transformation was 
intimately linked to the attempts to reform the international aid system, spearheaded not least 
by the World Bank. Two important elements were (a) the channelling of aid through 
nationally managed sector reform programmes and (b) the pooling of aid from several donors 
to ensure better coordination. Part of the reason NORAD in 1994 decided to cancel its 
funding of RUDEP had to do with these new international trends in aid policy. Although 
Norway reiterated its support for rural development, poverty reduction and decentralisation, it 
argued that this had to be accomplished through national reform programmes – such as the 
                                                     
16 Eriksen, J., J. Lomøy and T. Refsdal, (1984). p.44. 
17 BRALUP (1977).  
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Civil Service Reform Programme. To Rukwa Region, and other regions accustomed to 
receiving targeted support from a particular donor, it meant a dramatic decline in development 
funds. It is important to notice that for Rukwa, development investments have not yet, in 
2008, recovered to the 1995 level despite an increasing flow of aid to the country as a whole. 
2.2 Economic development  
The injection of Norwegian aid money had a major effect on the economy at the time. One 
study estimated that RUDEP constituted 10-15% of the cash economy in the region.18 All of 
the investments were channelled through public institutions, but the economic spin-off effects 
were wide ranging. Informants vividly recollected the enhanced “money circulation” during 
RUDEP, benefiting not only the civil servants involved but also the private sector supplying 
goods and services. In rural areas where the programme was particularly active visible 
changes took place. When one of the authors of this study returned to the Mwimbi Division of 
the Sumbawanga District in 1993 he saw numerous houses with shining corrugated iron roofs 
where in 1989 there had been only thatched roofs. What has happened to the economy since 
then? What were the effects of the sudden tightening of the money circulation and contraction 
of public sector activities?   
 
Agricultural growth and diversification 
As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the Region is today producing three times more than in 1990, 
but agricultural production started picking up only from about 2000 – five years after 
RUDEP. 
 
Figure 2.1: Agricultural production, Rukwa Region, 1989/90 to 2005/06 
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*Traditional food crops include finger millet, cassava, sweet potato and sorghum  
Source: Regional Administrative Secretariat 
 
 
This statistical evidence was corroborated by many informants referring to the late 1990s as 
difficult times. The stagnation of public sector activities following the closure of RUDEP was 
part of the problem. 
                                                     
18 3E Economics (1993), p.ii. 
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Children in Kate village, Sumbawanga District,  
showing a healthy stock of sunflower 
 
 
 
 
 
It must be noted that the recent agricultural growth has been 
achieved without a similar growth in maize production.19 The 
production of beans, the other dominant food and cash crop on 
the Ufipa plateau, has also remained fairly stable, while other 
traditional crops (esp. finger millet, cassava and sweet 
potatoes) have increased in recent years. A possible 
explanation of the latter trend can be the new migrants settling 
in areas less suitable to maize and beans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Production of rice, potato and sunflower 1989/90 to 2005/06 
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Source: Regional Administrative Secretariat 
 
                                                     
19 It must be noted that agricultural statistics do not capture all production for the simple reason that there is no 
reliable reporting system. And figures are possibly even less reliable after the liberalisation of crop purchase from 
farmers. Also, the methods of computing production estimates vary over the years. 
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Another important development which has significantly contributed to the overall agricultural 
growth has been the introduction of new cash crops, especially rice, potato and sunflower. In 
Figure 2.2 we see that the production of all three crops starts picking up towards the end of 
the 1990s. As a result, the cropping pattern today is significantly more diversified compared 
to 15 years ago (see Figure 2.3). Today we can see healthy stocks of sunflower all over the 
Ufipa plateau. It is worth noting that RUDEP played an active role in promoting both 
sunflower and potatoes. However, the most important factors behind crop diversification and 
increased production are improved market access and population growth.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Crop diversity 1989/90 versus 2005/2006 
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Traditional food crops include finger millet, cassava, sweet potato and sorghum  
Source Figure 2.1-2.3: Regional Administrative Secretariat, Rukwa 
 
 
Private sector is picking up 
Another evidence of economic growth is trade in agricultural produce and agro-processing. 
Crops are exported to other parts of Tanzania and increasingly also to neighbouring countries. 
Significantly, is the increasing trade with the DRC using the Kasanga port. Prosperous 
businesses have developed based on retail trade, crop purchase and transport services, as 
evidenced by the more recent contributions to Sumbawanga’s “skyline” (see photo). Growth 
1989/90 
2005/06 
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in agricultural processing has been significant, and diesel powered flourmills and oil pressing 
machines are now found in many villages. 
 
 
 
The new office building of Malila’s Enterprise, 
also called Mipango, named after the owner’s 
background as planning officer (working with 
RUDEP) 
 
 
 
 
 
The former Regional Commissioner 
and current MP from Rukwa, Mr. 
Mzindakaya, has invested in a modern 
abattoir aiming at selling beef on the 
international market. The economic 
viability of the venture is however 
questioned by many. Interestingly, 
expatriate advisors working for this 
company now rent the staff houses 
once built for RUDEP expatriates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the “NORAD Compound” today  
 
Small scale mining is the second 
largest contributor to Rukwa’s 
economy, after agriculture. It is 
still all based on labour intensive 
methods, mostly digging shafts by 
hand. Gemstones are found in 
areas near Sumbawanga, and 
Mpanda has long been a centre of 
gold digging. The effects on the 
economy of the region are 
difficult to assess, since much of 
the incomes generated are not 
registered. One emerging local 
businessman – Mr. Kasiano – has 
cast his eyes on the coal deposits on the Rukwa valley escarpment. From the Namwele coal 
fields he has sold coal to Mbeya-based industries, and hopes to establish a coal-fired power 
plant in the future relieving the Region from its acute shortage of power.  
 
Finally, the most striking change in recent years is the communication revolution created by 
the rapid extension of the mobile phone network. In the 1980s, often unreliable telephone 
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landlines extended only to Sumbawanga and Mpanda towns and only very few had the 
privilege of access. Even in remote villages people today are connected to the mobile phone 
network and several companies compete for customers. The economic effects are not known, 
but the benefits to trade and transport are obvious. And obviously it reduces the sense of 
remoteness in Rukwa.  
 
 
 
 
Village phone card  
vendor in Mwimbi 
  
 
 
 
Rapid population growth 
Over the last 15 years, Rukwa Region has 
experienced a population growth exceeding the 
national average due to immigration (see Figure 
2.4). The growth rate from 1988 to 2002 was 3.6% 
annually compared to a national average of 2.9%. In 2008, the population is estimated to 
reach 1.4 million. Especially Sukuma pastoralists have moved into to the Katumba plains and 
Rukwa valley and are now also many on the Ufipa plateau.  
 
 
 
 
Namanyere hairdresser shop 
 
 
 
 
 
Rukwa is considered one of the few areas 
in Tanzania where agricultural land is still 
available. The population density was for a 
long time the lowest in Tanzania, but Lindi 
Region is now less densely populated. This 
growth is accompanied by an even higher 
urban growth, especially for Sumbawanga, 
straining public amenities such as drinking 
water, sewerage and electricity. Namanyere, the administrative centre of Nkasi District which 
was hardly more than a road crossing in the early 1980s, is now becoming town-like. 
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Figure 2.4: Population growth, Rukwa Region (‘000) 
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Source: Tanzania Bureau of Statistics 
 
 
Climatic change 
There is a perception of the weather getting drier. Whether this is a lasting trend is yet 
difficult to determine, but over the last decade there has been a drop in the ground water table 
in many areas, dry-land farming has shown declining yields per acre, and deforestation in 
low-land areas has escalated.  
2.3 Poverty not declining 
Poverty without food deficit 
Reliable measurements of poverty and the incidence of poverty are not available for the 
Region, since no extensive household and income expenditure surveys have been carried 
out.20 However, based on the 2002 Population and Housing Census and the 2001 Household 
Budget Survey it has been estimated that the percentage of households below a poverty line 
defined in terms of basic needs is somewhere in between 32 and 40% for Rukwa (taking 
account of standard errors in the statistical calculation). Rukwa is ranked 11 of 22 regions, 
where Dar es Salaam is at the top and Mara at the bottom.21 Other income based indices 
linked to food consumption confirm a picture that Rukwa in terms of income poverty today 
falls in the middle range among regions in Tanzania. The situation appears to be better in 
Sumbawanga District compared to Mpanda and Nkasi, with the latter as the worst.  
 
It is commonly agreed that living standard – or poverty – not only is a reflection of income. 
One also has to figure in factors such as health conditions and access to education. This was 
done when computing the so-called Human Development Index. In doing so, the Dar es 
Salaam based research institute ESRF found in 2000 that the situation in Rukwa was the 
worst in the country (see Table 2.1).22  
                                                     
20 The incidence of poverty (or poverty rate) is defined as the percentage of people with incomes and consumption 
levels that fall under a level defined as the basic needs poverty line. In 2000/01 this was set to be TShs 262 per 
adult equivalent per day.  
21 United Republic of Tanzania (2005).  
22 Taken from a presentation made in connection with presentation of the Poverty and Human Development Report 
2005, by the Director of ESRF, Prof. Amani. 
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Table 2.1: Human Development Index – regional comparison (2000) 
HDI 
rank 
 Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years) 
1988 
Adult 
literacy rate 
(% age 15 
and above) 
2000 
Combined 
primary, 
secondary and 
tertiary gross 
enrolment 
ratio (%) 
2000 
Mean 
monthly 
consumption 
expenditure 
per capita 
(000 Tsh) 
2000 
 TANZANIA 50 71 84.9 10.1 
1 Dar es Salaam 50 91 98.7 21.9 
2 Kilimanjaro 59 85 104.4 11.2 
10 Morogoro 46 72 87.2 10.0 
18 Lindi 47 58 67.6 9.5 
19 Shinyanga 50 55 68.0 8.0 
20 Rukwa 45 68 83.2 6.7 
Source: ESRF 
 
From the figures we see that Rukwa scores particularly low on the income variable 
(consumption per capita). If we reconcile this with the finding above on income poverty the 
picture that emerges from Rukwa is a region with fewer better-off people than most regions, 
but also fewer that are very poor compared to many regions. In other words, Rukwa is still a 
poorly developed economy, but food is generally available.  
 
Although there is no basis for drawing firm conclusions three trends over the last decade are 
evident: the economy has been growing in GDP terms although from a low level; poverty 
levels remain high; while extreme poverty linked to food deficit is low. There is evidence that 
access to social services improved remarkably for some time, but is showing a declining or 
stagnant trend over the last ten years, with the exception of education. Let us look at the latter 
a bit more in detail. 
 
Health situation improved but signs of stagnation  
Maternal and child care is generally considered a good indicator of the quality of a health care 
system. It is also an indication of the status and role of women in the society. In 1978, the 
region was recorded with the highest infant mortality rate in the country (170/100 compared 
to 137/100), but since then the gap to the national average has narrowed. 
 
Table 2.2: Health status and health service indicators, Rukwa vs. national (percentages) 
  1991 1996 2004 
Rukwa 46 46 37 Delivery at 
health facility 
 National 53 47 53 
Rukwa  35 29 Delivery assisted 
by nurse/trained 
midwife National  33 37 
Rukwa 32 30 39 
Delivery assisted 
by TBA 
National 13 18 19 
Rukwa 81 60 83 
Children with 
vaccination card 
National 78 77 79 
Source: Tanzania Demographic and Health Surveys 
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Tanzania has carried out three Demographic and Health Surveys that provide information at 
the regional level over time – from 1991 to 2004. The sample size from Rukwa is small and 
one should allow for a wide error margin when interpreting any trends. In Table 2.2 we have 
compared the figures for Rukwa with national averages. Certain features are worth 
mentioning.  
 
Firstly, there seems to have been no improvement in the access to health facilities over the 
last 15 years, which corresponds with observations in the field. In fact, the surveys suggest a 
declining trend from 1996 in the use of hospitals and health centres. Secondly, the coverage 
of health facilities in Rukwa is lower than the national average, which shows up in the 
important role played by traditional birth attendants (TBAs) in assisting deliveries.23 And 
thirdly, other reports indicate a major decline in infant mortality up until the mid-1990s24, and 
that the rate has stabilised at that level (or some informants suggested that it even has been 
rising).  
 
Deterioration in safe drinking water supply 
Available statistics show a marked improvement of water supply until 1995, when the 
situation gradually started to worsen (see Table 2.3). Since there is no systematic collection of 
data at the household level and record keeping when it comes to individual schemes is quite 
uneven, figures from different years may not be strictly comparable. But interviewees 
confirmed the same trend, and a water coverage of about 40% of households sounds like a 
realistic estimate today, as indicated by the Regional administration.   
 
Table 2.3: Percentage of households with piped or protected drinking water, Rukwa 
Region, 1974-2005 
 
 1974 1987 1994 2001 2005 
 
Rukwa 
 
5 18 7325 6326 4027 
National    55  
 
 
Major increase in school enrolment 
In 1978, the literacy rate in Rukwa was 49% and below the national average, with male 
literacy (66%) being above the national average, and female literacy (31%) below, which 
reflected a tradition where mainly boys were sent to schools (including several mission 
schools) and men engaged in labour migration which also contributed to literacy. Girls and 
women were much less exposed to the modern society. 
 
In Rukwa, similar to Tanzania as a whole, there was a positive effect of the abolition of 
school fees on primary school enrolment, with a peak in 2004 (see Figure 2.5). We do not 
have up to date enrolment rate estimates, but it has probably exceeded 90% of the school age 
population. However, there is an acute problem in that the councils are not able to provide 
enough qualified teachers or to upgrade the physical infrastructure. This contributes to an 
alarmingly high drop-out rate, especially in the many remote villages of the Region.  
                                                     
23 The main difference between Rukwa and the national average is that in Rukwa more traditional birth attendants 
(TBAs) assist in deliveries rather than only relatives. Rukwa has fewer deliveries assisted by a doctor. 
24 Mattle, E. Report prepared for RUDEP Impact Assessment Workshop, Kibaha, 16-17.11.2007.  
25 Figures for 1974,1987 and 1994 are taken from Rukwa Region Socioeconomic Profile 1998. 
26 Figures for 2001 have been taken from the 2001 Household Budget Survey. Rukwa ranks 5 of 20 regions. 
27 Information provided to the Team. 
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Figure 2.5: Net enrolment in primary school  
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Source: Regional Administrative Secretariat 
2.4 Public sector finances improving but local taxation down  
As we shall discuss below, NORAD did raise fundamental concerns about the Region’s aid 
dependency, and at a national level donors called for more attention to revenue generation. 
There was a suspicion that aid had the negative effect of reducing the incentive of 
Government to collect tax, and even for central Government not to prioritise a backward 
region like Rukwa – since Norway was there. What happened after NORAD pulled out?  
 
In Table 2.4 we present the budgets of the four local authorities in the Region from 1998/99 
onwards.28 Unfortunately, the figures for revenue collection and the development budgets in 
recent years are missing. There are three marked tendencies in these figures. Firstly, the 
recurrent expenditures – for personnel and administration – have steadily increased, financed 
through central government transfers. Secondly, the funds set aside for development 
investments are significantly less and have not increased. Finally, there has been no 
improvement in revenue collection. In fact, after the abolishment of the development levy in 
2003, being labelled a ‘nuisance tax’, local tax collection plummeted. Hence, the local 
authorities are less financially self-reliant than during the time of RUDEP. This is further 
illustrated by the figures for revenue collection in 1989 and 1990 (Table 2.5), which in real 
value by far exceed what was collected more than a decade later. 
 
Taking Sumbawanga District Council as an example, Figure 2.6 graphically presents the trend 
towards increasing dependency on central government transfers and inability to set aside 
funds for development investments. 
 
                                                     
28 Data from earlier years are not available. 
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Table 2.4: Local government authorities: budget figures  
1998/99-2006/07 (in million TShs)29 
 
  1998 
/99  
1999 
/00  
2000 
/01  
2001 
/02  
2002 
/03  
2003 
/04  
2004 
/05  
2005 
/06  
2006 
/07  
CG 729  751  1,092  1,153  1,475  1,680  2,031  2,178  3,261 
R 135  153  221  201  164  2  4  N/A  N/A  
Sumbawanga 
M.C 
DB 23  27  42  45  45  45  21  N/A  N/A  
CG 1,077  1,130  1,792  2,009  2,292  2,773 3,812  4,559  7,205  
R 227  207  239  227  152  3  7  N/A  N/A  
Sumbawanga 
D.C 
DB 16  22  42  50  60  60  61  N/A  N/A  
CG 579  621  1,034  1,206  1,389  1,716 2,484 2,684  4,105  
R 144  185  202  301  326  1 4  N/A  N/A  
Nkasi D.C 
DB 5  27  42  36  37  6 36  N/A  N/A  
CG 1,032  1,005  1,672 1,901  2,568  3,157  4,446  5,228  8,117  
R 278  356  400 778  380 3  9 N/A  N/A  
Mpanda D.C 
 
DB 19 24 50  54  49  62  74  N/A  N/A  
Legend: CG = Central Government grants; R = revenue collection; DB = development budget 
 
 
Table 2.5: Development levy and other revenue collected, Rukwa Region (in million 
TShs)30 
 
 1989 1990 
Sumbawanga Urban 22.4 12.9 
Sumbawanga Rural 21.4 26.0 
Nkansi 17.8 34.7 
Mpanda 32.7 30.9 
Total 94.3 104.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
29 Data obtained from Government Notice Board at www.repoa.go.tz.  
30 Manger et al (1990). 
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Figure 2.6: Sumbawanga District Council budget trends  
 
 
 
Although there has been significant improvement in central government transfers in recent 
years, still it remains a long way to go to get back to a level comparable to what NORAD 
provided through RUDEP. During the latter years of the programme an increasing share of 
RUDEP was channelled to the local authorities and was reported to be about 70% at the end – 
amounting to about USD 3 million annually. In comparison, total central government 
transfers (for recurrent as well as development costs) to the 4 local authorities in Rukwa in 
2006/07 amounted to about USD 17 million, of which only 1.5% (based on the 2004/5 
budget) was allocated to the development budget – or USD 260,000. This is one-tenth of the 
RUDEP contribution.  
2.5 Summary 
RUDEP was an episode in the history of the Region. It was borne as a product of 
development policy thinking of the Nyerere era in Tanzania; a strong state aiming at 
mobilising the grassroots. It was thrown into a whirlwind of drastic policy reversals, 
downplaying the role of the regional administration and the public sector more generally. This 
made NORAD reassess its role in Tanzania which led to RUDEP’s demise. Since then the 
regional economy has continued to grow, though not making a dent in the poverty situation, 
while public sector investments have declined.  
 
In the next two chapters we shall look in some more detail at the way RUDEP was managed 
and the experiences gained with respect to the various principles and ideas influencing the 
approach (Chapter 3). And we shall briefly present what the programme did in key sectors 
and how the status is today (Chapter 4).  
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3. The RUDEP approach 
3.1 The ideas 
The concept of ‘basic needs’ strongly influenced development aid policies during the 1970s. 
The idea that all citizens, irrespective of economic status, socio-cultural background and 
location, should be entitled to a minimum level of basic services in health, education and 
drinking water, prompted Norway’s decision to select some of the most backward regions in 
Tanzania – Rukwa and Kigoma – as priority areas for development assistance. In 1979, a 3-
year study of drinking water resources in Rukwa and Kigoma commenced with funding from 
NORAD, resulting in comprehensive Regional Water Master Plans. This lead to the start, in 
1983, of a Water Supply and Sanitation Project (labelled TAN055 in NORAD’s budgets) in 
the two regions aiming at supplying all villages with safe potable water according to standards 
set by WHO (i.e. within a distance of 400 metres for every household).  
 
The concept of integrated projects became an important element in the policy of NORAD 
shortly thereafter. It was generally believed that integrated, multi-sectoral projects had a 
greater ability to meet popular demands and to stimulate people’s own development efforts. 
Furthermore, positive experiences in Sri Lanka convinced key policy makers in NORAD of 
the virtues of a flexible learning-by-doing approach working from within the existing public 
sector, refraining from setting up so-called ’aid islands’. While Tanzania was working on a 
model of teaming up its regions with main donors, each sponsoring a regional programme, 
Norway responded positively in favour of Rukwa and Kigoma. However, there was much 
scepticism in NORAD to embark on an ambitious regional investment plan along the lines of 
World Bank and others following typical five-year blue prints.  
 
The planning mission engaged by NORAD in 1984 supported the idea of a regional 
programme, but emphasised the need for a gradual building-up, reflected in the following 
recommendations:31 
- that Norway should be prepared for a long-term involvement; 
- that the programme should start small and gradually build up with a strong personnel 
component; 
- that the programme be integrated in the regional administration; 
- that it should be flexible in terms of implementing partners (public and NGOs) and 
sectors; and  
- that it should be based on a model of revolving planning as opposed to a comprehensive 
development plan for the area. 
 
It took until September 1985 to sign the agreement on what became RUDEP – Rukwa 
Integrated Rural Development Programme (TAN060 in NORAD’s budgets). RUDEP 
formally commenced operations on 1st July 1986. The objectives outlined in the agreement 
were fairly general, emphasising capacity building, raising of living standards, people’s 
involvement and sustainability of investments. The basic concepts outlined in the planning 
study were reiterated. There was a particular reference to improving the conditions for women 
and children, reflecting that the Norwegian government had just approved a strategy for 
women in development. The Regional Development Director’s Office would be responsible 
for managing the programme through the Regional Economic Affairs Department (READ).32  
 
                                                     
31 Eriksen J. et al (1984). 
32 This office was called the Regional Planning Office (and referred to as Mipango) at the time of signing the 
agreement. 
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We see that the two NORAD projects in the region were modelled on rather distinct 
approaches. The water project was based on a ’blue-print’ – a water master plan – and 
implemented by an independent project organisation managed by a Norwegian consultancy 
firm (Norconsult), while RUDEP emphasised process planning and integration in the 
Tanzanian public administration. This was soon considered to be unsustainable and a decision 
was made to incorporate the water project in RUDEP as from July 1988.  
3.2 Principles facing the reality 
The decision memo prepared by NORAD in December 1984 summarises the principles of 
RUDEP in the following main points:33 
• A multi-sectoral programme aiming to enhance the living standard through increased 
food production. 
• A process planning approach with a flexibility to initiate activities in response to 
bottlenecks identified on the way, based on work plans to be approved by NORAD on 
an annual basis, formalised in minutes of Annual Meetings. 
• The programme shall to the extent possible be integrated within the local 
administration. 
• Enhanced popular participation in planning and implementation is a goal. 
• Start modest, with a 5-year commitment totalling NOK 45 million, with the 
understanding that the programme will continue much longer and that additional 
resources can be added if capacity allows. 
 
Multi-sectoral: but where to draw the line? 
The programme was organised into projects and activities. A project was conceived of as a set 
of activities with a specific common goal and often without a specific duration, while an 
activity was the budgeting unit. The start of RUDEP was characterised by seeking 
engagement in several sectors at the same time, to gain experience from working with 
different government institutions and to build a platform for a multi-sectoral approach. It was 
deliberately spreading widely and thinly.  
 
But already at the first Annual Meeting in 1987 the following constraints were reported: the 
implementation capacity of key departments was limited, and there was an inclination to view 
donor financed projects as somewhat independent from the rest of the departmental work. 
 
From a modest beginning in 1986 with activities in forestry, agriculture and regional 
development planning RUDEP soon expanded into most sectors, and a concept of five 
programme areas was developed. At the time of signing the Phase II agreement in 1991 these 
were labelled: Improvement of Health by Preventive Measures, Natural Resources 
Development, Infrastructure, Local Level Development through Participatory Planning, and 
Economic Production and Small-Scale Industry. The annual budget had reached 
approximately NOK 20 million. It was made up of a wide ranging set of projects; in 1994/95 
RUDEP had 24 projects involving 93 separate activities. For some the budgets were rather 
small, but the sheer number indicates the complexity of the programme.  
 
The fact that RUDEP had no clearly defined boundaries in terms of sectors, development 
themes and geographical focus soon led to a pressure for incorporating more and more. This 
pressure did not only come from the recipient end, also constituencies within NORAD exerted 
their influence. One of the most vocal was the ‘women in development’ lobby. The RUDEP 
managers were constantly reminded, and rightfully so, of the need to more effectively involve 
women and address women’s needs.  
 
                                                     
33 Project Document (in Norwegian) dated 13.12.1984. 
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Within the region, the first pressure was to ensure more equal spreading of the benefits on all 
districts. The second was to include new sectors, in particular the education sector that had 
been ruled out at the beginning. Initially, RUDEP concentrated on Sumbawanga District to 
maximize impact, but this was not politically acceptable in the long run. The Area 
Development approach (see below), concentrating resources in one Division, was also 
criticised from this perspective. But in hindsight, we see that this approach made sense in 
terms of impact. It also facilitated better sectoral cooperation.  
 
There was a need to draw a practical boundary around RUDEP and its activities. “Someone 
must be able to say what is included and what is not part of RUDEP.” The programme was 
perceived of as having a special role “being able to bridge the gap between the Regional, the 
Districts, and villages, thereby reaching the rural poor in a direct and coordinated way”34. 
How to reconcile the quest for a special role with the never ending demands from the 
government sector for what was tantamount to general budget support? There is no doubt that 
RUDEP represented a catalyst of new types of activities and not merely responded to requests 
from within the system. But it is fair to say that riding both horses simultaneously proved 
difficult. It neither satisfied those on the Norwegian side who wanted to see more of the 
special role, nor those who dreamt of a strengthened government system in general.   
 
Process: an end in itself or at the expense of results? 
The organisational structure and mode of operation of RUDEP became a major issue during 
the initial years. It was indeed learning by doing, but characterised by little engagement from 
regional authorities. This illustrated a common problem in Tanzania’s aid dependent public 
sector: reluctance among senior officers to assume ownership and the responsibility for using 
aid that goes with it, while donor representatives were reluctant to let go of their control not 
really trusting the recipient institutions. To overcome this double hindrance would at best take 
time, but it turned out that time was not on RUDEP’s side. 
 
Two years into the programme NORAD underscored the need to be patient, and to accept that 
it will be a slow process to build up the required capacity in key departments to expand 
activities. NORAD reluctantly accepted that Tanzanian staff could be paid by the programme, 
but “subject to the conditions that the number is small, that the personnel is not available from 
GOT, that the contract period does not exceed 1-2 years, and that GOT seeks solutions to take 
over the responsibilities after the contract period expires”35. To attract qualified staff and 
provide incentives to officers in key departments RUDEP financed housing for key Tanzanian 
personnel, and substantial resources were spent on various forms of staff training, including 
studies outside Tanzania. Offices of key departments (READ, Natural Resources, Health, and 
Water36) were rehabilitated and equipped. 
 
In a report from the 1988 Annual Meeting NORAD observed that expenditures during the 
first 1.5 years were under one-fifth of the approved amount for the Phase I period of four 
years, that 70 percent had been used for administration, transport and support infrastructure, 
and that there were few tangible impacts of the programme. Nevertheless, NORAD warned 
against exerting pressure for higher expenditure and more visible outputs, and stated that the 
start-up of RUDEP was on the right track and was promising.37 
 
At the end of the first phase the Region reiterated that the thrust of RUDEP’s philosophy was 
institutional strengthening: 
                                                     
34 READ. RUDEP Annual Report 1990/91. Sumbawanga October 1991, p. 20. 
35 Agreed Minutes from 1st Annual Meeting on RUDEP, 27.3.1987. 
36 We sometimes refer to departments by their colloquial Kiswahili name: Maliasili (Natural Resources), Afya 
(Health), Maji (Water), Kilimo (Agriculture), Ujenzi (Works), Elimu (Education) and Maendeleo (Community 
Development). 
37 Draft memo from Annual Meeting, dated 25.2.1988. 
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“the purpose being to establish an enabling framework for support and 
assistance to Regional and District Administration in order to enable them to 
be more effective in planning, implementing and managing development 
activities. At its heart RUDEP was process oriented rather than output 
oriented. The aim was to influence complex institutional processes “rather 
than mainly achievements of physical targets within fixed financial 
allocations”38.  
 
What matters most: getting results fast or getting there at the local pace? What is more 
sustainable? There is no simple answer to this dilemma. The dilemma is equally present in the 
aid debate of today, with an increasing number of vertical crash programmes being promoted 
– e.g. for vaccination. As we will argue below, the water supplies installed by the Water 
Project (before and during RUDEP) have been remarkably resilient in a situation where 
Government failed to follow-up on maintenance. It shows that quality of implementation in 
the long run matters more than merely adhering to bureaucratic procedures.  
 
Within the local administration: but hard to get in 
The first RUDEP Coordinator aired his frustrations with the integration process in a memo to 
the 1987 Review Mission. Attitudes both on the donor and the recipient side made integration 
an uphill battle, he argued:39 
• The accounts had been kept separate, although disbursement and payment procedures 
resembled the government ones. 
• Procurement had been outside the government system. 
• NORAD had employed a RUDEP Coordinator working within the Regional 
Economic Affairs Department, but he had no formal position in the government 
system. Still, he was entrusted with a lot of informal powers, being some sort of 
NORAD-representative in the Region. “The position is an artefact”. 
• There was a tendency that expatriates, primarily recruited as advisors, in reality 
functioned as managers and main decision makers. 
• Experience had shown that many senior government officers clearly distinguished 
between government projects and RUDEP-projects, and that they felt less responsible 
for the latter: “what RUDEP is funding, RUDEP should also be responsible for”. 
• The RUDEP Annual Plans had not received the attention envisaged in higher 
government and political fora when the agreement with NORAD was signed.  
 
The challenges of making RUDEP an integral part of the Tanzanian government system were 
clearly demonstrated with the decision to incorporate the Water Project. It meant redirecting 
an excessively ‘import dependent’ project from procurement in Norway through a private 
company – Norconsult – to using government regulations and more procurement in-country. 
It meant removal of allowances in excess of Government rates. And understandably it caused 
resentment and declining morale.  
 
In 1991, RUDEP reflected on its achievements as an integrated programme, not in the sense 
of working across sectors, but in being operated as a genuine Government programme. 
“RUDEP has in many ways taken on an existence of its own and is perceived as an institution 
in its own right”, it was admitted.40 In certain sensible areas RUDEP had deliberately been set 
up with parallel structures: for financial control and accounting, for procurement and stores, 
and for management and maintenance of vehicles. But RUDEP projects were part of the 
Regional budget, approved by Parliament; implementation was done using only government 
departments; the Regional Development Director was in overall control; and all allowances, 
salaries etc. followed those of the Government.  
                                                     
38 READ, RUDEP Annual Report 1991/92.  
39 Taken from a memo dated 15.11.1987, signed by the RUDEP Coordinator. 
40 READ. RUDEP Annual Report 1990/91. Sumbawanga October 1991. 
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An independent study of the RUDEP-approach in 1994 concluded that “regional heads [of 
departments] felt strongly that integration was a fact on the regional level whereas district 
heads [of departments] denied that RUDEP was integrated at the district level.”41 
 
Within the local administration: but who pulled the strings? 
The objective of making RUDEP an integral part of the regional development plan and budget 
posed several challenges. One was synchronising NORAD’s approval process with that of the 
Tanzanian budget process. It was decided that NORAD first gave its approval in principle to 
proposals put forward by the Region, which were then later tabled for the approval of the 
Regional Development Committee. This was later criticised as weakening the influence of 
politicians on RUDEP, since they discussed RUDEP projects only at a time when the regional 
planners and NORAD had struck a deal, so to speak.  
 
Another dilemma concerned the line of authority between RUDEP project officers in various 
departments and the RUDEP administration. It was agreed (in the first Annual Meeting, 1987) 
that project officers were to be directly responsible to READ for matters relating to physical 
and financial management. For personnel issues the Project Officer was to report to the Head 
of Department. This implied bypassing heads of departments, which obviously created 
resentment, but was then seen as a necessary measure to strengthen implementation and 
accountability. Many heads of departments, rightly or wrongly, were initially perceived as 
stumbling blocks and there was a fear of undue interference in project activities especially 
concerning use of vehicles. In the later years of RUDEP, department heads were more 
formally made responsible for RUDEP funds.  
 
This serves to illustrate how RUDEP had to compromise between the objectives of working 
entirely within the government system, on the one hand, and establish more effective control 
mechanisms and lines of command to achieve results on the ground, on the other hand. This 
led to much power being held at the Regional Economic Affairs Department.  
 
With the local administration: though not without Norwegian influence 
Based on Norway’s experiences in Sri Lanka the rural development stalwarts in NORAD 
envisaged a role of Norway in influencing RUDEP based primarily on close informal 
dialogue and formal response to initiatives coming from the Region. The dynamics in 
Tanzania turned out differently. First of all, the Regional authorities were rather passive, and 
much was left to the expatriates in the programme to give it shape and direction. The capacity 
of NORAD’s office in Dar es Salaam to follow events in remote Rukwa was also limited.  
 
Increasingly, NORAD made use of review missions as a means to push its various agendas. In 
principle, these were joint missions in the sense that representatives from Tanzanian 
government institutions participated. Some reviews looked at RUDEP as a whole, while 
others had a sector view. Common to all, was that the Region did not participate and often 
complained about the lack of involvement. The teams spent little time in the Region, and 
often had members not familiar to the Region. Conclusions were greatly influenced by signals 
delivered by NORAD or certain preconceived ideas about problems in the Region or 
Tanzania in general. Several of the reviews were criticized for poor quality. The 1991 “Roads 
Review”, for instance, received the assessment from the Region as “’lightweight’ containing 
no detailed argument or discussion on any subject”.42 This extensive use of short-term 
missions to inform the dialogue with the recipient has been a common feature in development 
aid. In the case of RUDEP it rarely added quality to the planning process. To NORAD, 
however, these missions were useful carriers of policy messages.  
 
                                                     
41 Shio, L., O. Smukkestad and B. Mrina (1994), p.67. 
42 Clapham, M.R. ’Comments re Roads Review Mission Dec 1991. 24.6.1992. 
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Another means whereby NORAD sought to engage in a policy dialogue was through 
requesting the Region to prepare sector policy documents. Although RUDEP started on a 
platform of ‘learning by doing’, NORAD justifiably felt a need for clearer policy direction 
and distillation of lessons in key sectors, such as agriculture, community development, 
women in development, water, roads, education, and health. In an internal memo NORAD 
complemented the Region for these ‘policy papers’, and reminded itself that NORAD ought 
to continue the practice “not to demand that the documents are being submitted for NORAD’s 
approval”43. Still, there were frequent disappointments with the quality. Commenting on the 
draft “Water Policy” NORAD, in an internal memo, states that: “the document is a big 
disappointment, not only because it does not provide a framework for decisions, but most of 
all because it seems to reflect a work process without consultation and cooperation”44.  
 
However, two fundamental realities in Tanzania made this dialogue approach not having a 
real impact: a long tradition of top-down centralised policy-making had left the regions with 
no clout or identity as policy makers; and in general there was a widespread apathy when it 
came to polices – as nice to have on paper but not something one needed to follow. From the 
Region, the inclination was to see these documents as fulfilling aid conditionality and did not 
reflect locally embedded political processes. Besides, the political role of the Region, after the 
local government reform of 1984, had been substantially weakened. NORAD wanted to 
elevate its dialogue with Rukwa Region from particularities of small RUDEP activities to 
strategies for development but did not achieve much. This experience, amplified by the new 
aid paradigms of the 1990s emphasising policy dialogue at central level, was another nail in 
the RUDEP coffin.  
 
Within the local administration: but was RUDEP perceived as a Norwegian or a 
Tanzanian programme? 
Officially, RUDEP was of course Tanzanian, but it was an issue whether it would be regarded 
only as a mechanism to handle Norwegian aid to the Region, a particular development 
programme aiming at seeking funding from all possible sources, or even more ambitiously a 
regional mechanism for handling aid to the region in a broad sense. In 1987, the RUDEP 
management put forward the latter argument. “By its development philosophy and its position 
within the government set-up, it should be a natural responsibility for RUDEP … to assist the 
READ to properly coordinate and monitor donor funded projects, in addition to the locally 
funded”45. By virtue of being part and parcel of the Regional Development Directorate this 
was viewed as an appropriate role.  
 
Several other aid agencies showed an interest in Rukwa at the time. In 1991, close to 20 other 
donors provided funding to projects in the Region mostly managed from Dar es Salaam with 
little cooperation with regional or district administrations.46 Only German GTZ and UNHCR 
operated project offices in Rukwa – the latter at the refugee settlements in Mpanda for 
Burundian refugees (i.e. Katumba and Mishamo). The expatriate RUDEP Coordinators, 
probably more than their Tanzanian bosses and colleagues, argued the need for aid 
harmonisation and coordination at the regional level. Heads of sector departments, however, 
for most part did not share this view and preferred the opportunity to handle potential donors 
separately. There was an instance where the Regional Agricultural Department tried to get 
funding from three different donors (one being NORAD through RUDEP) for basically the 
same activity – production of ox-carts – without any attempt to coordinate the three.  
 
The Region had some success in making RUDEP more than aid from Norway, through for 
instance the involvement of ILO in the road projects and the use of American (US Peace 
                                                     
43 Memo from NORAD HQ to NORAD-Dar es Salaam re Annual Meeting 1993, 18.2.1993 (in Norwegian). 
44 Memo form Health Section, NORAD HQ, 26.2.1993 (in Norwegian). 
45 RUDEP Annual Report 1987-1988, Preface. 
46 Naustdalslid, J. and B. Aasen (1995), p.37. 
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Corps) and British (VSO) volunteers. In the RUDEP Annual Report 1988-89 it is stated in no 
uncertain terms “that RUDEP is not an entity in its own right, nor is it an organisation for the 
disbursement of NORAD funds. It is a development programme for Rukwa Region”.47 Still, 
when Norway pulled out in 1996, this became immediately also the end of RUDEP. The 
attempts to establish RUDEP as a programme or mechanism that could survive a Norwegian 
withdrawal had failed.  
 
 
 
Former RUDEP expatriate remembering  
old days by the swimming pool 
 
 
 
 
 
Within the local administration: and the 
struggle for qualified manpower 
Capacity building was a major challenge 
from the start: “It is very important in the 
time ahead not to let the programme’s 
activities grow faster than the development 
of local capacity to manage the work 
tasks.”48 However, as it had been for the 
Water Project, it turned out to be difficult to 
wait for the government to bring the 
required qualified manpower to the region. 
It was in short supply nationally, and 
Sumbawanga was not at all an attractive 
posting. As RUDEP expanded, it had to 
bring in qualified manpower through expatriates or Tanzanians on project contracts, 
especially in engineering and financial management.  
 
In 1987, the RUDEP Coordinator and the Regional Planning Officer requested NORAD to 
approve direct employment by RUDEP. “We are constantly facing a dilemma, having to 
choose between direct employment or not getting any competent staff”49. 
 
At the end of Phase I there were 14 expatriates working with RUDEP, recruited through five 
different organisations, including Norwegian Volunteers and US Peace Corps (three positions 
in total). The costs amounted to about 30% of NORAD’s allocation to RUDEP (1990). This 
was considered too high by NORAD and it was arguing for a reduction. This argument, 
however, was not linked to careful assessment of the effectiveness of the technical assistance 
or whether the availability of qualified Tanzanians made expatriates superfluous. It was a 
combination of a cost issue and the desire to see a natural evolution towards “tanzanizing” the 
programme.  
 
In line with the capacity building philosophy of RUDEP major efforts were taken to get 
qualified Tanzanians to work in the region, as well as to invest in training. Although a number 
of key project officers decided to stay on and worked for RUDEP to its end (in planning, 
forestry, health and community development), the problems were acute especially with 
engineers. They were in high demand and did not stay for long in the programme.  
 
                                                     
47 READ, RUDEP Annual Report 1988-1989, November 1989. 
48 From Memo (in Norwegian) prepared by NORAD, 9.10.1986.  
49 Letter from RUDEP to the Norwegian Embassy, 27.2.1987. 
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Within the local administration: financial accountability a constant problem 
It was clearly stated in the 1987 Annual Report that “one shall avoid creating new institutions 
solely for the purpose of implementing RUDEP activities, even where this in the short run 
may prove to be more efficient”. Nevertheless, within the Regional Economic Affairs 
Department a separate RUDEP Finance Unit was established with personnel seconded from 
the Regional Accounts Office. And soon NORAD saw the need for an expatriate as the head 
of the unit. The RUDEP Finance Controller was the last expatriate position to be terminated 
when RUDEP was closing. In 1988, NORAD asked for an external audit of the programme, 
since the Government Audit was unable to meet the 18 months deadline set by Norway for 
audited accounts, and several followed later.  
 
The Tanzanian public sector suffered, and still suffers today, from a well established culture 
accepting misuse of funds and vehicles and poor monitoring of results. There is a general 
perception that this is unavoidable and excusable in a system where people are paid salaries 
that do not keep pace with rising living costs. RUDEP was a honey pot that many wanted to 
taste. The initial response of RUDEP was to control all payments centrally through the 
Finance Unit. With the growth of the programme, not least after the incorporation of the 
Water Project, the Unit handled more transactions than the rest of the Regional Accounts 
Office, and it soon became a bottleneck. The Region therefore proposed at the end of 1988 to 
strengthen the Unit with personnel hired from a private auditing company (Coopers & 
Lybrand) admitting that “RUDEP is facing severe constraints in its administrative capacity to 
handle accounts, financial monitoring, procurement and transport. Constraints in these areas 
are already causing delays to project implementation. Besides, there is inadequate monitoring 
of expenditures and physical progress”50. 
 
There was a perception that leakages in the programme were growing, and NORAD had the 
following complaint minuted in 1989: “Physical progress is not in accordance with financial 
expenditures. The Water Projects appear to be the worst performers in this regard”51. 
Inadequate financial control remained a problem throughout and in one instance NORAD 
decided to hold back funding (see more below). 
 
Participation: did the bottom come up or only the top come down? 
The kind of development approach that was promoted for RUDEP reflected new thinking 
internationally about rural development, advocating a bottom-up and participatory approach 
in contrast to large schemes planned from above. One of the most influential writers during 
1980s was Robert Chambers with the book Rural Development: Putting the Last First.52 The 
quest for grassroots-type planning was further strengthened by critiques of blueprint planning, 
advocating that rural development programmes had to adopt a flexible learning-by-doing 
approach, using the term process planning, and design programmes like experiments where 
ideas are tested and modified through practical implementation.53 
 
To institute this way of thinking in Tanzania at the time, and not least in Rukwa, was a 
formidable challenge. The so-called grassroots were not at all prepared, having the top-down 
villagisation process fresh in their memory. The government planning system, likewise, had 
become a ritual where plans where written up by civil servants and forwarded to central 
government without any involvement of beneficiaries or their representatives. Many projects 
appearing in the Regions development plan did not even exist. It was merely an exercise to 
secure some central government funds that were subsequently diverted to cover 
administrative costs, especially travels.  
                                                     
50 Letter from RUDEP to NORAD Dar es Salaam, 17.12.1988. 
51 Agreed Minutes from 3rd Annual Meeting on RUDEP, 1.3.1989. 
52 Chambers (1984). 
53 Korten (1980) and Rondinelli (1984). 
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The bottom-up approach of RUDEP became linked to the Community Development 
Department (Maendeleo ya Jamii). This was probably the obvious connection, but one 
problem emerged. The role of Maendeleo in the government departmental structure was far 
from settled. One would assume that it was to become a facilitator assisting conventional line 
departments in their relations with local communities. In stead, Maendeleo tried to build their 
own portfolio of small scale projects for which they controlled the implementation.  
 
RUDEP pushed for the facilitator role of Maendeleo. There were frequent reiterations of the 
need to make community participation an integral part of all RUDEP activities, being it water 
supply, roads, tree planting or primary health care. It started with water supply, but it was 
soon evident that inter-departmental cooperation was looked upon with suspicion. Maendeleo 
officers were assigned to Maji (Water Department) and Afya (Health Department), but 
complained about not being properly included.  
 
However, cooperation became easier when there was genuine interaction in the field. This 
was one important reason behind the idea of Area Development Projects with a focus on one 
division only. Maendeleo was given the key role in managing this approach, and received 
considerable capacity development support through RUDEP including expatriate advisors. 
Could sector integration and people’s participation be better achieved at a lower level, 
removed from the segmented bureaucracy in Sumbawanga? The answer is yes, but the price 
tag was high. In Section 4.4 the Mwimbi Area Development programme is discussed in more 
detail. 
 
A complete turnaround in the approach to community involvement took place during the time 
of RUDEP, partly based on experiences on the ground but mainly facilitated by the wave of 
democratisation hitting the continent following the end of the Cold War. The supply driven 
approach from the heydays of “African socialism” had lost its credibility, and the answer was 
democratic decentralisation. ‘Let people decide themselves what they need and place their 
demands to government’. This shift in mindset represented a formidable challenge to 
government workers who had been trained to teach people what to do. This applied to 
Maendeleo staff as well. Gradually, application-based approaches were introduced – in the 
Mwimbi project itself, with a new mechanism labelled District Development Funds, and also 
in village water supply. Once people realised that their applications actually triggered a 
response by government (i.e. RUDEP) community and group mobilisation were greatly 
encouraged.  
 
Within the local administration: Is rural development conditioned on 4-wheel drive 
vehicles? 
Seeing expensive vehicles parked next to a village meeting engaged in participatory planning 
is to most a contradiction in terms. Is it not possible to kick start community development 
efforts without the heavy costs of bringing in government officers from afar, not to speak of 
advisors from Norway?  
 
Transport was a major issue in RUDEP, and the requests for vehicles were virtually 
unlimited. The Water Project had been well equipped with vehicles from the start, which was 
unavoidable given the aim to cover the whole region – twice the size of Denmark. 
Furthermore, the expansion into new sectors had to be matched with increasing the pool of 
cars, which reached about 80 vehicles at its peak. Costs of transport constituted a major 
component of the RUDEP budget, not least because of high running and maintenance costs 
due to bad road conditions and a major problem of unauthorised use of vehicles for non-
RUDEP departmental work or for personal benefit. At the 1989 Annual Meeting NORAD 
stated that “the proportion of the budget absorbed by transport had risen to unacceptable 
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heights”54. In 1991, the Region argued against the claim that transport cost had become too 
high, and that it warranted a freeze in purchase of new vehicles. It was reported that the 
proportion of the budget allocated to transport fell from 33% in 1988-89 to 18% in 1991-92, 
and the Region maintained that the conditions in Rukwa more than justified this level of 
transport costs in the Programme.55  
 
 
The truck once used by RUDEP to ferry 
goods from Dar es Salaam – now used by 
Tanroads 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not a surprise that transport 
was a major consumer of funds 
given the remoteness of the 
region, its size and the lack of 
private transport services, but the 
RUDEP administration never 
succeeded in effectively curbing 
the misuse of vehicles for private 
gain despite elaborate transport management procedures and strict regulations. And this 
problem became a major factor explaining NORAD’s growing disenchantment with RUDEP.  
 
One study speculated that the sizeable car pool and impact of subsidised transport in the 
private market made it “practically impossible for any private initiative to establish a 
commercial transportation company”56. The same concern was raised by RUDEP in a meeting 
with NORAD in 1989 – “private companies are scarce in Rukwa because the numerous 
RUDEP cars seem to cover much of the transport needs and at a much lower price than what 
private companies can operate at”57. Whereas this might have been a possible effect, it was 
probably off-set by overall growth in the economy stimulated by RUDEP. A number of 
transport related companies – bus services, contractors and small traders – started growing 
during RUDEP.  
 
In retrospect, one needs to ask whether it would have been possible to develop a programme 
with the objective of RUDEP with less reliance on motorized transport. This would have 
required more decentralised operations and capacity at district and lower levels to 
independently manage project implementation. The capacity was indeed weak, but also the 
resistance towards delegation and devolution of powers was a major obstacle. Once 
established as a programme managed by the regional administration, regional departments 
tended to cling on to RUDEP resources. It would have required strong political will among 
leaders to minimise the use of transport. To the contrary, all leaders craved for more transport, 
and for valid reasons. Reducing the RUDEP car pool would have required more use of private 
sector contractors. Such companies, however, with the required capacity, were not available 
during most of the RUDEP period.  
 
The RUDEP managers tried to shift as much of the procurement as possible to Tanzanian 
suppliers and Rukwa based suppliers. This is illustrated by the share of so-called C-funds in 
the budget. C-funds constituted expenditures in Tanzanian Shillings and was channelled 
                                                     
54 Agreed Minutes 3rd Annual Meeting, 1.3.1989. 
55 5th Annual Meeting, 3 March 1991. Agreed Minutes.  
56 3-E (1993), p. 5-12. 
57 NORAD, Dar es Salaam, Travel report from visit to Rukwa 1-25 November 1989. 
CMI REPORT RUKWA RUKA R 2009: 12 
 
 34 
through the state budget, while D-funds involved payments for goods and services made in 
foreign currency directly paid by NORAD. In 1986/87, C-funds constituted 30 percent. This 
share increased considerably and reached 70 percent in 1992/93 and as much as 87 percent in 
1994/95 (see Table 4.1).   
 
Today, the context is different. A RUDEP-type programme can now rely more on contracting 
out services on a competitive basis. But the most important change since the time of RUDEP 
is the mobile telephone network. Supervision of and communication with project sites were 
only possible through physical travelling during the days of RUDEP, while today much can 
be done by mobile phone.  
 
Learning by doing: Drawing lessons from Phase I in search for an amended approach 
The discussions prior to signing of a second phase agreement illustrate well the mood within 
NORAD and the Region. At the end of 1989, the message from NORAD is to stay on course, 
but to consolidate. “The size and scope of the programme should not be much expanded in the 
next phase”.58 No further expansion, but a slight opening for the education sector was 
indicated. But when getting into specifics, NORAD’s ambitions sum up to a lot more than 
consolidation: more equal distribution of activities to all districts; women’s participation to be 
increased; activities within agriculture and forestry to receive continued attention; health 
sector activities to be strengthened; and ways of supporting economic activities to be 
explored. While consolidation probably was the most sensible approach, the discussion shows 
how difficult this is in an aid relationship, and how difficult it is to be patient when both sides 
want to achieve a lot in a short term. The Region wanted as much aid as possible, and various 
quarters within NORAD all wanted a little say in what RUDEP did. Frequent rotation of staff 
further contributed to this pressure. 
 
Nevertheless, NORAD HQs asked for an overall review of the approach of RUDEP before it 
was ready to approve a second phase, necessitating postponing the decision one year. This 
was probably the first sign of mounting scepticism. Hence, the main objective of the 1990 
RUDEP Review Team was “to carry out a review of the strategy followed by RUDEP”.  
 
The 1990 Review concluded that “given the constraints facing RUDEP in its present form the 
mission calls for starting a process that over time may loosen ties with the regional 
administration and which will provide NORAD with more than one channel through which 
development funds can be forwarded”.59 In its response, the Region challenged the inclination 
to introduce change “for its own sake”. Is there any evidence, it argued, that the new channels 
proposed (i.e. local governments, NGOs and private sector) represented more effective 
alternatives. “In terms of penetration, distribution and participation the Government offers the 
only possibility of access to services for the bulk of the Region’s population”. Furthermore, it 
dismissed the argument in the report that what NORAD financed through RUDEP was likely 
not to be sustainable in the long-run. If sustainability is interpreted financially, “the question 
cannot be solved in Rukwa”. “It should be stressed that the Region endorses the Report’s call 
for greater impact. Where the Region would express doubt is over sustainability. The Report 
does not make it clear what is meant by this”60.  
 
This disagreement amply illustrates fundamental dilemmas in any aid relationship; how the 
ideas of sustainability vs. process vs. output pull in different directions. RUDEP was clearly 
caught in the middle of these forces of ideas (see Figure 3.1 below).  
 
 
                                                     
58 Letter from NORAD to RUDEP Coordinator, 25.10.89. 
59 Manger et al (1990). p. x. 
60 Letter to NORAD from Regional Development Director and RUDEP Coordinator, 26.1.1990. 
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Figure 3.1: Diverging orientation in aid relationships 
 
 
 
 
The Water Project was clearly output oriented. With RUDEP this was replaced by process 
orientation. Coming 1990, however, concerns were raised whether RUDEP investments could 
be maintained without continued infusion of Norwegian aid. NORAD acknowledged that the 
Region’s planning and implementation capacity had increased significantly during the initial 
years of RUDEP, but the 1990 Review Mission articulated a view increasingly shared by 
many: “Government officers appear to have been the primary beneficiaries from the 
assistance and the time when Tanzanians can take over seems remote”61.  
 
 
From the 1991 Annual Meeting  
held in Sumbawanga 
 
 
 
 
 
At the 1991 Annual Meeting 
NORAD affirmed its call for “more 
emphasis to be given to the District 
level”. This would have to be a 
guiding principle in a second phase 
of the programme. The Phase II Document prepared by the Region distanced RUDEP even 
further from the Regional Administration: “It is learned that Government through the regional 
administration cannot effectively implement the program….The private sector and Non 
Governmental organizations are going to be the main implementers of the program”.62 This 
represented a major shift in emphasis, probably also facilitated by the change of Coordinator 
at the same time. Furthermore, the document introduced another donor-fashion at the time, 
namely Logical Framework Analysis, as a means to improve project planning. RUDEP was 
told to bias its investments towards agriculture and the small-scale industrial production, at 
the expense of social services, but little was said in the Document about how to make this 
turn-around.  
                                                     
61 Manger et al (1990), p.vii. 
62 READ. The RUDEP Document for Phase II. Sumbawanga, April 1991 
Sustainability orientation:  
Reducing aid dependency 
as soon as possible  
Process orientation: 
Building institutional 
capacity for development 
first 
Output orientation: 
Achieving tangible 
impact as fast as 
possible  
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NORAD approved at the end of 1991 NOK 100 million to a second phase (4 years). 
According to the agreement, “the Regional Development Directors Office, Rukwa, shall 
together with the respective District authorities be responsible for the planning and 
implementation of the programme on the local level”.63 The reference to District authorities 
was the only difference introduced compared to the Phase I agreement, but there is no 
reference to how RUDEP would relate to these two mutually independent levels in the 
government structure. The formidable challenge of transforming a regionally managed 
programme to a local government support programme remained unresolved. 
 
Learning by doing: searching for new partners  
On decentralisation, progress was recorded. By 1992, 30% of RUDEP funds were managed 
by the District councils, and in the 1994/95 budget 50% was allocated to the districts and in 
the last RUDEP year the districts’ share rose to 70%. In 1993, RUDEP reported that the 
capacity of districts is too weak to assume the expected role. This implied that RUDEP had to 
invest in training programmes, it was argued from NORAD HQs. At the 1993 Annual 
Meeting the Regional Development Director said this about the capacity at district level: 
“funds cannot just be dished out to the Districts. Any disbursement will have to take into 
accounts the Districts’ operational capacities, availability of necessary resources, lack of 
which could lead to implementation deadlocks”64. The districts on their side were not pleased 
with the dominant role of the Region, and wanted more autonomy within RUDEP, even 
including separate annual meetings with NORAD.  
 
The idea of using RUDEP as a promoter of private sector development never took off. This is 
partly understandable given the absence of experiences with public-private partnerships 
shortly after liberalisation. The private sector in Rukwa was small and mostly involved crop 
marketing, retail trade and transport related businesses. Capital was also accumulated in more 
shady and less controlled activities – gem stone mining, poaching, timber and charcoal, and 
through corruption. The trading and retail business was mostly controlled by families of 
Indian and Arab descent. Slowly one has seen the advent of business people originating from 
the Region, but immigrants to the Region still dominate. The sector was at the time ill-
prepared for constructive cooperation with Government. An agreement was reached with 
SIDO (Small Industries Development Organisation) to establish a revolving fund for 
subsidised loans. The initial response from private entrepreneurs was encouraging. It turned 
out later that loan recovery was too low to make the fund revolve, and there was no follow up 
with the closure of RUDEP.  
 
Support to civil society development was high on the agenda, and NORAD commissioned a 
study of NGOs in Rukwa. Its main recommendation – to establish an association of NGOs to 
facilitate external support and capacity building – was soon followed up with RUDEP 
support.65  
 
Long-term commitment: but the ship starts taking in water 
The story of RUDEP can be presented through the image of taking an old boat that had 
stranded and been left unattended, mending it, putting it back on the water, and gradually 
improving it with new fittings and equipment. This was much the story of Phase I. The boat 
was the regional development apparatus in Rukwa. By 1991, the boat was afloat and delivered 
improved services, but it was the same old hull, and some of the holes and structural 
weaknesses had not been permanently fixed. New leakages appeared and at the end of Phase 
II the boat was again drifting ashore. What happened and why? 
                                                     
63 Agreement between Norway and Tanzania regarding RUDEP Phase II, 18 December 1991. 
64 Seventh RUDEP Annual Meeting, Agreed Minutes, 16.3.1993. 
65 Nilssen, E.S.W. and P.A.K. Muchungusi. ‘Study of the development of non-governmental organizations in 
Rukwa Region. Dar es Salaam. April 1992. 
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The RUDEP management had been given the following marching orders for Phase II: 
integration of RUDEP in the government system had to go deeper in response to sustainability 
concerns; more funds were to be managed by district councils; and more emphasis should be 
given to productive sectors and roads. These strategic objectives, however, could not be 
achieved in a coherent manner. There was a contradiction between making RUDEP part and 
parcel of the government system, while at the same time demanding more tangible outputs. In 
Phase I, it had been accepted that a slow process of building capacity was the only way to go. 
That kind of patience was now withering – on the Norwegian side, but also among politicians 
in Rukwa. The role of the Regional administration in developing new financing modalities 
directed at local government, private sector and NGOs was at best ambiguous.  
 
In 1992, the RUDEP Annual Report reported on progress towards further integration. The 
number of staff directly paid by RUDEP had been reduced to 125 (down by close to one-
third); the RUDEP general store had been closed, RUDEP vehicles (74 in all) had been re-
registered on government number plates, and there had been a cut back on personal benefits 
not part of government staff regulations.66 
 
The consequences were not surprising. The same year, the RUDEP Coordinator wrote to 
NORAD:  
 
“The staff are now finding less opportunities within RUDEP, and with less 
real earnings, the already difficult situation is quickly deteriorating. I have 
been asked to forward you the “outcry” from our staff. Personally, I 
sympathize with the staff, but also approve of the policy of avoiding special 
treatment of staff working within RUDEP activities.”67  
 
At the Annual Meeting in 1992 NORAD complained about declining quality of planning 
documents. They noted growing frustrations within Maji as a result of reduced budgets and 
adaptation to government regulations. Kilimo (Agriculture Department) was not capable of 
responding constructively to NORAD’s desire to focus more on the agricultural sector. For 
instance, in the Annual Report, the Kifinga Irrigation project was presented in positive terms 
– allegedly boasting a high completion rate and strong involvement of beneficiaries, whereas 
a visit to the site led NORAD representatives to conclude that it ought to be stopped. This 
case illustrated a general problem in RUDEP, namely to achieve monitoring of acceptable 
quality. 
 
The problem of controlling expenditures worsened in subsequent years. At the 1994 Annual 
Meeting NORAD noted with concern that some projects during first half of the 1993/94 
financial year had spent more than 100 percent of their yearly budget. “It leaves the 
impression of inadequate planning and budgeting or lack of proper financial management”.68 
The minutes of the meeting reflected NORAD’s concerns with major cost overruns (“the 
Region having spent over 70% of the administrative budget in the first half of the year”) and 
inadequate financial reporting, and NORAD was reluctant in endorsing several new proposals 
from the Region “because of the uncertainty of RUDEP continuation after 1994/95”69.  
 
What were the reasons behind this deteriorating performance? Only a couple of years earlier 
RUDEP had been congratulated for its improvements on financial management. One decisive 
factor, according to informants, was the very integration process itself, culminating in the 
decision to localise the position as RUDEP Coordinator. Since the start of RUDEP until 1993 
                                                     
66 READ. RUDEP Annual Report 1991/1992, November 1992, p.3. 
67 Letter from RUDEP Coordinator to NORAD dated 3.9.1992. 
68 Instruction to NORAD’s delegation to the RUDEP Annual Meeting 1994, 27.2.1994 (in Norwegian). 
69 1994 Annual Meeting. Minutes, p.9. 
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the Coordinator had been recruited by NORAD. From mid 1993 until the end the position was 
held by staff of the Regional Economic Affairs Department, who did not have the advantage 
of being outside the rank and file of the Tanzanian bureaucracy.70 Consequently, the 
programme became more vulnerable to pressures from regional and departmental heads. The 
integration process also resulted in weakening the position of RUDEP Project Officers vis-à-
vis their superiors, or so-called warrant holders. The latter could approve payments without 
the consent of the project-in-charge. A RUDEP Community Development Advisor aired her 
concerns directly to NORAD: “an unscrupulous or desperate Warrant Holder might be 
tempted to borrow some of the money for non RUDEP activities”71. Hence, the decision to 
push for full integration, while ideologically well-intended, was obviously premature given 
the way RUDEP had been set up. It seemed to have pulled the rug beneath the programme, 
but other factors also mattered.  
 
While the Regional authorities wanted as much aid as possible from NORAD, at the donor’s 
side there were excruciating discussions about how to set the limit. How much? For what? 
And of course – for how long? In a travel report prepared by an officer at the Norwegian HQ 
visiting RUDEP in 1994 there are frequent reference to these overall questions. “There is a 
need to find the right principles of limitation [of funding]”.72 He flagged concerns for 
financial sustainability arguing that RUDEP should not take over Government’s 
responsibilities. Transport and general office expenditures had become too high. He argued 
for more use of co-funding or matching funding between Government (or communities) and 
RUDEP. These thoughts were all indications of a mental shift in the “RUDEP philosophy” 
from being part of Government to some kind of external body cooperating with Government, 
and hence more like an extended arm of NORAD.  
 
This merely illustrates the ambivalence of the RUDEP identity, which existed throughout. 
Although verbally regional leaders referred to RUDEP as “ours”, their actions often did not 
demonstrate a sense of ownership. Or, as some would argue, the problems faced by RUDEP 
in terms of cost overruns, misuse of vehicles and interdepartmental rivalries were endemic to 
the Government system, and only proved that RUDEP was part of the system – with its 
deficiencies and challenges. One can only speculate, if it would have been a better strategy to 
establish an institution in Rukwa that more explicitly played the donor’s role as a partner to 
recipient institutions in Rukwa – being Regional departments, District councils, village 
governments, NGOs or private companies.   
3.3 A less than honourable exit 
The justification: hard to grasp the logic  
In 1993, development thinking in Dar es Salaam and at NORAD HQs started turning against 
the RUDEP-concept. Questions were being raised against the sustainability of such targeted 
investments and the slogan was sector-based multi-donor programme support and aid 
sponsored national reforms rather than single donor project aid. At the 1993 Annual Meeting 
NORAD announced that a financial and economic review of RUDEP will be undertaken73. 
The terms of reference clearly reflected the views of the RUDEP-sceptics, and the report was 
later used as a reference for justifying reconsideration of NORAD’s support. In 1995, a study 
of the experiences with RUDEP and KIDEP commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs noted that: “(T)he demand for a reconsideration of the programmes on the 
                                                     
70 The RUDEP Coordinators were: Alf Morten Jerve (1986-1989), Graham Teskey (1989-1991), Oddvar Espegren 
(1991-1993), E.J.K. Ntemi (1993-1995) and N.A. Mwingira (1995-1996). 
71 Letter for RUDEP Community Development Advisor to NORAD, 29.5.95. 
72 NORAD (NATUR). Summary memo following visit to RUDEP 28.2 – 17.3. 1994 (in Norwegian). 
73 3E Economics (1993). 
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basis of a financial and economic review was for many people seen as contradicting the very 
design and policy of the programme, as well as NORAD’s long term commitment”74. 
 
Henceforth, the Country Strategy document for Tanzania prepared in 1994 stated that studies 
had confirmed that the programme did not meet requirements for economic and financial 
sustainability: “The Head of the Norwegian delegation referred to a recent evaluation raising 
serious questioning regarding the sustainability of the Kigoma and Rukwa programmes”75. 
The size and complexity of the programme “surpasses the capacity of local authorities to 
carry it forward, which has resulted in high aid dependency”76. While this conclusion was 
irrefutable, the logical consequence could have been different.  
 
The same argument was equally valid for Tanzania as a country. At that level, the conclusion 
was not to exit aid but to seek new modalities for strengthening Tanzania’s capacity to receive 
and manage aid. Why was this approach not taken at the regional level? The answer was 
probably threefold: project aid was in discredit; rural development was loosing out to other 
thematic priorities such as governance reform and infrastructure; and there was a sense that 
the complexity of RUDEP also had surpassed the capacity of the Norwegian embassy to 
handle it. The problems of financial control furthered contributed to the unilateral decision by 
Norway in 1994 to terminate its support by end of Phase II – June 1996 – 13 years after the 
start of the water project and only 10 years after initiation of RUDEP. 
 
Reform or exit? 
The prevailing view early 1994, however, was not one of complete exit but “the need to revise 
the project concept”, placing more emphasis on the district level and local resource 
mobilisation. “The district focus is pre-eminent and activities should, as far as possible, be 
planned and implemented by the local authorities”.77 The Region was informed at the Annual 
Meeting that final approval of the 1994/95 budget had to await the outcome of bilateral 
country level negotiations later that year.  
 
In preparation for the bilateral consultations between Tanzania and Norway in October 1994 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote: “It is proposed that the rural development 
programmes be terminated in their present form. A District programme taking into account 
the ongoing reform process in public administration and incorporating relevant experience 
from KIDEP and RUDEP instead be developed”.78 However, in November 1994 NORAD had 
decided to go for a complete exit and officially agreed with the Prime Minister’s Office to 
terminate funding by end June 1996.79 The idea was to replace designated regional support 
with support to a national civil service reform programme involving local authorities. 
However, in 1994 this idea was still at the drawing table, and it was highly uncertain what 
was in it for the districts in Rukwa.  
 
Nevertheless, NORAD was adamant to wind up quickly. Ironically, the 1 ½ years for the 
phasing-out was communicated as “NORAD realizes that it will not make sense to terminate 
rather abruptly”, adding that “the level of funding will have to be tapered off during the 
winding-up period”. Although NORAD acknowledged that “the two programmes are entering 
into a most difficult phase”, there was no political will to make the exit more gradual.80 In a 
matter of only few years the perception of RUDEP had changed from being ‘the right thing to 
do’ – a country study of Norwegian aid to Tanzania in 1988 had called RUDEP a positive and 
novel experiment well worth trying – to ‘a dying horse no longer worth feeding’. It is telling 
                                                     
74 Naustdalslid, J. and B. Aasen (1995), p. 69. 
75 Agreed Minutes Country Programme Review between Tanzania and Norway, 23-25 March 1994. 
76 Taken from NORAD Appropriation Document for additional support to RUDEP, November 1995. 
77 Annual Meeting 16 March 1994, Agreed minutes, p.3. 
78 Quote taken from Lunøe, B. et al.,1996. Review Report on RUDEP 1995/96 Implementation, NORAD/PMO. 
79 Letter from the Norwegian Embassy/NORAD to Principal Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office, 8.11.1994. 
80 Ibid. 
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of this u-turn that the Norwegian embassy rejected the suggestion to evaluate the RUDEP 
experience. The time for learning by doing was over.  
 
A turbulent phase-out 
The Region agreed with NORAD to prepare a phasing out plan, but it is quite evident that the 
regional administration only paid lip service to this challenge. Understandably, NORAD’s 
pull out was as major blow and some felt it as a betrayal. The relations were also quite 
strained during the last year because of audit queries and the decision by NORAD to suspend 
payments for a period until appropriate actions had been taken. At the 1995 Annual Meeting 
the ambiance was tense. “We are holding this meeting under very difficult circumstances”, 
was the opening statement by the head of the Tanzanian delegation, adding that all queries in 
the audit report “should be addressed and answered to”81. Apparently, the answers were not 
satisfactory and a new meeting was convened two months later. 
 
At this meeting, NORAD accepted to resume the release of funds, the Regional Development 
Director appealed for NORAD to reconsider its exit decision, and Prime Minister’s Office 
argued that the period for phasing out was too short. But NORAD had reached a point of no 
return. The Region was merely advised to “prepare an environment in which the region will 
be able to run the activities left after the end of financial assistance from NORAD”82. As it 
turned out, this wish was nothing but ‘a pie in the sky’.  
 
The Phasing Out Report, demanded by NORAD and submitted in early 1996, which reads as 
a long complaint about the negative effects of the exit, depicts the gravity of the situation but 
also reveals the lethargy of the Regional administration in mitigating the consequences.  
 
“The withdrawal is surely going to leave a gap between the capacity created 
and the level of activities within the local development budget. Projects started 
by RUDEP on a long-term perspective are being stopped prematurely. The 
District Development Fund spirit which has taken about three years to implant 
in the hearts of the local people is being frustrated. All in all the untimely and 
abrupt ending of financial assistance to RUDEP will disrupt the region’s 
development reached with RUDEP support.”83 
 
Without prospects for continued funding many of the best qualified local staff soon looked for 
other jobs, but due to the RUDEP strategy of working within the government system quite 
many with RUDEP experience continued as civil servants in the Region. During fieldwork for 
this study we met several former RUDEP officers working with the district councils. Others 
resigned from public service and went into private sector activities. 
 
No phasing out strategy 
A NORAD recruited technical adviser at district level complained bitterly in a letter to the 
Embassy about “endless lack of budgetary discipline” especially at the regional level, and that 
by mid-1995 he was not aware of any plans for the projects after RUDEP. He suggested to the 
RUDEP Coordinator that emphasis should be on sustaining investments already made. For the 
water projects this would imply “to speed up handing over of schemes and to stock revolving 
stores”. If RUDEP would leave behind a stock of essential spares he professed that “the 
schemes should be able to run 10-20 years after RUDEP”84. As we shall see below, his 
projection was not totally off the mark.  
 
                                                     
81 9th Annual Meeting. Agreed minutes, 4.5.1995. 
82 9th Extended Annual Meeting. Agreed Minutes. 10.7.1995. 
83 RUDEP Phasing Out Report, January 1996. 
84 Letter to RUDEP Coordinator from Technical Advisor, Nkansi District, 7.3.1995. 
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The challenge to the Region was formidable; 80% of development investments in the Region 
were financed through RUDEP at the time. Still, the 1996 Review Team concluded that “the 
Phasing Out document does not give the analyses which are required to ensure the best 
possible planning and implementation of future activities to ensure sustainability of the 
RUDEP investments to the extent possible”. The Team also observed that the 1996/97 budget 
for the Region showed that “no plans have been made to make a conscious effort to sustain 
the RUDEP investments in the next financial year”.85 The question remains unanswered 
whether this inertia was caused by aid dependency or a failed government system. 
Irrespectively, it was a telling illustration that, at best, there was a need to revamp the RUDEP 
approach.  
 
Why did the Region not resist more forcefully? 
It is disconcerting to observe that RUDEP, once proclaimed to have at least a 20 years 
perspective, suddenly came to an abrupt halt half way in what appears as acts of 
irresponsibility on both the donor and the recipient side. Unfortunately, this is a legacy that 
RUDEP shares with many aid projects. The donor changed its mind and was in a hurry to get 
out, whereas the recipient took little ownership and responsibility for salvaging and carry 
forward as much as possible. In fact, the problems of financial management only increased 
during the final count down. 
 
In retrospect, one needs to ask why the political and administrative leaders of Rukwa did not 
exert stronger pressure on central government and NORAD to agree on a more gradual 
phasing-out. It is worth noting, that NORAD about the same time (in 1992) agreed to an eight 
year phasing-out strategy for RUDEP’s sister programme in Sri Lanka (Hambantota 
Integrated Rural Development Programme – HIRDEP).86 The answer we got from talking to 
people who were close to events at the time can be summarised as two main factors. One 
factor was that the regional set-up to which RUDEP had belonged was in a state of flux and 
was losing much of its former role due to the local government reform. It was already a 
”sinking ship”. Key civil servants did not care or have the incentives to mobilise. It is also 
generally believed that one is powerless if a donor decides to stop giving: “He who pays the 
piper calls the tune”. A second factor mentioned was rivalry among local politicians typical of 
the Region. The districts had a lot to loose from the closure of RUDEP. They had gradually 
been receiving a greater share of the budget and the District Development Fund mechanism 
(see Chapter 4) was yielding positive results. Nevertheless, Members of Parliament and 
councillors did not mobilise to challenge the decision. It is also reported that the Regional 
Commissioner at the time, for reasons known to him, had no interest in RUDEP.  
 
Exits: always a one-sided affair 
NORAD’s exit from RUDEP was unilateral and without any genuine consultation of the 
recipient side, which is the common feature of most aid exits. The exit of the Norwegian 
Church Aid from RUDEP in 1991 only serves to prove the point. It was also dictated by 
changes in HQ policies and delivered to the Region more or less as a fait accompli. In a 
meeting with NORAD the RUDEP Coordinator complained that “the needs and opinions of 
the region were being neglected”.87 The Regional authorities acted in a similar way, when the 
Area Development Programme in Mpimpwe Division (Mpanda District) suddenly was 
slashed from the budget (1995/96) without even informing the District department concerned.  
 
Post-RUDEP: NORAD did not close the door completely 
NORAD indicated at the last Annual Meeting, April 1996, that it would consider supporting 
an initiative aimed at strengthen operation and maintenance of water supply schemes. NGOs 
in the region could also be supported, as well as specific investment projects based on 
                                                     
85 Lunøe et al 1996, p. vi. 
86 See Jerve A.M. et al (2003) for an evaluation of this process. 
87 NORAD Dar es Salaam, Travel report from visit to Rukwa 18-25 November 1989. 
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national priorities – such as the proposed Mbala (Zambia) -Sumbawanga high voltage 
transmission line.  
 
Norway continued supporting the regional association of NGOs (RANGO) until 2002 through 
a Norwegian NGO – Norwegian Peoples Aid. The hope still remains that Norway may again 
bestow the Region, as vividly demonstrated with the VIP reception given to a Norwegian 
delegation visiting in 2006. The regional authorities interpreted the purpose of the visit to 
explore prospects for a renewal of cooperation, while the real aim was only one of surveying 
the NGO scene. In his welcome address the Regional Commissioner said: 
 
“Ever since the departure and end of contract between NORAD and RUDEP 
things have not been so well in a number of areas particularly those started by 
RUDEP… for reasons of underfunding through normal budgetary resources 
… Unlike other regions in the country where there are direct development 
partnerships with foreign agencies Rukwa does not have anyone to date ever 
since the Norway/RUDEP project … we wish the Norwegian Government 
foreign funding package were to reconsider Rukwa for a second time.”  
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4. The outputs of RUDEP and the situation today – 
main areas of intervention  
In Phase I of RUDEP a decision was made to organise activities in sub-programmes aimed at 
solving specific development problems identified by the region and its districts as having 
highest priority. Each sub-programme consisted of various projects each with a Project 
Officer in charge linked to a responsible department at regional or district level. All 
programmes were of a kind that called for integration and coordination between different 
sectors and departments. Below we see the share of investments received by the sub-
programmes at the end of Phase I (1990/91) and towards the end of Phase II (1994/95) prior 
to the phasing out decision. 
 
Table 4.1: RUDEP expenditures by programme areas 
 
1990/91 
expenditures 
1994/95 expenditures Programme areas 
TShs 1000 % TShs 1000 %
1. Improvement of health by preventive 
measures 
302,700 40 346,900 35
2. Land use development 46,300 6 119,800 12
3. Infrastructure 172,700 23 209,200 21
4. Local level development through 
participatory planning 
83,800 11 165,900 17
5. Economic production and small-scale 
industry 
200 0 0 0
Management and operations 156,300 20 144,900 15
Total 762,000 100 986,700 100
 Of which local expenditures 
(C-funds)
341,200 45 857,500 87
 Of which procurement in foreign 
currency     (D-funds)
420,800 55 129,200 13
 
 
This shows that Area 1 – Improvement of Health by Preventive Measures – consistently 
received the highest share of funding throughout, which reflected the initial investments made 
in the Water Project prior to RUDEP and the commitments implied by the Water Master Plan. 
Furthermore, we see more than a doubling of investments in Area 2 – Land Use Development 
– in the second phase. This came as a direct response to the critique raised in the 1990 review 
of RUDEP that it had neglected its original mandate to support agricultural development. We 
also see that Area 5 – Economic production and Small-scale Industry – never really took off.  
 
An important observation is the decline in the share of the budget that was used for direct 
procurement abroad (through RUDEP’s procurement agent in Dar es Salaam). This of course 
reflected the increased availability of commodities in Tanzania, but also a deliberate attempt 
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to reduce import dependency. Consequently, the flow of capital entering the Rukwa economy 
increased substantially.  
 
It must be noted that these expenditure figures do not include costs of expatriate manpower. 
In 1990/91 there were 14 expatriates working in the programme, recruited through NORAD 
(7), Norwegian Church Aid (3), Norwegian Volunteer Service (1), ILO (1), and US Peace 
Corps (2). In 1994/95 this had dropped to 7, and the last year of the programme only three 
expatriates followed the ship to the shore – the RUDEP Finance Controller, the RUDEP 
Workshop Manager and the adviser to the Rural Roads Engineer.  
4.1 Improvement of health through preventive measures 
This area basically consisted of the extension of the Water Project (TAN055) combined with 
support to primary health care. The latter grew out of the sanitation component linked to the 
Water Project. The water sector received 70 to 80 percent of funds going into this area. 
4.1.1 Water supply: the most tangible outcomes 
The approach 
For rural water supply, the objective was to ensure safe and adequate water supply to all 
people in the Region within a distance of 400 meters through the use of appropriate 
technologies and involvement of the beneficiaries. For urban water supply, the objective was 
to increase the supply of water in Sumbawanga, Namanyere and Mpanda towns. The way to 
do this was spelled out in an elaborate Water Master Plan, identifying water sources and 
technical solutions. The planning work was done between 1979 and 1982, by a Norwegian 
consultancy firm – Norconsult – covering both Rukwa and Kigoma regions, at a total cost of 
NOK 36 million. NORAD then approved another NOK 45 million for a two year mobilisation 
phase leading into full scale implementation from 1983. NOK 90 million was allocated to 
Rukwa for a third phase ending 1987.  
 
In 1985, a separate community participation and health education component was added, 
under the management of a Norwegian NGO – Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). The aim was 
to improve community sanitation and cleanliness in relation to water use and promote user 
participation in maintenance of water supplies. This involved also promotion of improved 
latrines – so-called ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrines, but with limited success. 
 
TAN055 can best be described as a crash programme. It was well funded and had a major 
input of foreign consultants, a separate set-up for procurement (mainly imports from Norway) 
and a project organisation in the region – the Implementation Unit – largely working outside 
the government system. In 1985, a total of 15 expatriates worked in the project, some 
employed by Norconsult and NCA, and others recruited by NORAD directly and financed 
over and above the programme budget. The physical progress had been “remarkable”, 
according to a 1985 review mission, but concerns were raised about the lack of institution 
building within the Water Departments at regional and district level. “There had hardly been 
progress on planned and organised training”.88 The need for stronger integration with the 
normal operations of the Regional Water Engineer was advocated, and training and 
maintenance ought to be priority issues in a subsequent fourth phase, according to the review 
mission. With the arrival of RUDEP in 1986, plans for better integration had to be seen in a 
new perspective.  
 
                                                     
88 TAN 055 Review Mission, 1985. 
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Celebrating a new village water supply 
scheme (1991) 
 
 
 
 
The legacy of the Water Project continued after it was incorporated in RUDEP as from 
July1988, with a large budget (relative to other sectors) and many expatriate consultants. But 
some expatriate positions inherited from the Water Project were assigned to other 
departments, such as Health, Community Development and as more general engineering 
advisors to the district administrations.  
 
Increasingly, more and more emphasis was placed on preparing for operation and 
maintenance by the users, symbolised in the “handing over” of the schemes. Government was 
in charge during planning and construction, and until the village was prepared for receiving 
the scheme. Then, a handing over ceremony was held. But did villagers really feel ownership 
and responsibility for the gift they had received? Many did not. Not because they did not 
appreciate the benefits, but the forming of effective and accountable village committees is a 
timely process. In the words of one of the former expatriate advisers: “Water was closed just 
when it was about to start functioning”89. 
                                                     
89 Interview, Bjørn Smith, Dar es Salaam, June 2007. 
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The sedimentation tank for 
Sumbawanga town water 
supply started as a “joint 
venture” with RUDEP in 
1995 but was not officially 
opened until 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
In the beginning the 
top-down approach 
was deeply ingrained. 
It was officially stated 
that “the Water 
Master Plan should 
form the basis for the 
project activities” and 
any deviations had to 
be approved by NORAD.90 This was later softened, but the Master Plan remained the guide 
throughout. This of course deviated from a genuine bottom-up approach based on user 
contributions. However, it is interesting to note that in the latter years RUDEP tried to change 
its role vis-à-vis the ultimate “owners” allowing villages to apply for water supply under the 
District Development Fund. This implied that there would be no handing over since “the 
owner” would be more in charge from the outset. 
 
RUDEP also entered into a cost-sharing arrangement (50-50) with the Sumbawanga 
Municipal Council for construction of a sedimentation tank for the urban water supply. The 
project was eventually completed (see photo), although NORAD complained that the Council 
never added its share to the project budget. Regrettably, this revised role of the programme, 
more as a partner and facilitator rather than deliverer of services, was not given enough time 
to be tested out.   
 
The achievements 
A Review Mission in February 1987 reiterated the physical achievements of the TAN055: 
“An impressive number of villages (57) and people (126 000) have benefited from improved 
water supplies”91. The Mission found costs per village or per capita to have been high, but 
that the difficult setting of Rukwa and its low initial starting point justified the cost level. The 
report complained, however, that the Region and Districts had diverted Central Government 
funds initially earmarked for the water sector to other uses. This exemplifies a fundamental 
dilemma of aid and programmes of this nature. On the one hand it is a perfectly valid 
argument to say that local funds should be directed to sectors not benefiting from aid, while 
on the other hand, in the name of future sustainability, the donor is legitimately worried that 
its funding to a sector dilutes, so to speak, the government’s own sense of responsibility for 
the sector. This dilemma remained a thorny issue throughout RUDEP, also with some sectors 
(e.g. education) complaining they had been left out.  
 
A total of 2,062 water supply schemes had been constructed under RUDEP by 1993 using 
various technologies; deep boreholes (40%), gravity supply (28%), tube wells (shallow), 
motorised pumps, ring wells and spring protection. Most boreholes and all shallow tube wells 
                                                     
90 Minutes of Annual Meeting 1985 (TAN055). 
91 Joint Review Mission of TAN055 and TAN060, February 1987. 
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were installed with hand pumps, using both an Indian type (India Mark 2) and a Dutch type 
(SWN). 73 percent of the schemes were reported in working condition with the remaining not 
working or yielding little water.  
 
In 1986, an expatriate adviser in the project rang the alarm bell, noting that almost every 
motorised pumping scheme could not be operated and maintained properly by villages. He 
ranked the technical solutions in this order of appropriateness: hand pumps – protected 
springs – gravity schemes – hydraulic ram pumps – motorized pumping. What we know today 
confirms this priority. What has been most sustainable are boreholes equipped with durable 
hand pumps. 
 
 
Meeting in the village water 
committee (painting in the office of 
the Mpanda District Water 
Department) 
 
 
 
 
 
By the end of RUDEP (1995 
figures) it was reported that 
close to 600,000 people were 
served with clean and 
adequate water through 
various types of water 
schemes. This corresponded 
to a regional water coverage 
of 76%, and ranked Rukwa 
among the best regions in Tanzania. From Table 4.2 we see that the coverage in the vicinity 
of Sumbawanga town approached 100 percent. It is estimated that the regional coverage was 
20% before 1980. The official 1995 figures apparently did not adequately reflect the 
operational status of all schemes, and the water department reported that the actual service 
level probably would be closer to 50% due to inadequate maintenance, problems with running 
costs of motorised pumping schemes and falling groundwater table in certain areas. 104 of 
255 villages had established Water Committees, and of these 68 had opened a bank account 
and had started collecting water fees. The amount collected, however, would cover only 15% 
of maintenance costs.92  
 
There are frequent references to estimates of water coverage in the literature, but all have to 
be taken with a pinch of salt. These are based on village and not household counts, and do not 
capture variations within a village with respect to access. The quality of individual water 
points in terms of yield and service time is also not recorded. There are even inconsistencies 
in the reporting of number of villages served. By end of RUDEP about 140 villages or close 
to 40% were reported without water schemes, relying on traditional non-improved sources – 
the majority being within Sumbawanga District Council. Although RUDEP could report 
major achievements the job remained half finished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
92 RUDEP Phasing Out Report, 1996, p.8. 
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Table 4.2: Rukwa Region water supply coverage – 1995 
 
District No. of 
villages 
No. of 
villages 
served 
Population 
1995* 
Population 
served  
% of pop. 
served 
Sumbawanga Town 
Council Villages  28 27 55,812 54,650 97 
Sumbawanga District 161 82 298,315 174,250 58 
Nkansi District 71 48 139,069 103,900 75 
Mpanda District 116 73 288,887 262,150 91 
Rukwa Region 376 230 782,143 594,950 76 
Source: RUDEP Phasing Out Report, January 1996 
 
 
The situation today 
The 1996 review of RUDEP raised serious concerns about the sustainability of the 
investments in water supply: “the sector which will require the most substantial involvement 
to ensure sustainability is the Rural Water Supply sector”93. In a recent (2007) study of the 
water supply component of RUDEP the author disapproves these arguments. Despite the 
absence of any “substantial involvement” after RUDEP “the water programmes did function 
and has turned out more sustainable than could be expected”94. It is claimed that 65% of the 
installed schemes are still supplying water, which is quite remarkable after a lifespan of about 
twenty years. The report relates this to some important observations regarding choice of 
technology: 
• Gravity schemes have been the most durable (76% working), but surprisingly deep 
boreholes follow closely (70%). This is a testimony to the quality of work and 
appropriateness of the technology. 
• The type of technology requiring less maintenance and less procurement of spare 
parts has been the longest lasting. This applies to the Indian hand pumps compared to 
the Dutch.  
• It is also evident that villages with diesel powered water pumps have had great 
difficulties with maintenance and operations. 
 
Our own observations reveal that many villages have functioning Village Water Committees 
and also deposit water fees collected in a bank account. Great emphasis was placed on 
promoting village level management of water schemes during RUDEP, through training of 
technicians and water committee members. The problem today is the cost of spares, which by 
far exceeds what villages collect in fees. Since many schemes are quite old there is also an 
imminent need for reinvestments which is beyond what villages can manage on their own. 
                                                     
93 Lunøe, B. et al (1996), p.6. 
94 Skaiaa, O. 2007. Fiction, facts and future. Norads’ assistance to water supply and sanitation development in 
Tanzania and Kenya during the 70s, 80s and 90s. Study commissioned by Norad. Tranor International Ltd., p.36. 
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People in Mpanda municipality 
collecting water from the taps 
supported by RUDEP 
 
 
 
 
 
Silting of boreholes and drop 
in the groundwater table are 
major problems. The District 
Water Engineer of Mpanda 
claimed that half of the 
shallow wells have dried up 
due to lower rains. In Karema 
(Mpanda district), 10 out of 
11 shallow wells drilled by 
RUDEP were working until 2005. Only 4 are working today. In Inyonga village (a remote 
area of Mpanda District), on the contrary, out of sixteen deep boreholes, all are working 
except two and one of these has not functioned since it was installed. In this village, water is 
about 200 – 300m from the houses, with the exception of a newly occupied area which is 12 
km from the village centre and has no borehole. The rapid population growth, not least due to 
immigration of Sukuma, has worsened the situation. Besides, the Sukuma prefer to settle at a 
distance from established villages.  
 
The situation in Mpanda District, as explained by Mr. E.S. Msengi, Principal Technician, is 
telling of the situation.95 He reported that the water coverage today is 38% (while in 1995 it 
was said to be 91%). Still, 85% of 156 boreholes and 35% of 76 shallow wells funded by 
RUDEP are working. In 1995, the district had 13 diesel pumping schemes; all stopped 
because villages could not afford the costs after RUDEP pulled out.  
 
Today, 80% of the 72 villages in Mpanda District have water funds. According to the 2002 
Government Water Policy a village can get a borehole if it contributes 5% of costs. The 
Government will cover the rest. More than 20 villages have requested new schemes, but the 
problem is that the Council has no money to match village contributions. The standard cost 
estimates today are: TShs 2.8 million for a deep borehole and TShs 1.7 million for a shallow 
well. In Paramawe village, for instance, the Village Chairman told that the Water Committee 
had TShs 270,000 in the bank, which is almost twice what they need to get a new borehole – 
in theory. 
 
The water coverage has improved somewhat since 2002, with the arrival of TASAF (Tanzania 
Social Action Fund), we were told by Mr. G.M. Shao, Principal Technician at the 
Sumbawanga District Council – an old RUDEP hand. “The period after RUDEP was very 
difficult. In 1997 the whole District Water Department received only TShs 60,000 for 
expenditures not related to staff costs. RUDEP developed 137 boreholes in 17 villages. 
Unfortunately only 25 percent function today”. Nevertheless, as we were told in Nkasi: “We 
still rely on RUDEP water”. In Namanyere town the main source is a water kiosk supplied by 
a RUDEP borehole. 
 
                                                     
95 Based on interview and paper submitted to RUDEP Impact Assessment Workshop, Kibaha 16-17.11.2007. 
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The chairman of Ntatumbila village at a 
borehole outside the village (the pump is the 
India Mark 2 type) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
District water engineers confirmed 
that RUDEP purchased a lot of 
equipment and spares which were 
left after the project and helped 
maintain and repair the pumps. 
Besides, RUDEP used quality 
pumps. Mr. A. Shirima, currently 
Managing Director of the 
Sumbawanga Urban Water Supply Authority, was involved with the Water Project almost 
from the beginning. He confirmed that most boreholes still are working, but the problem is 
the falling water table and population increase, including several new villages. And not to 
forget, the difficulty of collecting water fees – even in town. “I have too few meters, and 
when I install meters people collect water from communal stand pipes where fees are not 
charged”.  
 
In Ntatumbila Village (Nkasi District) the chairman, Edes Helandogo (see photo), reiterated 
the same message: “We have problems with raising money for repairs. Last year was a bad 
harvest and people had no money. The water fee is TShs 2000 per year per household. The 
Village Water Committee has no bank account”. The village has 5 water points, but they yield 
no water during the dry season, and people have had to go back to traditional wells.  
4.1.2 Primary health care: changes in health seeking behaviour 
The health sector was not part of the initial scope for RUDEP involvement, but was brought 
in through the Water Project, and in 1987 NORAD formally approved the sector as eligible 
for RUDEP support. The Community Participation and Health Education (CPHE) component 
of the Water Project was transformed into a broader support for primary health care. RUDEP 
adopted a three-pronged approach to primary health care – training village level health 
workers, revitalizing or improving existing public facilities and influencing people’s health 
seeking behaviour. 
 
Training of village health workers 
The concept of village level health workers had entered official Tanzanian policy prior to 
RUDEP. Educated, mostly young, people were to be selected for training in preventive health 
care. By 1995, 150 villages had trained Village Health Workers (VHW), 360 in total, all 
trained with support from RUDEP. They were also given bicycles. The VHW programme 
collapsed after RUDEP. A few years later government tried to reengage the VHWs as 
contraceptive distributors.  
 
In Mirumba village, the VHW once trained under RUDEP said: 
 
“Sisi tuliweza kuhamashisha jamii kuhusu vyoo, kufyeka mazingira, kufukia 
madimbwi ili kupunguza malaria na kujenga uelewa wa jamii, sasa wanajua. 
Pia tulisimamia ujenzi wa zahanati na usafi wake mpaka daktari alipokuja.” 
(We were able to create awareness in the community on the importance of 
toilets, proper environmental sanitation to control malaria, and people became 
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knowledgeable. In addition, we supervised construction of the dispensary and 
ensured cleanness until the arrival of the medical staff.)96 
 
 
 
 
 
Award ceremony after completion of TBA training course (1989) 
 
 
Another important effort was training of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) – 1265 in all. 
They received a total of 6 weeks training in intervals. In a region where transport is a major 
problem due to long distances and poor roads, it made sense to enhance the capability of 
TBAs. There is strong evidence that this reduced complications and deaths during delivery. 
Many of the TBAs trained during RUDEP are still active, but the support from Government 
ceased with RUDEP. The delivery kits that they were given are worn out today and they have 
received no replacement. Official policy of the Ministry of Health now discourages the use of 
TBAs to assist delivery, but due to long distances to health facilities and customs the majority 
of village women in Rukwa still go to the TBAs for delivery services. Besides, the quality of 
service and the costs involved also deter many from using public health centres. 
 
                                                     
96 RECODA 2008. 
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Improving existing public health facilities 
The Regional hospital in Sumbawanga received support to upgrade several wards and the 
operational theatre. A production unit for intravenous infusions was established, not to be 
dependent on irregular supplies from Dar 
es Salaam or Mbyea. This proved to be of 
critical importance in combating cholera 
outbreaks in the Lake Tanganyika area – 
last in 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The infusion unit at Sumbawanga Regional  
hospital which was financed by RUDEP 
 
 
 
 
The Infusion unit is still operating, but currently under maintenance (see photo). It is today 
the only plant of its kind in a government hospital. Today, the Regional hospital has great 
difficulties in recruiting doctors, according to the hospital management; the main reason being 
that in Sumbawanga there is no market for private practice which is a major source of income 
to most public doctors.  
 
RUDEP also assisted Mpanda District hospital and financed training of several hospital 
staff.Mr. Alfons Shitindi, today Clinic Officer at the Mpanda hospital, has been working there 
since 1987 and was among the “RUDEP beneficiaries”. “I have really befitted a lot from 
RUDEP training”, which including a course in the UK. Besides training of trainers, RUDEP 
supported the district health office in terms running costs and transport, and the system started 
functioning better. “After RUDEP things went very slowly, but we still have PHC committees 
at Ward level – introduced by RUDEP. Now they are called Hudumu za kijamii [Social 
services committee].” 
 
 
 
The ‘boat ambulance’ stationed 
 at Kirando 
 
 
 
 
 
Four divisional Health Centres (out of 18 in the 
Region) were improved (Kirando, Karema, 
Inyonga and Mwimbi), and four dispensaries (out 
of 105 in the Region) were renovated. Kirando 
represents a centre located far from the nearest 
hospital. It caters for 35 villages along the Lake 
Tanganyika shore. Transport was, and still is, 
extremely difficult with few roads and many 
villages depend on open boats as “ambulances”.  
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Contrary to standard government regulations, it was decided to equip the Kirando Centre to 
undertake emergency obstetric care, including caesarean section. This reportedly saved many 
lives. “Ministry of Health came to Kirando and has since adopted this approach” according to 
a key informant. 
 
Dr. Willinard Mwisinjili (Assistant Medical Officer) complained about big problems in 
financing a “rural hospital” like Kirando. There has been a shortage of staff in recent years 
and the number of operations performed is declining – from 106 in 2003 to 57 in 2007. 
“Water supply is a big problem since the water tank pumping from the lake, installed by 
RUDEP, no longer is working because the pump was stolen. We have an electric generator 
but no money for diesel.” 
 
 Kirando Health Centre 2008: struggles to make ends meet 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Influencing health seeking behaviour 
The main goal was to reduce the spread of HIV and 
Aids. It was a key period of spreading due to 
ignorance, and RUDEP unwittingly contributed to this 
with improvements of transport and increased 
movement of people. It is said that many RUDEP 
drivers have died of Aids. Health education campaigns 
were conducted; addressing the general public as well 
as high risk groups, and RUDEP supported 
distribution of condoms and supplied HIV screening 
equipment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Alternative use of VIP-latrine slabs in the Maji yard, Sumbawanga 
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The introduction of the ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine was not successful, and few use 
this technology today. According to the PHC Project Officer, at the time, Mr. R. 
Mnyenyelwa, people accepted to try it as long as it was subsidised. But several factors 
prevented people from adopting it. The latrines were too costly. People were reluctant to 
remove the compost due to cultural believes – “although we never came to that point”. 
Traditional pit latrines are just covered when full and a new pit is dug. But the message about 
the importance of improved sanitation had an impact. Now people are buying concrete slabs 
for their latrines, but they were reluctant 10 years ago.  
 
According to informants, during the ten years of RUDEP in primary health care there were 
noticeable improvements in health seeking behaviour as well as health conditions (see Table 
4.3 based on a report prepared by Ms. E. Mattle who was active in the RUDEP PHC project). 
 
The District Medical Office in Nkasi informed that, after RUDEP, there had been a trend 
towards increasing use of medical services and also general improvement in some important 
health indicators. 60 percent of deliveries today take place at a health facility, the HIV 
prevalence has declined and maternal mortality has gone down. The statistical validity of 
these trends are however uncertain, since figures are not based on representative surveys. At 
the same time the Office complained about a serious shortage of health staff with 270 
positions currently vacant (spring 2008), and acute problems with transport. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Changes in primary health indicators during RUDEP97 
 
 1985 1995 
Maternal mortality rate 
 
660 450 
Infant mortality rate 
 
185/1000 145/1000 
Severe malnutrition 
 
15% 8% 
Pregnant women attending antenatal care 
 
15% 35% 
Contraceptive prevalence rate 
 
1% 6% 
Immunization cover 
 
23% 80% 
Households with acceptable latrines 
 
15% 50% 
 
4.1.3 Education: only a modest start  
We present the education sector here although it never surfaced as a priority of RUDEP and 
was not covered by any of the programme areas. This can probably be explained by 
reluctance in NORAD to take on yet another large social service sector – after water supply 
and primary health care. The emphasis of RUDEP was supposed to be the productive sectors 
– agriculture in particular, however regional and district authorities kept pushing for 
education to be included. It did not make sense, it was argued, to keep education as the only 
major sector or department excluded from RUDEP. 
 
Gradually, the door was opened to some extent. In 1993, the government requested support 
from NORAD to a Rukwa Education Policy. The only major project which was initiated was 
                                                     
97 Mattle, E. Report prepared to RUDEP Impact Assessment Workshop, Kibaha, 16-17.11.2007. 
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support to Kantalamba Teachers Training College in Sumbawanga for the construction of one 
dormitory for female students and classrooms, and supply of training materials. The main 
objective was to increase the number of female teachers. The school administration reported 
that the quality of teaching improved at the time, and that “the overhead projector is still in 
use”98.  
 
Some construction work was left unfinished by RUDEP (e.g. a dormitory for male students), 
and was later completed by funds from the Ministry. The capacity of the college is about 350 
students but as many as 550 students are currently admitted. This is an effect of the secondary 
school improvement programme which has significantly increased the number of students 
seeking higher education. Still, there is a huge demand for new teachers to match the increase 
enrolment in recent years (see Chapter 2.3).  
4.2 Improvement of land use  
4.2.1 Agriculture: small but significant efforts  
It is estimated that 90 percent of the working population in Rukwa is engaged in subsistence 
agriculture. At the same time the region is believed to have a large untapped potential for 
agricultural growth. Two thirds of the Region’s land area is suitable for agriculture but in 
1980 only 3 percent was under cultivation. This was the central theme of the planners of 
RUDEP. There was a need to address problems such as declining soil fertility due to leaching 
and lack of crop rotation, limited diversification and too much focus on maize, reliance on 
hand hoes rather than draft power, poor extension services and lack of market access.  
 
At the same time RUDEP evolved during a period when agricultural policies were in a state 
of flux with a shift from central planning to market liberalisation. The means and ways to 
stimulate agricultural growth were far from obvious. How much to rely on inefficient state 
institutions – such as the National Milling Corporation and RURECU (the government 
managed cooperative), and how to reach out to the farmers? There was a call for participatory 
approaches, whereas the agricultural extension workers – the bwana shamba – clung to the 
top-down approach they were used to.  
 
Two major studies undertaken in 1989 report of an agricultural system in distress. The 
introduction of maize as the main crop in rotation with finger millet and beans “will 
ultimately lead to soil degradation and a decrease in fertility unless nutrient supplements are 
added in the form of fertiliser or manure”.99 Protein-deficient malnutrition, particularly among 
children and pregnant women was endemic.100 Both reports pointed at the malfunctioning of 
the crop marketing system, partly due to the institutional set-up and partly because of a 
genuine transport crisis. 
 
RUDEP adopted direct and indirect measures to stimulate agriculture. The indirect measures 
were road improvement and nutrition education. The direct measures were land use planning, 
improvement of small-scale irrigation, horticulture and crop diversification, and oxenisation. 
 
Land-use planning but with no effect 
This was not a successful approach to agricultural development. The regional land-use 
planning unit was not in the position to cooperate with Agriculture, Forestry and Livestock 
departments, and the policy ambitions dictating its approach – to demarcate all village lands 
and make village land use plans, were at the time completely unrealistic.  
                                                     
98 RECODA (2008). 
99 Uyole Agricultural Centre (1989), p. 50. 
100 German Development Institute (1989).  
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In general, RUDEP found it difficult to respond meaningfully to requests for strengthening 
the agriculture extension system. Each village (338 in total) was supposed to have a bwana 
shamba, but only 40 % had one (1989) and the lack of training and supervision was 
formidable. It seemed like a bottomless pit to try boosting this system.  
 
 
The intake for the Msanzi irrigation scheme: the 
gates for diverting water no longer function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The approach adopted was to establish 
discrete projects that hopefully would 
have a demonstration effect through 
informal dissemination of knowledge. 
One example was the making of village 
land use plans for a couple of villages in 
the Rukwa valley facing conflicts over 
land between pastoralists and local 
farmers. In the absence of close follow-
up by the District and weak community 
involvement this had no lasting impact.  
 
Irrigation facing problems of management 
 
The objective was to improve traditional irrigation systems in cooperation with the farmers, 
initially at Mzansi (Ufipa plateau) and Muze (Rukwa valley). It had a difficult start due to 
lack of qualified engineers. Subsequently, the schemes met with operational problems due to 
problems of organising joint maintenance of the schemes.  
 
A visit to Msanzi in 2008 confirmed that the scheme continues to supply waters to some 85 
farmers and the water catchment is protected by the village. There is, however, a problem 
with organizing maintenance since the irrigation committee is not functioning. As a result, 
during the last four years tail end farmers have been lacking water. The attempt to introduce 
coffee was not successful, but there is a good market for vegetables with buyers coming from 
Sumbawanga and Kasanga.  
 
Horticulture promotion bearing fruits  
Horticulture is an area where RUDEP can claim some success, not because the fruit tree 
nurseries once established in places like Msanzi, Kate, Kantalamba (near Sumbawanga town) 
and Kifinga (near Muze in Rukwa valley) still remain, but the dissemination effect. It also 
mattered that GTZ continued promoting horticulture when RUDEP closed down – from 1995 
to 2001. The establishment of nurseries got off to a good start, in no large part due to the 
efforts of a Norwegian volunteer. About 100,000 seedlings were distributed. The fruit tree 
production nurseries were handed over to the district councils when RUDEP phased out. The 
councils did not continue maintaining the nurseries, however, and the production of tree 
seedlings ceased. The survival rate of fruit trees has been low, and there have been problems 
with diseases especially on citrus fruits, but the programme promoted a shift in farmers’ 
perceptions.  
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Fresh juice for sale in Sumbawanga, but the 
supply of raw material is now less reliable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Muze village, there are several 
farmers selling oranges, pawpaw 
and mangoes. Mr. Leonsi is a 
retired agricultural extension 
worker who was in-charge of the 
Muze orchard. He has several 
orange, mango and papaya trees 
and he said the income from fruits 
per year amounts to about TShs 200,000. How much of this development is due to RUDEP’s 
effort is hard to say, but the rehabilitation of the road up the escarpment to Sumbawanga, by 
RUDEP, was definitely a major impetus to cash crop farming in the Rukwa valley.  
 
Promotion of vegetables, such as onions, leaf vegetables and tomatoes, was done through 
conducting seminars for extension workers. Homestead gardens of fruits and vegetables are 
commonly found today. In Nkasi District there are three well-known farmers in Isale, Masolo 
and King’ombe villages who are doing well in oranges and onions. Below is the story of one 
of them – John Sadale.  
 
In Mwimbi village, Mr. and Ms. Malifimbo have grown vegetables for several years and have 
been able to purchase a vehicle through the sale of vegetables; the vehicle has been named 
“Mchicha” - meaning African spinach (Amaranthus). The income has also contributed to 
increase the acreage of maize cultivated by the family. Other families in the same village said 
they grow vegetables for local sale; “ Huwa ninauza hela ndogo, mia mbili, hamsini…. Lakini 
tunalima kwa ajili ya matumizi ya nyumbani (I usually sell for small money, two hundred 
shillings, fifty shillings ….. but we grow basically for household consumption)”101. 
 
But also in the agriculture sector there are alarming signs, and indications that private 
initiative alone is not enough; a capable extension service is also needed. The supply of fruits 
in the marked has actually declined compared to ten years ago, according to a business 
woman in Sumbawanga (see photo). Farmers throughout the region complained that yields – 
especially of maize – are going down. Soil fertility is declining and due to escalating prices 
farmers cannot afford the fertilizer required to compensate for this.  
 
                                                     
101 RECODA (2008). 
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John Sadale from Isale village, Nkasi District 
 
 
I started training as a farmer under RUDEP. I attended seminars on budding and grafting of 
orange and lemon. We were given working tools such as watering can, sprayer pump, rake, fork 
and hand hoe – jembe. I started to do some gardening and grafting oranges. I decided to 
specialize in onion production. I started by planting 25 g of onion seed and the harvest I got 
earned me TShs 80,000 in 1996. With this money, I bought about 100g of seeds and the 
onions performed well and earned TShs 440,000. I used this income to build a house and 
moved from my previous house. At the same time, I continued with grafting of oranges. I 
planted onions again and harvested 36 bags and I sold them at TShs 18,000 – 24,000 per bag. 
For the money I got I purchased two milling machines which I later sold and continued to 
advance my agriculture and I started a food crop business. After sometime, I built another 
house and started lending other community members money. For every TShs 3,000 I was 
lending I was paid a sack of maize, and then I could sell the maize for TShs 15,000 – 20,000. I 
have 8 cows and 4 oxen. I’m selling milk and the oxen are used for ploughing and weeding. I still 
sell orange seedlings, pineapples and bananas. Now, I have no problems paying school fees for 
my children in secondary school and vocational centre.  
 
Today I have two houses. One has 7 residential rooms and 2 business rooms which I am renting 
out at TShs 5,000 and 15,000 respectively per room per month. The other house is where we 
are living. I am planning to open a shop soon and I am still growing onions (see photo below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I am sharing my knowledge with the youth in my village and many are now growing onions. 
Some of them started by being casual labourers in my farm and I later gave them sugarcane 
seedlings which they planted. From there, they have prospered in agriculture. The reason 
people are poor here is because they only work during the wet season but I work throughout 
the year.  
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Successful diversification 
In a bid to move away from mono-crop agriculture, the Regional Authorities wanted to 
introduce new crops that could earn farmers money. So, the authorities asked RUDEP to start 
piloting cultivation of sunflower, round (Irish) potatoes and beans. High yielding varieties 
were introduced. The districts through the RUDEP District Development Funds (DDFs) 
promoted the growing of sunflower 
while the Uyole Agricultural Research 
Institute through its Nkundi sub-station 
propagated the growing of potatoes in 
Nkundi, Kipande and Kantawa villages. 
Ten years hence, it appears these crops 
have been widely adopted.  
 
 
 
 
Women selling potatoes in Kantawa village on the 
Sumbawanga-Mpanda road  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sunflower in particular is giving a stiff 
competition to maize as farmers are 
increasingly expanding sunflower 
acreages. This motivation comes from 
the fact that the market for sunflower is 
readily available, oil pressing machines 
are found in large numbers and thirdly 
that the sunflower oil is good for cooking as it is not highly refined as industrial cooking oils. 
It took off from the mid-1990s with the assistance of RUDEP and GTZ. Seeds were 
distributed to farmers and also manual oil pressing machines were given to villages (e.g. in 
Mwimbi Division). Today, these hand pressure machines have been replaced by diesel 
powered ones. In Sumbawanga there are 20 small-scale businesses with oil expeller machines. 
Many women are involved in the cooking oil business, and the association of oil producers is 
headed by a woman.  
 
In Kantawa village, close to Nkundi, farmers explained that they experienced a three-fold 
increase in the yield with new potato varieties introduced to them. They rotate maize and 
potato, and ¾ of the farmers grow potatoes and it is the most important cash crop, followed by 
beans and maize.  
 
Intensifying agriculture and more use of oxen 
Surveys in the late 1980s indicated that over 60% of farms in the region had access to trained 
oxen that were used for ploughing. The use of oxen for transport, weeding, harrowing and 
planting however was quite limited. The implements required were not available, and the 
technology partly not known. Through its various community participation projects RUDEP 
promoted the use of new agricultural implements and farming methods. Groups of farmers in 
Mwimbi were given improved seeds (maize, beans and groundnuts) and were trained on 
improved farming. In Kantawa, farmer groups were given ploughs, weeders and planters, 
enabling them to extend the acreage farmed.  
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Testing a new “RUDEP” oxcart 
 
 
 
 
 
In Usevya, a group of women 
were given an ox plough on 
loan after being trained. The 
group had been formed in order 
to get the assistance from 
RUDEP. The group failed to 
service the loan as per the 
agreement so they decided to 
sell the plough in order to offset 
the loan. The plough was sold to 
a nearby villager from whom 
they could hire the service. It 
was a general experience that farmer groups often were dissolved because the members could 
not agree on how to contribute. In that sense, RUDEP failed as much as the ideology of 
“African socialism” – ujamaa na kujitegemea – did. However, the knowledge and the 
equipment passed on to farmers were actively used on family farms.  
 
 
 
Double ploughing in Mwimbi division 
through the use of oxen  
 
 
 
 
 
RUDEP, in cooperation with the 
Mbeya Oxenisation Project, 
extended the use of oxcarts by 
distributing prototypes and 
training local craftsmen in 
making them. A total of 47 ox 
carts were constructed with 
support of RUDEP. Today, 
oxcarts are available on hire in 
most villages, and in Sumbawanga and Namanyere there are private oxcart makers. One 
farmer explained the benefits in this way: “We have benefited a lot from this technology; 
oxcarts have eased transportation of building materials, such as sand, brick and stones, and 
crop produce from the fields to the market. Moreover, we can now transport farmyard manure 
to the field”.  
 
One district agricultural official confirmed the increased use of manure which to a great 
extent can be attributed to the availability of oxcarts. The effect of using manure is 
considerable; the difference between manured and non-manured fields can range up to 5-7 
bags per acre. A villager from Mwimbi said: “Tunaweza tukatoa mfano wa Mzee Malifimbo 
ambaye alikuwa akipata gunia arobaini kutoka ekari kumi lakini sasa anapata gunia 300 – 
400 kutoka ekari ishirini (We can give an example of Mr. Malifimbo who used to harvest 40 
bags from ten acres but now harvests between 300-400 bags from 20 acres)”.  
CMI REPORT RUKWA RUKA R 2009: 12 
 
 61 
Mr. Peter Sasala of Namanyere is an oxcart maker and earns his living from making carts. 
The demand for oxcarts has increased to the extent that there is a shortage of supply. “You 
see, I cannot make enough oxcarts to fulfil the needs of my customers. Getting a loan is 
cumbersome and I don’t have any support to purchase enough equipments which would 
enabled me to make more oxcarts; at least 10 per month. Right now I am making only three 
per month”. Mr. Sasala was not trained by RUDEP but has benefited from the market for ox 
carts stimulated by the programme.  
 
 
 
Oxcarts made in Nkansi District – the ones to the left by Mr. Sasala 
 
It is notable that oxenisation is for the better-off farmers only. Poor households do not have 
the financial resources to invest in the implements, not to speak of having trained oxen in the 
first place. This applies to many small and female headed households. In the absence of other 
opportunities for cash income, they also have limited ability to pay for ploughing or transport 
by oxen. A process of creating grater economic inequality in rural areas is well advanced.  
4.4.2 Forestry: an uphill battle 
The process of deforestation on the Ufipa plateau is not a recent phenomenon. The Fipa have 
for centuries practiced sedentary farming based on slash-and-burn (ntemele) , but the 
villagisation combined with population growth and also the abandonment of a traditional 
farming system aiming at retaining soil fertility (based on compost-mounding and tree-year 
crop rotation and fallow periods – called intumba) have accelerated the process. The British 
colonial masters banned ntemele already in 1938 in an attempt to arrest deforestation and 
protect water catchments.  
 
Rules are posted but 
enforcement remains weak 
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RUDEP developed a twin strategy of both protection and tree planting. Both turned out to be 
an uphill battle, having to fight deeply ingrained beliefs making people set bush fires every 
dry season, people reluctant to invest in tree planting when they had good reasons to doubt 
whether they would be able to hold on to the land until trees had matured, and an escalating 
demand for firewood not least because more and more people wanted houses constructed 
from burned bricks. 
 
Protection of forest reserves 
The first project was protection of the water catchments supplying drinking water to 
Sumbawanga town – the Mbizi Forest Reserve covering an area of 24000 ha, gazetted in 
1958. Thirty years later, half of this area was open grassland. The situation was the same in 
the Chala Forest Reserve also taken up by RUDEP. RUDEP financed firebreaks and 
watchmen, and replanted denuded areas, mainly with indigenous species. Attempts were 
made to enlist the support of surrounding villages by offering employment as well as free 
seedlings for their own use. The main challenge was to limit forest fires and protect planted 
areas. 
 
In total, RUDEP planted 1600 hectares in Mbizi from 1986 to 1992, of which there is little 
remaining today. There were at the time noticeable improvements in forest cover, reduction of 
fire incidents and illegal felling, although bush fires took place every year. With the closure of 
RUDEP Mbizi was again left to its own destiny and the situation has since deteriorated (see 
photos). 
 
 
 
 
) 
A village nursery supported by RUDEP (1990 
The forest reserve turns into open grassland 
(April 2008). The area was once planted by RUDEP 
and later destroyed by fires. Some indigenous 
species planted have survived but do not grow big 
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While the justification for protecting these reserves was never put in question, concerns were 
raised about the approach. Did it work? Was planting worth the money, or should natural 
regeneration only be promoted through prevention of fires and encroachment? Was the right 
species selected? Whatever the approach, it depended on strong government commitment. 
There are positive signs that this is coming back after the inertia that set in with the closure of 
RUDEP, but funding remains severely limited.  
 
Village afforestation  
These projects took place in Sumbawanga Municipality and the Sumbawanga and Nkasi 
districts. The approach included sensitisation through village meetings, forming of village 
committees, assistance in setting up small nurseries, provision of essential equipment and 
training of nursery attendants. The targets involved both the establishment of woodlots 
and conservation of existing forested areas. The outputs have been mixed, and there is no 
clear evidence that deforestation on the Ufipa plateaus has been arrested. The root causes to 
this problem, by and large, have not diminished – i.e. ambiguity with respect to land rights 
and open access to forest resources on what is perceived as public lands, population growth 
and increased demand for firewood and timber, bush fires, and problems of protecting young 
trees from grazing animals. 
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However, the story of Mr. Mkondiya (above) amply illustrates that with commitment, 
knowledge and security of tenure – the essential preconditions in afforestation – 
environmental degradation can be stopped.  
 
Another evidence of change is the greening of Sumbawanga town. Today, seedlings are sold 
commercially as exemplified by the life story of by Mr. Martin – known as the Gardener.  
Ernest Mkondiya: A passionate forester 
Mzee Mkondiya (see photo) is famous in the area for his passion for tree planting – for 
timber as well as fruits. After completing four years of primary school at the newly 
established catholic mission at Ulumi he went to Mbeya in 1950 where he picked up the 
knowledge of planting pine and eucalyptus. A few years later a foreign company came to the 
area to explore possibilities for establishing tree estates, and Mkondiya was offered a one-
year course in tree planting at Sumbawanga. He established a nursery and distributed to 
villages, but most trees died for lack of proper care. He later continued distributing 
seedlings free to the new ujamaa villages – especially schools. Today, he has twenty small 
nurseries on his land, which stands out with its lush vegetation, orchards of oranges and 
banana and stands of tall eucalyptus (see photo). 
 
He was never forced to resettle during ujamaa, and have developed his property without 
interruption. Why is Mkondiya such an exception in an area of escalating deforestation? He 
explained that people faced problems protecting seedlings against termites, but a change in 
attitude seems to take place. More people are coming to ask for seedlings. Maybe, people 
again gradually see the benefits in long-term investments. 
 
Mkondiya have benefited from his investments in trees, but his investments could have 
yielded so much more if there had been a better market for timber and fruits. 
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A view of a greener Sumbawanga seen from the road to Mbizi Forest Reserve 
 
 
Mr Martin – the Gardener 
Mr. Martin (see photo with his wife) was born in 1940 in Sumbawanga District. After leaving 
school at Grade 6, he was employed by the Government in 1979 as a Ward Executive Officer 
but later became a Branch Secretary of CCM and later a Village Chairperson. 
  
In the execution of his duties, he happened to visit one 
farmer who had fruit trees that were doing very well. 
Since in those years it was almost a belief that fruit 
trees could not grow on the Ufipa Plateau, he did not 
believe his eyes. So he asked that farmer where he got 
the fruit seedlings and if he could also get them. He 
was directed to a RUDEP Horticultural Garden that 
was in Kantalamba area, and returned home full of zeal 
of owning his own garden and immediately he started 
preparing one.  
 
He says that he regularly visited the RUDEP Garden and bought more and more seedlings. 
Among them were avocado, oranges, lime, guavas and lemons that he planted in his garden 
and tended them according to the extension education given to him. The more the fruit trees 
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blossomed, the more he increased his attention in looking after them and expanding the 
garden till it reached three acres (almost 1.5 ha). After some years, he started testing fruits of 
his sweat. Some fruits were eaten by his family and the surplus was sold. 
 
He started selling the fruits and ever since he has been earning not less than TShs 
1,000,000/= per year. He used the money for paying school fees for his children, for buying 
garden inputs, for other domestic expenditures and also bought 2 dairy cows.  
 
He narrates that when people saw that the fruits could be grown on the Plateau, they also 
wanted to try to raise them. So, he shared with them the basics of starting a fruit garden but 
directed them to the RUDEP Garden for the seedlings and also for the extension education as 
he himself was still dependent upon RUDEP for more expert training.   
 
When RUDEP phased out its activities in 1995, Martin started raising fruit seedlings himself 
just to fill in the gap. He started a nursery of 10,000 seedlings of various grafted fruit trees 
among which were mangoes, passion fruits, oranges and even coffee. He sold the seedlings at 
a flat rate of TShs 100/= per piece just to motivate as many farmers as possible to adopt fruit 
and other tree growing husbandry.  
 
His involvement in orchard business made him famous as many individuals and Non-
Governmental Organisations went to learn from him and buy fruits and seedlings. As a result 
of this, in 2006, he was offered a Study Tour to Uganda by the Heifer International Project as 
he was also a beneficiary of this project. 
 
In Uganda, he learnt many things not only in animal husbandry but also in horticulture. He 
learnt how a farmer can make a “kitchen garden” even if he has an area of land as small as 1 
square meter. On returning home, Martin started his Kitchen Garden where he planted 
vegetables. He also started teaching others how to integrate the livestock and the fruit 
growing as they complement each other. He narrates that so far about 20 of his trainee 
farmers are almost becoming his competitors on fruits and have adopted zero grazing of 
animals. 
 
Martin has a long term goal of being a focal point in fruit growing as he intends to start fruit 
processing just to add on value to the products he is selling. He will also buy fruits from other 
gardeners. 
 
He winds up his story by saying that although RUDEP ended some 12 years ago, it left them 
with the fruit and vegetable farming knowledge that they are now using to eradicate poverty. 
He continues to say that farmers now know that nearly all fruits can be grown on the Plateau. 
So he thinks that in a couple of years, the Region will be self sufficient in fruits and hence stop 
importation of fruits from other regions. 
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4.3 Improvement of infrastructure 
4.3.1 Rural roads: creating immediate benefits 
Improvement of rural roads was highest on the priority list of the regional authorities, and 
NORAD soon realised that this had to become a major element of the programme. Already in 
1986 efforts started to plan the first two projects, namely improving the roads connecting the 
Mwimbi Division, selected as the first focus area of community development, to the trunks 
roads, and the road from the Ufipa plateau down the escarpment to the Rukwa valley – the 
Ntendo-Muze road. 
 
In view of the need to maximize employment creation and the major difficulties associated 
with operating and maintaining heavy road construction equipment it was decided to try 
labour-based techniques. The problems with machine-based road works were amply 
demonstrated by the bulldozers, tractors and graders rusting in the yard of the Regional 
Engineering Department (Ujenzi) stranded for lack of simple spare parts and qualified 
mechanics after only limited use. RUDEP did provide funds in an attempt to get some of 
these equipments back into service. 
 
 
Road works on Ntendo-Muze road (1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooperation was established with 
ILO which had extensive 
experience with labour-based road 
works in Africa. Under the 
supervision of an engineer 
seconded from ILO, the initial 
aim was to establish technical 
procedures and training guidelines appropriate for the local circumstances by working on the 
road from Sumbawanga to Mwimbi. Several issues had to be addressed: the feasibility of 
mobilising community participation as an alternative to paid labourers; the seasonal 
availability of labour; and prospects of engaging women. There was clearly a need to upgrade 
technical skills. Work initiated on the Mwimbi road under the supervision of the Regional 
Engineer received the following judgement by ILO: “… while being pursued with 
enthusiasm; [it] was almost entirely counterproductive. In many places the condition of the 
road was actually becoming worse”102. There was initially a lot of scepticism against labour-
based technology in the Region, but it turned out successfully. 
 
In her third half-yearly report the ILO Project Engineer reported of difficulties of mobilising 
self-help participation on the feeder road where this approach was to be tested. “The 
attendance of labourers is very erratic and small in number, also the quality of work on some 
sections is well below standard”103.  
 
When the road sector activities of RUDEP were reviewed in 1989, the team concluded that 
the pilot project for labour based road rehabilitation had “proved the viability of extending 
                                                     
102 Mission Report from ILO Regional Adviser, April 1988. 
103 Ritchie, Jane M (1989). Third bi-annual progress report, January-June 1989, RUDEP. 
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this method in the region”, but the standard adopted was considered too low to be 
sustainable.104 The importance of the quality and quantity of professional engineering 
supervision was strikingly evident when comparing two road projects in Mwimbi Division 
implemented simultaneously – one supervised by an expatriate engineer and the other by a 
Tanzanian engineer.105 This case amply illustrated how critically dependent programmes like 
RUDEP are on qualified and motivated staff.  
 
The review team furthermore noted that one had to be more careful in encouraging women to 
work on the roads “until the nutrition of mothers and young children is improved” (in section 
5.3 we further analyse the impact of RUDEP on women). The team also commented on the 
relationship between RUDEP and the Regional Engineer’s Office (Ujenzi), and advised 
against the established RUDEP model where Project Officers (in this case appointed by the 
Ministry of Communications and Works) reported directly to READ/RUDEP. This made 
RUDEP assuming a responsibility for implementation which it ought not to have, it was 
argued. The justification for this set-up had been the need, for valid reasons, to strengthen 
accountability. The team recommended that RUDEP should engage more in institutional 
support to the sector, especially the improvement of regional transport planning and the 
capacity of Ujenzi for maintenance of prioritised roads. 
 
It is also interesting to note the change of approach with respect to the road down to the 
Rukwa valley (Ntendo-Muze). In the initial planning, all parties agreed that the only feasible 
option was to tender the project because of the weak capacity of Ujenzi. However, the work of 
the Tanzanian company that did the detailed design and prepared tender documents was later 
discarded, and a decision made to do the project “locally” as a mainly labour based operation. 
This is one of many examples of learning by doing, in the true spirit of RUDEP, but not 
everybody looked at it in such a positive light. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintenance on the Sumbawanga-Mwimbi road April 2008 
 
 
 
                                                     
104 Project Review TAN-060, RUDEP – the Road Sector Activities, October 1989. 
105 READ, ’Status Report on the Implementation of Recommendations from the 1988 RUDEP Joint Annual 
Review, November 1989. 
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At the termination of the programme, the status of the “RUDEP roads” was as follows: 
  
  
Kaengesa-Mwimbi Maintenance had been handed over to Ministry of Works 
Laela-Mwimbi - same - 
Ntendo-Muze Under RUDEP maintenance 
Paramawe-Namanyere-Chala - same - 
Mwimbi-Kizombwe Under construction 
 
 
It was reported that 200 km of regional roads out of a network of 1200 km had been 
rehabilitated by RUDEP, in addition to 70 km of district roads. About 2500 workers had 
received training in labour based road construction techniques. While this technology had 
been proven appropriate to the Region and people greatly appreciated the income earning 
opportunity, it had been evident that road works faced labour shortages during the main 
farming season.  
 
For some years RUDEP established a lengthman system for road maintenance, using workers 
who had been involved in labour-based road rehabilitation each covering about 3 km. Without 
continued funding the system soon collapsed and after RUDEP there were no funds for 
maintenance for several years. 
 
 
Ntendo-Muze Base Camp  - 
Now cows grazing 
 
 
 
The Ntento-Muze base construction 
depot on the edge of the escarpment 
is an example of facilities not being 
used today and gradually is falling 
into disrepair. It was built to 
maximise efficiency during the 
construction period, and to function 
as a depot for road maintenance in 
the future. The latter was never 
established.  
 
4.3.2 Kasanga port: today a major success 
The idea of improving the facilities for berthing cargo and passenger ships at the Kasanga 
port by Lake Tanganyika had been launched by the Region already in the late 1980s, but 
NORAD did question the economic feasibility. However, NORAD finally gave in and the 
construction of new berthing facilities at Kasanga was the last major RUDEP project 
approved, even necessitating a special arrangement for channelling funds after the closure of 
RUDEP using Norwegian Peoples Aid and RANGO (a newly established NGO umbrella 
organisation). 
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Kasanga port under construction 
 
 
 
 
 
There has since been a growing 
demand for food and consumer 
goods in Eastern DRC and today 
Kasanga has also become an 
export outlet for cement to 
Burundi. Thus, the port has 
created business opportunities for 
transporters who ferry cement 
and other commodities from 
Mbeya. At the port there are today some 30 – 40 men engaged in loading and unloading ships 
(see photo). 
 
 
2008 - workers busy 
loading and offloading 
luggage from a 
passenger ship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Area development through participatory planning and self-
help: effective but resource demanding 
 
Concentrate efforts on one Division 
To bring development closer to the people, RUDEP-managers proposed a radical experiment: 
one had to bring the planning process physically closer to villagers. It was decided to 
concentrate resources initially in one division of Sumbawanga District – Mwimbi Division – 
and bring qualified manpower to the division on a permanent basis. RUDEP constructed staff 
houses, an office and a small guest house in Mwimbi. An experienced Community 
Development Officer moved there to manage the Mwimbi Area Development Programme - 
MAD. He summarised the approach as follows:106 
o Communication, awareness creation and mobilisation at village level. 
o Involvement of and cooperation with local political structures in project identification 
and implementation. 
o Improvement of existing government extension services. 
 
                                                     
106 Kapinga, N.B.(1989). ’Support to local self-help efforts – the approach of RUDEP’. 
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The concept had two main thrusts. One thrust was to stimulate the formation of self-help 
groups through Social Mobilisers, and assist village and group projects on a cost-sharing 
basis. Social Mobilisers, one women and one man in each village, were selected among 
villagers and given training and supervision. RUDEP would provide 40 to 70% of the project 
value, depending on the nature of the project (with less given to income generating projects), 
while the group would provide the rest, mostly in-kind. The second thrust was to bring in 
various other public sector activities. This included road rehabilitation, water supply and 
health facilities. RUDEP also supported a Catholic mission to build a training centre on the 
agreement that it would be available for RUDEP-sponsored training. 
 
MAD was initially reporting directly to the RUDEP-office, although through the District 
Executive Director. In the longer term the idea was that the District would take over the full 
responsibility. The project also deliberately bypassed the Ward Development Committee and 
the District Council to reduce bureaucratic red-tape normally associated with projects to be 
included in the annual regional budget. 
 
The decision to build staff quarters and to bring qualified project staff closer to the area of 
operation applied first and foremost to staff of Maendeleo responsible for community 
participation and overall management of the project. But also a road engineer was housed at 
Mwimbi. This approach was later criticised as too expensive and not replicable.  
 
 
One of the staff houses in 
the Mwimbi Camp today 
 
 
 
 
 
It was argued that the 
housing standard was 
too high, and the 
design not suited for 
“African family life”. 
The issue of housing 
design had been 
debated with the 
regional authorities at 
an early stage, and 
they had insisted on 
applying standard 
government regulations for staff quarters. The houses are being used today by government 
officers, but maintenance has been poor. A study of the project from 2005 draws the lesson 
that low cost offices and houses should have been built.107 However, one cannot dismiss the 
counter argument that in a context where future maintenance is likely to be a major problem, 
investing in high quality is cost effective. But this was not raised as a justification when the 
decision was made to build the Mwimbi Base Camp. The planners had no reason to believe 
that the project would last only until 1995.  
 
The Fund for village level projects under MAD proved to be a success. Applications soon 
exceeded the funds available. After about one year 56 applications had come in, and in the 
box below we present the list of projects supported by end of 1989. The Project Officer 
                                                     
107 Mshana, S., W. Swai and G. Bugeraha (2005). ‘Learning from the past. A 10 year after assessment of Mwimbi 
Area Development Project in Rukwa Region, Tanzania. 
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commented: “As can be seen, the peoples’ needs call for inter-departmental involvement and 
cooperation”.108 
 
MAD was subject to an internal evaluation in 1993, when activities were at its peak. Two 
main messages were delivered. The project had succeeded in stimulating community 
participation: “it has shown, despite all 
the difficulties, this form of grass roots 
participation is effective”109. But more 
efforts were needed to increase the 
involvement of women, with only 15% 
of the groups supported being women 
groups. The second message was one of 
concern about the high costs applied to 
construction activities arguing that this 
would not be sustainable if left to local 
communities for operation and 
maintenance.  
 
In 2005, a team from Sumbawanga was asked by Norad to assess the longer-term impacts of 
MAD. They visited 8 out of 43 villages, randomly selected, and concluded based on peoples’ 
responses: 110 
 
o Economic impact. The project had “contributed significantly to the revamping of 
Mwimbi division”. This was evident through increased agricultural production and 
trade. After RUDEP, there was a marked deterioration of the economy: “agriculture 
has deteriorated year by year”. According to the report, the yield per acre of maize in 
2005 was only one-third of the 1993 figures. “During the MAD years Mwimbi 
Village became a commercial centre where traders from nearby villages came to 
purchase their merchandise for their shops. There was a guesthouse and a decent 
tearoom, which are not operating any more.”  
 
o Education. MAD had little impact on primary education. The enrolment rate in 2005 
was high, but this was explained by the removal of school fees as from 2002. MAD 
had financed a secondary school, and the team noted with concern that attendance in 
2005 was almost the same as in 1995. They related this to the inability of parents to 
afford school expenses, and the mere physical deterioration of school buildings. 
 
o Health. The input of MAD to health institutions had not been sustainable – Mwimbi 
Health Centre and village dispensaries were in a poor condition and often medicines 
were not available. “As a result traditional healers and traditional birth attendants 
have again resumed a greater role in health services.” However, the non-tangible 
impact of health education had been quite strong – on sanitation and nutrition. 
“Today all women are aware of the importance of a varied diet and most households 
have vegetable gardens.” 
 
o Water supply: The situation since 1995 had worsened significantly. During the dry 
period “most people have no access to safe water”. The main reason appears to be 
that the water table has been gradually sinking. 
 
o Community participation. The introduction of Social Mobilisers originating from the 
villages “seems to be the single most important achievement”. These became 
                                                     
108 Kapinga (1989). 
109 A second Evaluation of Mwimbi Area Development (MAD), August 23 – September 10, 1993. 
110 Mshana, S. et al. Op.cit. 
Mwimbi – village level projects 
 
• 8 agricultural projects 
• 2 carpentry groups 
• Bridge construction (Msoma) 
• Godown (Kafakula) 
• Dispensary (Kalemba) 
• 2 vegetable gardens 
• 2 water supplay projects 
• Repair of milling machine 
• Restaurant 
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appreciated and acknowledged for their role, and today there are Social Mobilisers in 
all villages of Sumbawanga District, as part of the current government policy of 
village-based participatory planning. But there were also a growing sense of apathy 
among village leaders since there had been no response from government for years to 
their proposals. Gender awareness seemed to have increased. And on a positive note, 
the team concluded that “empowered with skills that originate back to the time of the 
MAD project, more people have confidence and capacity to take part in their own 
development process then ever before”. 
 
A second MAD 
Although concerns had been raised about the replicability of MAD as model to be extended 
throughout all divisions, it definitely had a positive effect in giving a marginalised area a 
developmental boost. Hence, RUDEP offered in 1992 to start a similar programme in Mpanda 
District. The District selected Mpimbwe Division in the Rukwa valley because of its transport 
problems, being cut off during the rainy season, and escalating land degradation and conflicts 
over land use between resident farmers (Pimbwe) and immigrant pastoralists (Sukuma). 
Agricultural yields were decreasing year by year, especially affecting the Pimbwe. The 
Sukuma, with their large herds of cattle and trained oxen for ploughing faired much better, but 
their extensive farming system greatly contributed to deforestation and drying up of the area. 
 
A participatory rural appraisal exercise was carried out recommending greater involvement of 
the Sukuma, tree planting and support to primary health care. Maendeleo posted a project 
officer to the area, a staff house and project office was built, and people were encouraged to 
form development groups. The project lasted effectively only two years, and the results were 
meagre; apparently also due to poor staff performance and lack of supervision by the District 
and RUDEP. Visiting Usevya in 2008, the most tangible impact according to some informants 
was the “RUDEP Store”, as people called it, operated by the RUDEP Project Officer. People 
benefited from the reduced prices offered, as the owner used the RUDEP vehicle for transport 
of his merchandise.  
 
At the closure of RUDEP, Maendeleo reported that more than 200 groups had been supported 
and 197 village projects implemented in Mwimbi and Mpimbwe. 
 
District Development Fund (DDF) 
This approach became an important part of RUDEP in the second phase, “and is probably the 
part of the programme which has had most success with the bottom-up approach”111.  
 
The DDF-concept was an attempt to move ownership entirely to the village requesting 
support. The guidelines were very similar to the once later adopted by the World Bank 
financed Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). DDF only contained infrastructure grants, 
and each district had a DDF controlled by the District administration. 80% of the Fund had to 
be earmarked for village initiated projects; the remaining could be used for projects initiated 
by the Council. The guidelines said: 
 
• The projects are at all stages the village property and the village responsibility. Under 
no circumstances can the DDF take over responsibility or any liability for the project 
and its performance. 
• The self-help/co-funding component must have a value of at least 20% of total project 
cost, and must be rendered as cash. In addition, contributions in kind may be 
accepted. This cash is to be entered into a bank account before grant money is made 
available. The village contribution will be utilized first, thereafter the DDF money.  
 
                                                     
111 Lunøe, B. R. Tembele and M. Bilia. Review Report on RUDEP 1995/96 Implementation, NORAD/PMO, 
February 1996. 
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4.5 Economic production and small-scale industry: a non-starter  
It is evident from RUDEP’s budgets that this programme area never took off. RUDEP was not 
successful in getting the local banks to cooperate on a credit scheme. The alternative became 
a revolving fund managed by SIDO. Support was extended to exploitation of the coal fields at 
Namwele, training of grinding mill owners, and tile and charcoal oven production. 
Regrettably, SIDO was not able to ensure loan recovery, and none of the loans were repaid. 
 
Although direct support to private sector development proved difficult, the indirect effects of 
RUDEP on the regional economy were substantial, as further elaborated in the next chapter. 
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5. Impacts of RUDEP: what is the RUDEP legacy 
today? 
This is a question that cannot be answered in a definite way. To do so scientifically entails 
analysis of the so-called ‘counterfactual’ – i.e. determining what would likely have happened 
in the absence of RUDEP and compare with what is observable today. Similar regions or 
districts without aid programmes of this kind could have been used as a counterfactual. One 
could also have compared Rukwa with regions or districts where area-based aid programmes 
have remained active until today. However, these kinds of analyses would have required time 
and resources not available for this study. Our approach has been confined to collecting data 
on Rukwa.  
 
In so doing, we looked at processes of change from when RUDEP entered the scene until it 
closed, and from then on until today. We have also visited villages with or without RUDEP 
involvement, to see whether people themselves today recognise any difference in their post-
RUDEP development.112 This is the closest we come to a counterfactual analysis. Although 
this does not give us the means to clearly differentiate between the impacts of RUDEP versus 
other factors, we know that from 1982 to 1996 Norwegian aid by a wide margin was the 
dominant player on the field, and after RUDEP no similar player took its place. As one long-
time officer in the regional administration said: 
 
“RUDEP has contributed a lot to the development of Rukwa Region and we 
do not know if there were no RUDEP how backward the Region would have 
been today! Since it phased out we have been struggling to get donors who 
would support the Region but we have not been able to get any! We are really 
missing RUDEP as the gap is vivid.”113 
 
Although similar views were expressed by many, there is little evidence to be found in the 
great number of reports that were produced on RUDEP and KIDEP: “The documentation is 
weak … as a basis for analysing the impact from the programmes … no baseline exists for 
any of the programmes”114.  
 
It needs to be emphasised that RUDEP impacted on the region in two ways; both in the way it 
entered into various development investments and in the way it exited from them. The rapid 
withdrawal of what constituted 80 percent of the combined public development budgets of the 
Region obviously created ripple effects on the economy, organisational cultures and people’s 
attitudes. While the economic and financial evaluation of RUDEP in 1993 produced 
arguments for those wanting to close the programme, it did also warn against a rapid 
withdrawal of aid: 
 
“The donor dependence thus created by RUDEP and KIDEP makes it 
critically important that the phasing out of the programmes is carefully 
planned and designed to avoid unintended economic contractions. And the 
phasing out of the programme should be planned well in advance of 
implementation.”115  
 
                                                     
112 The control villages are: Madibira and Kiundinamema in Mwimbi Division, Sumbawanga District; and 
Kakoma and Mbwendi in Namanyere Division, Nkasi District. 
113 Quote from RECODA (2008), p. 39. 
114 Naustdalslid, J. and B. Aaasen (1995), p. 77. 
115 3E Economics (1993), p. 5-12. 
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It is evident that the regional cash economy contracted with the closure of RUDEP, and since 
no replacement funding came in projects just grounded to a halt. With this in mind, we 
present our assessments of impacts in relation to nine different dimensions of development 
that all have appeared as goals set by RUDEP: 
 
• Poverty reduction – i.e. the improvement of the economic and social conditions of 
poor households  
• Gender equality 
• Economic growth 
• Environmental protection 
• Capacity development of public institutions 
• Private sector development 
• Strengthening of the civil society 
• Policy development  
• Human resources development 
 
5.1 Impacts on the economic and social conditions of the poor  
The situation today 
Available information (see Chapter 2) suggests that there has not been a noticeable reduction 
in poverty despite growth in agricultural production. Rukwa still ranks low among regions in 
Tanzania if we combine indices of consumption, education and health. The situation in rural 
areas seems to be comparable to what it was 10 years ago although some farmers have 
succeeded in further expanding incomes. Market access improved during the time of RUDEP, 
but has since stagnated. This was confirmed in interviews. 
 
Farmers have experienced that farm level crop prices, especially for maize, have declined 
relative to the costs of agricultural inputs and essential commodities. The absence of 
functioning cooperatives, at village as well as regional level, makes it difficult for farmers to 
store produce and sell when prices are better.  
 
Informants reported that the purchasing power of maize sold by a farmer compared to the 
price of sugar in the shop has declined over the last ten years. 
 
 
 Sugar 
(price per kg in TShs) 
Maize 
(price per tin in TShs) 
Ratio  
1998 200 600 1 tin maize bought 3 kilo 
of sugar 
2008 1200 2400 1 tin maize bought 2 kilo 
of sugar
 
 
At the time of our study farmers were buying a kilo of maize flour at the price of TShs 500, or 
TShs 50,000 for a bag of 100kg. The same quantity was sold by the same farmers during time 
of harvesting at the price of TShs 10,000-15,000. This serves to illustrate the considerable 
profit margin benefiting the middle-men – traders and owners of food processing businesses. 
Buyers have often no competition and can dictate the price, especially where the roads are 
bad. For instance, comparing crop prices in Madibira (a control village) with Ulumi 
(benefiting from RUDEP road rehabilitation) it was reported that the price offered to farmers 
in Madibira was 25% less. Hence, the situation for poor and marginal households has not 
improved commensurate with growth in the overall regional economy.  
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However, no up-to-date study of change in Rukwa over time exists. A socio-economic profile 
of Rukwa Region presents a picture of rapid GDP growth between 1984 and 1994 – 
increasing thirty times in current value.116 However, this was a period when the annual 
inflation rate hovered around 30%, which means that the GDP in real value about doubled in 
the 10 year period which coincided with RUDEP.117 We have no reliable data from the last 
decade, but the 2005 Poverty and Human Development Report confirms that for the country 
as whole “it is in the rural economy where growth has been weakest”118. Between 1991 and 
2000 the estimated percentage of households living below the poverty line did not change (the 
figure dropped from 39 to 36%, which is within the statistical error margin). Where regional 
comparisons are made Rukwa falls in the lower middle range.  
 
 
An old type house from 
Ulumi, Sumbawanga 
District 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The social conditions 
have changed, 
however. There is a 
marked difference in 
peoples’ awareness 
and aspirations. This 
started during 
RUDEP, described 
by many as an eye-
opener to the Region, 
and has continued 
since. This is observable in health seeking behaviour, in changing and more nutritional food 
habits, improved housing standards and the attitude towards education. Communication is 
easier, including by mobile phones, and people are motivated for change. Above we see a 
photo of the type of house common before the 1990s – built by dried mud-bricks, with grass 
roofing and having merely small openings in the wall as windows. Below is a photo of a new 
house – built in burned bricks, with cemented floor, iron sheets on the roof and proper 
windows. Informants claimed that at least two-thirds now live in houses of the modern type. 
 
However, looking at health statistics there is no real improvement over the last 15 years, and 
key informants argued that the situation has gradually worsened because public health 
facilities have deteriorated. Government policy is to discourage the use of Traditional Birth 
Attendants during delivery, but still half of all pregnant mothers go to them. In addition, one 
informant argued that today there are likely many more unreported deaths since “we do not 
have someone collecting data at village level. The TBAs did this, but today they are afraid of 
reporting”. 
 
Impacts of RUDEP 
There is substantial evidence that RUDEP contributed in a major way to improving living 
conditions. First and foremost, the improved access to clean drinking water had an impact on 
                                                     
116 United Republic of Tanzania (1998), p.20. 
117 Laryea and Sumaila (2001). 
118 United Republic of Tanzania (2005), p.94. 
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the health situation – for instance in reduced infant mortality. The Water Project worked in all 
areas of the Region, and reached about 60% of the villages by the time RUDEP closed. Health 
indicators improved significantly from 1985 to 1995. Training and posting of Village Health 
Workers contributed considerably – e.g. the immunization cover tripled during the RUDEP 
period. Likewise, the training and equipping of Traditional Birth Attendants reduced maternal 
deaths.  
 
 
A new type house from 
Ulumi village  
 
 
 
 
 
A second area of 
major impact was 
transport. Where 
roads were rehabili-
tated by RUDEP it 
immediately un-
leashed increased 
economic activity. 
Crop marketing was 
stimulated and prices 
to the farmers im-
proved, and the ease 
of communication 
itself, through busses, private trucks and not to forget all the RUDEP vehicles plying the 
roads “helping” with transport, as it was often phrased, stimulated retail trade and lowered the 
prices on commodities. On our visit to Mwimbi Division, where three road projects radically 
improved transport, people repeatedly referred to this effect. 
 
Furthermore, RUDEP directly transferred assets and incomes to rural people. The labour 
based road construction approach provided seasonal employment, and the stories are many 
about how people used this cash to invest in agriculture and housing. The groups supported 
through community development approaches benefited mostly in kind. Although the groups 
were rarely viable, and often formed opportunistically just to access benefits, resource 
transfers nevertheless improved peoples’ economy. 
 
Finally, we have to mention the attitudinal change referred to above. Of course, RUDEP was 
not at all the only force of influence, but many informants referred to the physiological effects 
of the presence of development workers and activities in areas that for long had been 
accustomed to be marginalised from modern Tanzania. It created expectations and changed 
mindsets. In a focus group discussion with women in Mwimbi village the following changes 
were mentioned: 
 
• “We now understand the importance of planting trees.” 
• “We now practice farming throughout the year, which has improved income.” 
• “Our group mentality has improved. From the former RUDEP women’s group new 
ones have sprung, and some groups practice saving and credit – called ROSCAs.” 
• “Our awareness about women’s and children’s rights has changed. “ 
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Where RUDEP did not create a lasting impact 
It follows from the above, that when RUDEP left there was not yet a foundation in place for 
continued reduction in poverty. The development benefits of the physical infrastructure 
financed by RUDEP (especially water supplies and roads) were sustainable only as long as 
maintenance was ensured. The RUDEP roads were the first hit by the public finance crunch in 
the wake of RUDEP. There was virtually no maintenance for 5-6 years, until aid-funded 
national road funds found their way to Rukwa more recently. The water coverage has slowly 
deteriorated, and there is no imminent sign of an improvement. The way RUDEP was phased 
out there was no attempt to mitigate this situation. The flow of funds merely stopped, and 
virtually all RUDEP activities dependent on public financing similarly ceased. 
 
RUDEP was a brainchild of the community development ideology of the 1970s and 1980s, 
where great hopes were placed on the ability of rural farmers to form new types of collectives 
for both income generation as well as public services. Nyerere’s “African socialism” was a 
more extreme variant of this thinking, which overlooked the facts that villagers generally 
distrusted the government and internally were divided along tribal and social lines in a way 
that undermined the trust necessary for collective action. Hence, RUDEP’s efforts in group 
and community mobilisation in most cases were not viable. It is reported, though, that the 
current operations of TASAF do benefit from the experiences people had gained during 
RUDEP. But also that it took time to convince villagers disillusioned by the abrupt departure 
of RUDEP and half-finished activities, that TASAF is a reliable partner and is there to stay – 
hopefully so.  
 
It is our impression that people today stand more ready to mobilise own efforts, and that the 
dependency syndrome of the past has been weakened. This can been interpreted as a positive 
but not-intended effect of the decline of government interventions after RUDEP. We also 
observed that non-governmental initiatives have become more widespread, by religious 
organisations, people with money, and even through remittances from Tanzanians abroad – 
like the school called “Manchester” in one of the villages of Sumbawanga District.  
 
In retrospect, we see that RUDEP did not get far in setting up demand-driven support 
mechanisms. This was piloted in the Mwimbi Area Development project with some success, 
but was never institutionalised. The District Development Fund was another attempt in the 
same direction, but had a short lifespan and was never evaluated. Generally, RUDEP failed to 
address farming households or small-scale entrepreneurs at an individual level, through 
extension, subsidies or credit. Neither the politics of the time nor the institutional set-up of 
RUDEP was conducive.  
 
The introduction of VIP latrines was another area where little impact can be recorded. The 
technology was just not appropriate for the socio-cultural environment of Rukwa. But 
awareness about sanitation increased and people improved their traditional pit latrines. Still, 
in some areas the number of cases of cholera, dysentery, malaria etc. is relatively high due to 
unclean water and poor environmental sanitation.  
5.2 Impacts on gender relations 
The situation today 
Over the last twenty years there has been a marked change in the role of women among the 
Fipa. In urban areas with a much more mixed population we find women in quite influential 
positions within government, politics, the private sector, and the civil society. In the Mwimbi 
area, women said they are allowed to inherit property from both their husbands and parents, 
something that was not there earlier, and girls are sent to school. According to the chairperson 
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of a woman-NGO and community development officer, the Fipa women are now coming up; 
they can speak in public and the divorce rate is going down.119  
 
Women are much more active in village government today. Typically, in Ulumi village the 
composition of the Village Development Committee was as follows, with almost one-third 
being women: 
 
 
 Women Men Total 
Health Committee 2 3 5 
Finance and Planning Committee 2 3 5 
Security Committee 1 4 5 
Environment Committee 1 4 5 
Community Development Committee 1 4 5 
Total Village Development Committee 7 18 25 
 
 
Impacts of RUDEP 
‘Women in development’ emerged as a priority concern among many development agencies 
during the 1980s, and so also in Norway. In the programme agreement of 1986 this is 
reflected in the statement: ”stress will be laid on the integration of women and children in the 
various projects”. NORAD kept on pushing the Region to develop a “plan for the full 
involvement of women in the planning and development”, and noted with concern that this 
had not been accomplished by mid 1989.120 Later, special studies on the situation of women 
were commissioned, several study tours arranged, and in 1992 a large seminar in 
Sumbawanga was devoted to the issue. 
 
The regional and district civil service consisted mainly of men, and NORAD often raised its 
dissatisfaction with the level of women participation in the programme, both at the level of 
planning and implementation and among villagers. Efforts were made to recruit women in 
new expatriate positions, and in 1989 three out of five positions (the Water Project excluded) 
– linked to roads, health and community development – were women. The fact that ILO, in 
cooperation with RUDEP, recruited a female engineer to pilot labour based road works no 
doubt had a demonstration effect, which was further amplified when a Tanzanian female 
engineer also joined the project. They both made efforts to include women as labourers on 
road works. Notably, women did only participate as paid labourers. Only men worked on the 
road on self-help basis. It is evident that this opportunity of earning cash loosened traditional 
gender relations.  
 
Studies from about 1990 raised the nutritional status of women and problems of child care as 
a concern; the change from production of finger millet to maize had worsened the situation, 
with maize having a much lower nutritional value. Hence, the road projects started providing 
a nutritional meal and also child care at the work site. In 1990, it was still not common to 
grow vegetables and use vegetables in the diet, which is not the situation any longer. 
 
A senior officer of Nkasi District claimed that women participation started with RUDEP. He 
gave an example of the change that has happened: “When I recently needed gravel for my 
house in Namanyere it was women that turned up. They had gained experience from working 
on RUDEP roads”. RUDEP in the early 1990s supported women groups in every village in 
Nkasi District (87 in all), and a female community development adviser (a VSO volunteer) 
was stationed in the district.  
 
                                                     
119 Interview, Ms. W. Swai. 
120 Agreed Minutes, 3rd Annual Meeting 1.3.1989. 
CMI REPORT RUKWA RUKA R 2009: 12 
 
 81 
The Area Development concept, first initiated in the Mwimbi Division, involved women in 
the following ways: 
• Efforts were made to employ women on roads works. 
• Two ‘social immobilisers’ were recruited and trained in every village where the 
programme operated – one woman and one man. 
• Two village health workers were identified and trained – of both sexes. 
• Women groups were promoted and supported and all of them were focusing on 
income generation mostly through farming. 
• Traditional birth attendants received recognition and training. 
 
Where RUDEP did not have a lasting impact 
Although informants reported that RUDEP contributed towards changes in gender relations, 
most clearly in areas where there had been a concentration in community development efforts, 
the situation of many women and girls remains a matter of concern. The Aids pandemic is a 
case in point. It has resulted in an increasing number of female headed households that are 
economically more vulnerable, and more orphans, among them the girls being particularly 
vulnerable. RUDEP supported Aids prevention campaigns, but indirectly it also contributed to 
the spreading of HIV.  
5.3 Impact on the economy of the region – the GDP 
The situation today 
According to the Uyole Agriculture Centre two-thirds of the land in Rukwa Region is suitable 
for crop farming or animal husbandry, whereas in 1980 only about 3% was cultivated yearly. 
About 90% of the population, living in the 336 registered villages, was then dependent on 
farming. In Rukwa, the National Maize programme from 1974 had some success in raising a 
tradable surplus of maize, but crop production remained constrained by low prices to the 
farmers, inefficient state procurement agencies, transport problems and peasants giving 
priority to subsistence farming using traditional cultivation practices. 
 
The situation today is much the same when it comes to the role of agriculture in the economy, 
and still farming for own consumption is essential in the rural economy. In aggregate, 
however, the tradable surplus has increased, and most importantly, there is a greater 
diversification of crops. Still, there has been a trend towards declining take home value to the 
farmer from crop sales. There was not yet any evidence in 2008 of farmers benefiting from 
the global rise in food prices.  
 
In addition, farmers reported declining productivity per acre and that high prices on fertilizers 
made it uneconomical and unaffordable. Use of inorganic fertilizers has declined because of 
the higher prices compared to the price of maize, as one farmer reported: ‘the price of maize 
most of the time is at the average of 10,000 Shilling per bag and one acre can produce about 
15-20 bags per acre if you apply 3-4 bags of fertilizers. When the cost of each bag and 
transportation is about 25,000 Shilling it becomes very difficult to raise the cash needed and 
in addition there are the costs for seeds, ploughing and weeding’. In the Ufipa highland, when 
cultivating maize without fertilizers yields drops up to 5-8 bags per acre. However, in the 
Rukwa valley (Usevya) it was reported that yields can go up to 20 bags per acre without 
applying any fertilizer.121  
 
Impacts of RUDEP 
Although only a small share of RUDEP funds directly went to productive sectors the impacts 
were significant, and can summarised in four points. 
 
                                                     
121 RECODA 2008. 
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Firstly, RUDEP contributed to increased diversification of crops with the promotion of 
sunflower, potatoes, fruit growing and vegetable cultivation. Statistics presented in Chapter 2 
clearly show a major improvement and reduced dependency on maize. This has been 
beneficial from a nutritional and food security perspective as well as for income generation.  
 
Secondly, RUDEP influenced agricultural productivity through improved cultivation 
practices, improved seeds and more use of animal draft power. The latter enabled households 
to expand the cultivated areas, and benefited better off farmers in particular. 
 
Thirdly, the most direct impact was created when rural roads were rehabilitated and made 
passable throughout the year. In Mwimbi Division, crop export and retail trade rose 
immediately. Many trucks preferred taking the detour via Mwimbi on their trips between 
Sumbawanga and Mbeya, partly because of the poor condition of the trunk road and partly to 
engage in trading.  
 
Finally, the indirect stimulation of the cash economy was substantial, as explained by Mr. A. 
Shirima, currently Executive Director of the water supply agency for Sumbawanga town 
(SUWASA):  
 
“In fact the economy of Rukwa grew during RUDEP era. That time there was 
high circulation of money to different levels of people. People who worked 
directly with RUDEP got good salaries and allowances, government staff were 
given allowance, business people got money through selling various goods, 
villagers engaged in rural road maintenance were paid, building contractors 
and local masons got jobs and money, improvement of roads enabled farmers 
to access markets and at least sell their crops at relative good prices, and 
transporters were busy as well; so everyone felt the presence of RUDEP even 
through multiplier effects. Staff used to refrain from working in Rukwa but 
right now they are ready to stay and even make their home in the Region. 
Even if there were some few cases of misusing the funds still the money 
circulated here and not in Dar es Salaam or somewhere else”. 122 
 
 
Where RUDEP did not have a lasting impact 
RUDEP did not succeed in linking the agricultural producers to the market, to credit facilities 
and input suppliers in an organised way. The end of the 1980s was the demise of the state-
controlled cooperative unions and marketing corporations, and farmers to a large extent were 
left to deal with private traders on an individual basis. Despite its effort to support farmers’ 
groups RUDEP never got to a position where it could support the genesis of a genuine 
cooperative movement.   
5.4 Impacts on the environment 
The situation today 
The environmental condition on the Ufipa highland has further deteriorated during the last 
decade. The number one reason is population growth resulting in increased cultivation 
pressure and further deforestation of common property or state lands.  
 
Impacts of RUDEP 
The efforts of RUDEP at the time clearly contributed towards greater awareness about tree 
planting and environmental conservation, but the outcome was mixed. Where one sees a 
visible change is in the greening of Sumbawanga town, which RUDEP alone cannot take 
credit for, but RUDEP-financed nurseries and extension workers made it easier for 
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individuals and NGOs to engage in tree planting. The “green belt” outside town, supported by 
RUDEP, has survived and matured.  
 
At the village level, the impact is less, but there are today several villages maintaining 
community woodlots as a source of firewood and timber – e.g. the Tamasenga village forest 
which was established under the facilitation of RUDEP (see photo).  
 
 
Mature eucalyptus trees in the Tamasenga village 
woodlot  
 
 
 
 
 
There is also evidence of villages that have 
improved the maintenance of catchment 
areas (e.g. Msanzi, Mwasye and Kaengesa). 
RUDEP did play a role, but probably more 
important has been the engagement of the 
Catholic Church and its various missions.  
 
 
Where RUDEP did not have a lasting impact 
The protection of forest reserves continues to be an uphill struggle. Every year the Mbizi and 
Chala reserves are affected by fires, and there is no longer any capacity in place to limit the 
damage.  
 
A section of Mbizi forest reserve which had been 
burnt in September 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One official from the District office had 
this to say: “The forester from Chala was 
shifted just after the project phased out and 
the house which he used to stay in was 
allocated to somebody else; we do not visit 
the catchment as it used to be”. There 
seem still to be unresolved conflicts with 
some families that lost access to land when the reserves were established, although RUDEP 
tried help settling such grievances. Nevertheless, the Mbizi catchment has remained the main 
source of water to a rapidly growing urban population, but its protection is far from adequate.   
 
It needs also be mentioned that RUDEP’s attempt to promote fuel efficient stoves never took 
off. It was experimented with using coal from the Namwele coal fields, making bricklets from 
powdered coal – a technology which is widespread in Asia, but the sulphuric content of the 
coal yielded an unpleasant smell when burning.  
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5.5 Impacts on public institutions 
The situation today 
Capacity development was by several seen as the prime objective of RUDEP, without which 
little else could be achieved. This was articulated in the RUDEP Handbook as follows:  
 
“The broad goal is to provide an enabling framework of support and assistance 
to existing government institutions and mechanisms in order to more 
effectively plan, implement and manage development activities. At its core 
therefore, RUDEP is process-oriented, not output-oriented. Development is 
understood to be the outcome of complex social, economic and institutional 
processes, rather than merely achieving quantifiable physical targets within 
fixed budgetary allocations.”123  
 
Since the mid-1990s two major trends impacted on the government system in Rukwa. Firstly, 
there has been the furthering of the local government reform programme involving 
strengthening of districts administrations at the expense of the regional level, and secondly, 
the recurrent budgets remained very low for several years until 2001/02 when central 
government grants started picking up. In this situation, what happened to the capacity 
development investments of RUDEP? 
 
 
Impacts of RUDEP 
Looking at impacts of RUDEP on public institutions today we have to go to the local 
governments. The impacts are indirect and not related to a continuation of RUDEP activities 
after NORAD pulled out. Many middle and junior level civil servants working in RUDEP are 
now working in the local governments of the region. They bring experiences and attitudes 
developed during RUDEP into their current 
jobs, and in interviews people mentioned 
popular participation, cross-sectoral cooperation 
and result focus as a kind of ‘RUDEP legacy’ 
that remains. 
 
 
 
 
A trace of RUDEP at the Region’s planning office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several informants stated that TASAF currently 
benefits from this, since in all districts TASAF 
coordinators previously worked with RUDEP as 
staff of the Community Development 
Department. The TASAF approach is quite 
similar to what was developed for the District Development Fund established under RUDEP. 
In the water and roads departments there are also many with experience from RUDEP and 
technical training funded by RUDEP. It is impossible in any way to measure this kind of 
impact, but RUDEP clearly remains the key professional reference point for many in the 
district administrations of today.  
 
                                                     
123 READ 1989. RUDEP Handbook. 
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Where RUDEP did not have a lasting impact 
An economic and financial evaluation of RUDEP from 1993 concluded that “given the 
estimated present size of recurring expenditure of RUDEP … current levels of resource 
allocation from the government have to be raised significantly in order to operate and 
maintain RUDEP … activities at their present level”124. The analysis shows two important 
features, one that the recurrent cost element in the programme itself was relatively high – at 
about one-third. This included payment of salaries to contracted staff, various allowances, 
wages to casual labourers and transport. And secondly, that the share of donor funding 
relative to central government contributions was high, estimated at about 80% of the region’s 
total development budget for the period 1987/88 to 1992/93. The total expenditure by RUDEP 
was around three times the total expenditure by the government from domestic sources.  
 
 
The drill rig financed by NORAD: 
still in working condition but not 
much used 
 
 
 
 
 
Such figures gave rise to 
concerns for the 
sustainability of the 
programme and what 
kind of aid exit strategy 
can be devised. NORAD 
opted for a rapid closure 
of the programme, and 
from reports and interviews we observed that the Region did not, or was not able to, prepare a 
sound phasing out strategy for RUDEP. The budget for 1996/97 and subsequent years did not 
reflect a concern for extending as much as possible of RUDEP activities using domestic 
funding. The main reason was that the central government had very little to offer. Regional 
and district departments that had been closely involved in RUDEP experienced a dramatic 
drop in their budgets. As an example, in 1994/95 the Water Department of Sumbawanga 
District received about TShs 35,000,000 under RUDEP for local expenditures, which 
basically funded all its activities. In 1996/97 the department received only TShs 60,000 for 
expenditures not related to staff costs.125 With this level of funding, development activities 
just stopped over night.  
 
The financial position of the central government was extremely difficult in the second half of 
the 1990s before a debt relief agreement with the donors was signed end of 2001. Regions and 
districts suffered even more than central government, which not only reflected the low degree 
of decentralization of public resources in Tanzania in general, but was amplified by a 
centralization of aid. Several donors, not only Norway, at the time wound up district and 
regional projects and moved their support to national sector programmes. Evidently, NORAD 
and RUDEP failed to devise a transition from aid dependence to domestic funding at least 
safeguarding the best functioning elements of the programme.  
 
 
                                                     
124 3E Economics (1993), p. v. 
125 Interview Mr. Shao, April 2008. 
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5.6 Impacts on private sector 
The situation today 
We do not have information on growth of the private sector over time. Clearly there has been 
a considerable development since the early 1990s in the number and range of enterprises, but 
the Region remains among the economically least developed and crop-related businesses 
continue to dominate. Problems of energy supplies and the poor state of the Mpanda-
Sumwanga-Tunduma trunk road are the main deterrents to investors.  
 
Impacts of RUDEP 
We have already mentioned the overall impacts of RUDEP on the regional economy. In the 
following are some examples of private sector entrepreneurship stimulated by RUDEP. 
 
Delta Engineering Works is a small mechanical workshop run by a former RUDEP staff. He 
is manufacturing manual water pumps and ox-carts, but he complained that the current 
demand is low; he sold less than 10 carts in 2007. “Farmers were better off during RUDEP”, 
he argued. There are several other mechanics who worked in RUDEP workshops that have 
their own garages today. 
 
A former RUDEP worker at 
his private workshop 
 
 
 
 
The coal deposits in 
Rukwa have been 
known for a long time, 
but a Norwegian 
geologist linked to 
RUDEP actively 
pushed the idea of 
commercial mining. 
With financing from RUDEP 2000 tons were first excavated in 1993 and mainly used for 
brick burning in Sumbawanga. 300 brick-makers were trained. 
 
 
 
Coal prepared for transport to Mbeya 
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In 2004, the mining concession was taken over by a local businessman – Mr. Kasiano, owner 
of the Upendo Group – and he is now selling coal to Mbeya Cement and Mbeya Textile. His 
long term goal is to start production of electricity using coal. Recently, he used own funds for 
a study trip to China and India to look at small-scale thermal power plants. Kasiano started his 
business in 1986, supplying construction materials, and from 1987 RUDEP for several years 
was his biggest customer. In his assessment, RUDEP did too many small projects: “it should 
have concentrated on a few big ones in relation to roads, power supply, railways or higher 
education, to stimulate the economy – the small projects we can do ourselves”. 
 
Mr. Kafulusu, another local businessman, also came up thanks to RUDEP. He started 
supplying construction materials to RUDEP. “RUDEP was paying promptly which was very 
important for my business”, he said. “RUDEP gave a boost to the economy – the circulation 
of money touched every person. Many businesses came up as a result of RUDEP: bars and 
hotels, small traders, and many bought vehicles”. He explained that 1996 had been a very 
difficult year and many businesses stalled. RUDEP had generated a lot of activity in the 
construction sector since people were investing in new houses. Crop processing also went 
down because of fewer buyers. It took about 3 years before business picked up again. “Now 
the situation is better, and I am getting contracts for road maintenance from TANROADS”. 
 
 
The office of one of Rukwa’s largest contractors who built himself 
up at the time of RUDEP  
 
 
 
Where RUDEP did not have a lasting impact 
By and large, RUDEP had limited success in its 
attempts at transferring appropriate low cost 
technology. One example is compressed bricks for 
house construction using a 6:1 sand-cement ratio. 
Several small demonstration houses were built and 
manual compressing machines given to people who 
wanted to try it commercially. For villagers, it turned 
out more expensive than burnt bricks, and the bricks 
were not accepted for government buildings. This 
example, and others, illustrates the problem of 
creating effective public-private partnerships at the 
time. 
5.7 Impacts on civil society  
With the political liberalisation taking place during the 1990s, NORAD repeatedly signalled 
its preparedness to finance NGO-activities in Rukwa. It was also argued that RUDEP should 
start involving civil society organisations to a greater extent.  
 
Impacts of RUDEP 
Except for religious organisations, however, the NGO-sector was rudimentary up until the 
closure of RUDEP. RUDEP made cooperative arrangements with Catholic missions in a few 
projects (i.e. constructing a training centre in Mwimbi Division and in promoting village 
afforestation and catchment forest protection). However, the most significant initiative was 
the formation of Rukwa Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (RANGO). It 
started in 1992 by 12 NGO founding members. Today, there are 62 member organisations. 
The role of RANGO is to assist member organisations preparing project proposals and 
accessing external funding. RANGO was supported by NORAD until 2004 through 
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institutional cooperation with Norwegian NGOs active in Tanzania (i.e. Strømme Foundation 
during the initial years and for the longest period Norwegian People’s Aid). 
 
Several small environmental NGOs were established in the wake of RUDEP’s afforestation 
efforts, but the Rukwa Association for the Advancement of Women (RAAWO) is probably 
the most successful of the local NGOs with a RUDEP legacy. It was started 1995 by a group 
of women Community Development workers who had participated in a RUDEP-sponsored 
study tour to Zambia looking at women organisations. RAAWO has 60 core members today, 
who are women in various professional and business related jobs. The organisation offers 
small-scale credit to poor women in Sumbawanga town and has been successful in mobilising 
grants from other foreign donors. 
 
Where RUDEP did not have a lasting impact 
International NGOs are prominent in Tanzania, and with the gradual withdrawal of bilateral 
donors from local level projects, such as RUDEP, they remained the only significant donors 
to many remote regions and districts especially in the social sectors. Faith-based organisations 
are particularly active. While this support is appreciated locally, the capacity of the public 
departments at district level to oversee and coordinate the various initiatives remains weak. 
The development planning capacity built up during RUDEP soon withered. 
5.8 Impacts on policy of lessons learned 
While Tanzania has been a testing ground for a variety of aid sponsored development 
approaches it has suffered throughout from weak linkages between operational experiences 
and national policy making. Regrettably, few of the results from the various experiments, 
RUDEP included, found their way into policy development in a systematic way. Policy 
change was primarily dictated by shifts in development paradigms largely imposed from the 
outside, rather than learning from positive lessons in ongoing projects. This was made no 
easier when in donor circles in Dar es Salaam a perception evolved during the 1990s that 
there was a need to make a fundamental break with past aid practices when embracing the 
“new aid architecture” emphasising policy dialogue at central level and funding through 
national programmes. Hence, neither central government nor donors like NORAD were keen 
on distilling lessons from the many rural development programmes that had virtually covered 
every corner of the country. 
 
Negative lessons 
Hence, we cannot trace any direct impacts of RUDEP on policy making. Only some implicit 
negative lessons were formulated. The main argument of relevance to policy was the concern 
for financial sustainability, or in other words, that the Region had become too aid dependent 
and there was a fear that aid substituted for local resource mobilisation and taxation as well as 
central government transfers. It was also argued that direct funding of a particular region or 
district by a donor introduced inequalities and unwarranted biases in the national distribution 
of public resources. These concerns justified shifting the funding to a national civil service or 
local government reform programme.  
 
Missed lessons 
In retrospect, informants did argue that RUDEP represented lessons of direct relevance to the 
Government’s development strategy of today, as articulated in the National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) or better known as MKUKUTA (the Kiswahili 
acronym for Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Taifa). “The strategy 
identifies three major clusters of outcomes for poverty reduction, namely: (i) growth and 
reduction of income poverty; (ii) improved quality of life and social well being; and, (iii) 
good governance and accountability.”126  
                                                     
126 http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/uploads/media/MKUKUTA_20FINAL-June.pdf, p.27. 
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“RUDEP did MKUKUTA”, as one interviewee expressed it. By this she referred to all three 
outcome indicators above, and frequently informants emphasized the RUDEP approach as 
something that is still relevant. The programme developed approaches to participatory 
planning and implementation, which were later resuscitated under new labels – TASAF, 
O&OD (Opportunities and Obstacles to Development) and CDD (Community Driven 
Development), all stemming from the enhanced involvement of the World Bank. “Bottom-up 
today is all what RUDEP used” and “TASAF just using what RUDEP did” are other 
statements pointing at the same. RUDEP was among several rural development programmes 
that in the 1980s and early 1990s actively promoted participation and beneficiary ownership, 
the concrete lessons from which seem to have been put in the waste bin of history.  
 
Similarly, RUDEP demonstrated considerable success in improving health conditions through 
preventive health care and drinking water supply. With the current problems facing Tanzania 
in meeting the health related Millennium Development Goals lessons from earlier 
programmes are worth studying.127  
 
Lessons on policy influence during implementation of RUDEP 
No success in strengthening regional policy making. On the issue of policy influence 
NORAD was fumbling in terms of ambitions and approach. On the one hand, RUDEP was 
envisaged as a mechanism for slowly building capacity of the public sector. This meant a 
focus on implementation by-and-large taking current policies as a given. On the other hand, 
however, NORAD over time started voicing more and more concerns with the inadequacy or 
lack of policy directives. In several Annual Meetings and Review Missions, the Region was 
urged to develop regional policies in areas such as agriculture, the role of women, 
afforestation, health and roads. Policy drafts were prepared by READ, such as a “Rukwa 
Forest Policy” in 1989, but they had limited effect. The mandate of the Region to formulate 
policies was unclear, and the capacity to act was limited. It was also a period when the 
Regional Development Directorates gradually were emasculated compared to the prominent 
role they had been assigned with the 1972 decentralisation reform. 
 
This illustrates a problem commonly found in aid relations; the donor develops ambitions for 
influencing policies and systems that are not in tune with political realities on the ground. 
Outsiders coming to review RUDEP had a tendency to give the programme a more prominent 
role than what it had. Looking at a Health Sector Review financed by RUDEP in 1989, this 
was apparent. The RUDEP Coordinator at a meeting with NORAD complained that the team 
had not understood the way RUDEP was integrated in the local administration, posing clear 
limitation on what could be achieved.128 
 
The goal of building stronger local governments notwithstanding, there remains until today a 
“regional vacuum”. Spearheading development in Rukwa a strong regional administration is 
needed - not as an implementer of services but in formulating and guiding regional 
development strategies. 
 
The challenge of finding a sub-national role for donor agencies. The story of RUDEP, like 
other similar programmes, is a tale of trying to establish a workable aid relationship at a sub-
national level – Region or District. When regions – like Rukwa – now plead for having 
donors back, after they “retreated” to Dar es Salaam in the 1990s, some lessons articulated by 
the outgoing RUDEP Coordinator in 1989 may be relevant.  
 
He then saw a need to rethink the approach of the donors. He argued that the coordinator and 
other expatriates had very ambivalent roles; partly being seen by Tanzanians as an extended 
                                                     
127 http://www.tz.undp.org/mdgs_progress.html.  
128 Minutes from meeting 21.9.89 at NORAD, Dar es Salaam (in Norwegian). 
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arm of NORAD to monitor activities, partly and officially being designated as advisors to 
Tanzanian counterparts, and partly being decision makers with substantial powers – though 
not formally being accountable to superiors in the Tanzanian administration. It would have 
been a better solution and one acceptable to Tanzania, he argued, to establish a control and 
monitoring intermediary in the Region independent of the implementers.  
 
The need for demand-driven approaches to community involvement. With respect to 
community participation, the Coordinator in 1989 noted that RUDEP had not been able to 
change the established top-down thinking; government extension officers convincing or 
cajoling villagers to accept what they had to offer. He advised NORAD to argue for a model 
where villages or groups on their own initiative sent applications to a development fund. In 
Phase II of RUDEP this idea was further developed with the facility called District 
Development Funds (DDF). There is no evidence of any direct link from this concept to 
TASAF, which was introduced in Tanzania in 2000 by the World Bank, but the similarities 
are striking. 
 
DDF was approved in 1992 and it was to be coordinated by the Planning Department in each 
of the districts. According to the guidelines it was “a decentralized, village oriented scheme 
under which all projects are identified at village level. The projects are the village property 
and village responsibility. DDF is seen as a funding and advising partner only. Self-help 
contribution is at least 20% rendered as cash to be entered into a bank account before grant 
money is made available.” DDF aimed at funding typical village construction projects 
(schools, dispensaries, water points, bridges etc.) that could be implemented in a one-year 
period. The 20-80 (RUDEP) cost sharing is the same ratio used by TASAF today.  
 
DDF was ahead of time. Not only TASAF but also the Local Government Support Grant 
today is based in similar principles. DDF did not last for many years but the response was 
promising, with many applications in the pipeline when RUDEP closed. Some DDF-projects 
collapsed because of lack of follow up after RUDEP. Today, many applications to TASAF 
and LGSP are coming in, and officers interviewed are convinced that part of the reason is 
related to the RUDEP experience. 
5.9 Impacts at the individual level – human resources 
development 
RUDEP provided training and new types of work experience for a large number of people. 
We were not able to trace in a systematic manner in which ways the enhanced knowledge has 
benefited personal careers, but during interviews people frequently rated this as among the 
most important impacts of RUDEP. It is useful to distinguish among four categories of 
people. 
 
Firstly, there were many ordinary villagers who participated in activities organised by 
RUDEP. The types of skills that people referred to as particularly useful in the period after 
RUDEP were group formation, preventive health care, simple construction techniques 
associated with roads, house construction and water supply, and production of seedlings and 
tree planting.  
 
Secondly, RUDEP directly or indirectly employed many semi-skilled workers and technicians 
in labour based road works, water supply, building construction, and mechanical workshops. 
They received mainly on-the job training as project workers. Some were able to continue 
within government, whereas most have struggled to earn a living in the private sector. Within 
this category also come Village Health Workers and Traditional Birth Attendants who went 
through formalised training. Some of the VHWs have later become nurses. Many of the TBAs 
trained by RUDEP are still active and some have introduced their daughters to the job.  
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Thirdly, there were lower level civil servants who had formal roles in RUDEP projects. Their 
skills development came mostly in the form of practical on-the job experience, since RUDEP 
never established formalised training programmes for this level of personnel. It is significant 
that quite many within this category can be found working for the local governments in 
Rukwa today. Therefore, in retrospect, one may argue that greater investments in training at 
this level would have been quite beneficial.  
 
Fourthly, it was the category that consumed the bulk of investments in formalised training, 
namely middle and higher level civil servants. This was driven by the necessity to ensure that 
project managers and trainer-of-trainers possessed adequate technical skills, but was also 
influenced by a perceived need to give incentives to senior civil servants to make them work 
in Rukwa. With the closure of RUDEP, or even before, many left the Region and successfully 
pursued their careers elsewhere. The latter also counts as impacts of RUDEP, although it also 
represented a loss to the Region of valuable skills.  
 
It need also be mentioned that the RUDEP-experience influenced the professional careers of 
many of the expatriates assigned to the programme – the co-author of this report being one 
example. Even if not beneficial to Tanzania, being a party to the difficult challenge of raising 
the living standard of people in Rukwa influenced mindsets and for some also work priorities.  
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6. Lessons for the future 
What can we learn from the story of RUDEP that is valid for Tanzanian policy-makers and 
planners of today, and for development partners that would like to see a more prosperous 
Rukwa Region? There are possibly three ways to look at this story. The first is to look at 
where there have been some lasting impacts despite the abrupt closure of the programme and 
no alternative funding coming to replace Norway’s. This may represent a lesson for how to 
invest aid resources in a setting with a weak and under-resourced public sector. The second 
way is to look at impacts of the programme while it was still actively pursuing its main 
objective of strengthening public sector efficiency. Is it possible to argue that the RUDEP 
approach, which was distinctly different from the way aid is delivered today, had its 
comparative advantages? And finally, there are possibly lessons related to the phasing out of 
aid and the quest for sustainability. 
6.1 What survived the absence of aid and why? 
We were able to find a legacy of RUDEP in three ways: 
• In infrastructure that had a technical quality high enough to sustain inadequate 
maintenance.  
• In the adoption of technologies related to agricultural-based income generation. 
• In the heads of people who were actively involved in the programme. 
 
Although the number of water points installed by RUDEP still in operation has gradually 
declined over the years due to problems of maintenance and a dropping groundwater table, 
the decline has been much less than one would have expected. The reason is not technical 
sophistication, but rather good workmanship and high quality hardware components. 
Boreholes and hand pumps, in particular, have exceeded their expected life time, which is a 
testimony to the durability and appropriateness of the technical solutions. Likewise, some 
“RUDEP roads” have remained passable until today, despite poor maintenance, serving the 
Mwimbi area and Rukwa valley. The Kasanga port plays a more important role than ever with 
a flourishing trade across the Lake Tanganyika. The following lessons from RUDEP can be 
learned: 
o Ensure quality when investing in rural infrastructure. Higher unit costs, involving 
proper planning and supervision, is likely to pay off in the long run.  
o Avoid sophisticated solutions highly dependent on aid financed supplies of spares 
and technical supervision. 
o Invest in people intensive activities. Involvement is in itself a good thing, both for 
local income generation and transfer of knowledge.  
o Using semi-autonomous implementation units is better than getting work done 
through regular public departments.  
 
There have been major changes in agriculture over the last two decades, first and foremost 
through increased diversification of crops both for marketing and own consumption. Although 
marginal in terms of financial outlays, the support by RUDEP (and other programmes at the 
time) to the introduction of new crops and farming techniques has had substantial multiplier 
effects. This shows the readiness of farmers to test and adopt new technologies, but that it is a 
timely process with farmers generally being risk averse. The combined effects in Mwimbi 
Division on agriculture from intensified advisory services, improved communications and 
cash incomes from public works were formidable. People intensified agricultural production 
and started growing new crops and vegetables. Cash incomes were used to invest in improved 
housing, education and migration. These gains, however, were vulnerable to changing market 
conditions. Currently, the returns to farmers from cash crops are deteriorating and small-scale 
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farmers mostly produce for own consumption. The following lessons from RUDEP can be 
learned: 
o Poverty reduction in rural areas depends on the terms of trade for farmers. 
o Improved market access is crucial, but has to be followed up by relevant 
extension services and effective farmer organisations. The latter was not a 
component of RUDEP.  
o With population growth there is an increasing number of marginal rural 
households. Poverty levels in Rukwa have not gone down and there is an urgent 
need to address the income and self-sufficiency level of the rural poor. Many will 
leave the village and look for income opportunities in urban areas. The rapid 
growth of Sumbawanga town the last decade underscores this trend.  
o The strategy of forming collectives and groups, as RUDEP was a party to, did not 
do well in Rukwa, with the exception of women groups that have continued until 
today – though not with its original membership and purpose. To reduce poverty, 
the free market offered opportunities but not the solution. There remains the need 
for targeting the rural poor, both in terms of assets and mobilisation.   
 
The influence of RUDEP on people’s attitudes and perceptions cannot be measured, and we 
rely on people’s testimony. At village level they talked about a change of mind set. RUDEP 
offered new opportunities for income generation, for access to information and knowledge, 
and it impacted on people’s aspirations and standard setting for their own life. Civil servants 
working in the programme learned a lot. Some took this knowledge to new jobs outside the 
region. For those that remained, the scope for practicing the acquired competence and 
experience was limited with development funds drying up. With new programmes coming in 
recent years (e.g. TASAF and road maintenance) there is evidence of RUDEP experience 
being put to use. The following lessons from RUDEP can be learned: 
o Aid in the “RUDEP way” represented more than resource transfers to a marginal 
region. There was a significant element of transfer of ideas through human 
interaction; involving expatriates but more importantly the increased level of 
activities of a large number of government and programme employees.  
o Today, people appreciate this form of influence as an opportunity for learning, 
but it took many years of RUDEP presence to be accepted. It shows the 
importance of time and patience in development processes. 
o This notwithstanding, the influence of RUDEP was often not as intended. The 
goal of building a more effective public sector struggled against mounting 
problems of corruption and lack of accountability. The goal of strengthening the 
Region as a policy-making and development coordinating unit was undermined 
by the decentralisation reform. And the goal of strengthening popular 
participation was often subverted by public departments reluctant to give up the 
top-down approach they for so long had been accustomed to. 
6.2 Can RUDEP claim any ‘best practices’? 
RUDEP was never subjected to a thorough ex-post evaluation. This study represents a partial 
attempt to do so, both focusing on long-term development impacts and experiences gained 
during implementation. We have concluded that RUDEP at its time of closure – mid 1990s – 
had contributed substantially to economic growth and improved preventive health care.  
 
Stimulation of the regional economy was mainly due to two factors at the time: RUDEP-
financed consumption and the rehabilitation of roads. When RUDEP closed the private sector 
in Sumbawanga immediately suffered and a period of economic recession followed. Statistics 
indicate that agricultural production has started picking up from about 2000, with rice, 
sunflower and potato growing more than maize. 
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The social benefits created by RUDEP were sustained only in so far as services were not 
dependent on public funding. With virtually zero replacement funding to fill the gap left by 
RUDEP, there was a virtual collapse in the extension work of departments such as Water, 
Health, Forestry and Community Development. 
 
In this light and with the benefit of hindsight, what can be said about various aspects of the 
RUDEP approach? We will address this through a number of questions of relevance to 
development planner today? 
 
Is process planning and learning by doing a valid approach? The flexibility of the RUDEP 
planning system greatly contributed to building local ownership of the programme. Vertical 
blue-print programmes directed from central level often face serious problems in adapting to 
local conditions. The RUDEP model, in theory, was well suited to stimulate local governance 
and accountability. The main problem was the learning capability of a civil service where key 
decision-makers constantly changed and had little affinity to Rukwa and its population.  
o The RUDEP-approach was too open-ended, and served as a “second Treasury” to 
where all kinds of financial requests from resource strapped departments 
potentially could be addressed. There was a need for a sharper strategic focus 
from the beginning. 
o The programme would also have benefited from a mix of process and blue-print, 
reflecting a division of work between units of government responsible for overall 
planning and monitoring – and learning, and units responsible for 
implementation. In RUDEP, the regional departments, and the READ in 
particular, often had both roles which weakened the accountability for results.  
 
Can popular participation be stimulated the way RUDEP tried? RUDEP went through a 
gradual transformation in its approach to participation from supply-driven to demand-driven. 
This change was facilitated by the gradual process of political reform, which since has made 
further strides. Clearly, there is today in both rural and urban communities a greater sense of 
civic action acknowledging that one can no longer wait for government to solve all problems.  
o RUDEP did only get a couple of years experience with its District Development 
Fund, which in many ways resembled TASAF that came ten years later, but the 
initial results were promising. Essential to this approach is that beneficiaries on 
their own initiative submit an application, and that financial support is 
conditioned on producing tangible results in advance. 
o Demand driven approaches ought to be further stimulated. TASAF has limited 
capacity and as a national programme it has less flexibility in adjusting to local 
circumstance. There is scope for new funds that can complement TASAF and 
potentially invite applications from other entities than village organisations – e.g. 
local governments, NGOs and private sector.  
 
Are area-targeted programmes a valid approach? Opinions among development 
practitioners have gone back and forth on this issue. For some time, the argument has been 
that area targeting introduces unwarranted biases and undermines central government’s ability 
to pursue national policies. Politically, in Tanzania there has been a great reluctance in 
introducing differential treatment among regions and district. When it has happened it has 
come as a response to donors’ demands. Yet, the gap between the stronger and the marginal 
regions is widening, and people in Rukwa vehemently argue that there is a need to reintroduce 
a measure of preferential treatment, similar to RUDEP. In the aftermath of RUDEP, the 
Region’s share of total aid to Tanzania declined substantially. 
o There is clearly a need for major strategic investments in transport infrastructure 
and energy supply. 
o In addition, special funds can be developed to support small-scale projects based 
on principles of cost-sharing and results-based funding. 
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o Broad-based support to public sector capacity building, similar to RUDEP, 
should be avoided, but there is a need to provide targeted support to strengthen 
the capacity of the Region to plan and monitor development projects. Rukwa can 
never be successfully managed from Dar es Salaam.  
 
Is integrated development still a valid approach? The term integration carried two different 
meanings for RUDEP that by and large contradicted: one was related to the aim of working as 
part of the Tanzanian government system, and the other was related to the need to better 
coordinate between sectors. With respect to system-integration RUDEP was probably the 
most advanced among the donor funded IRDPs in Tanzania, although financial control was 
kept separate throughout. With respect to cross-sectoral cooperation the achievements were 
marginal. While this concept logically makes sense, sector departments tended to jealously 
guard their turfs.  
o While supporting the capacity of key departments for strategic planning and 
learning, implementation of concrete output oriented projects (such as road 
rehabilitation and water supply) could better be done by semi-autonomous and 
temporary project organisations There is no need that all should be integrated or 
even be part of the government structure.  
 
How can accountability be strengthened? Critical issues in the current aid debate are 
corruption and accountability for results. RUDEP struggled with both problems and 
NORAD’s decision to terminate funding was greatly influenced by a growing perception that 
there were too many leakages and too little output monitoring. This problem was not genuine 
to RUDEP or Rukwa, and has not been resolved by more centralised management of aid. The 
lessons of RUDEP showed that: 
o A clearer division of roles was needed on the recipient side between the agency 
responsible for challenging funds and the agency responsible for implementation. 
o There was a need for greater transparency and dissemination of information about 
budgets and planned outputs to enhance the scope of beneficiaries and their 
representatives to monitor government agencies. 
o There was a need to move towards more results-based funding. 
o The donor – NORAD – needed some kind of extended arm in Rukwa. The more 
the “RUDEP Office” in Sumbawanga resembled a regular regional department 
the weaker became the sense of partnership. For a donor to engage in a region 
remote from the Embassy it is essential that a trusted partner exists in the Region, 
one that has the legitimacy and capacity to adequately monitor use of funds.  
6.3 How to exit aid? 
As we have argued above, NORAD’s exit from RUDEP was traumatic and poorly planned by 
both sides. Whereas donors legally reserve the right to unilaterally terminate funding at short 
notice, it is generally agreed that the phasing out of an aid relationship has to be a joint 
process allowing adequate time for the recipient to adjust. The problem of RUDEP was 
twofold.  
 
Firstly, the programme partners never seriously discussed phasing out as an unavoidable and 
necessary component of the RUDEP strategy – or in other words there was no talk about ‘exit 
at entry’. 
o The open-ended nature of the RUDEP approach almost discouraged any thinking 
about phasing-out. Exit of aid should have been considered from the beginning, 
not necessarily in terms of setting a deadline, but in devising financial 
arrangements preparing for reduction in aid. One approach would have been a 
mandatory local cash contribution that had to increase every year the programme 
was implemented. 
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o In a complex programme like RUDEP, involving very different kinds of projects 
in various sectors, there should have been guidelines for how to phase-out from 
individual projects. In particular, there was a need to address the lack of 
performance. Clearly, not all initiatives were successful, but funding tended to 
continue for too long. 
 
Secondly, NORAD unjustifiably decided to phase-out funding in a very short time span – 
less than two years finally. In a development partnership, such harsh measures can only 
be justified if there is a breach of contract or serious political tensions between the 
partners. NORAD for valid reasons had been withholding funding awaiting investigations 
on some audit queries, but this in itself was not a legitimate reason for terminating a 
programme initially built on a long term commitment from Norway. Understandably, on 
the Tanzanian side, there was not the financial capacity to accommodate to this rapid 
phasing out, but more surprisingly there was virtually no political mobilisation on the 
recipient side, neither in the Region nor centrally, to secure a more gradual phase-out. As 
a consequence, most RUDEP-funded activities stopped, which, ironically, only served to 
prove the point made by the adversaries of RUDEP in the NORAD administration that it 
had become too aid dependant and was not sustainable.  
o The negative consequences of the rapid and unplanned phasing out of RUDEP 
serve as a lesson to both Tanzania and Norway, as development partners, that aid 
relationships to be successful must incorporate both long term and predictable 
donor commitments as well as binding obligations on the part of the recipient to a 
jointly agreed and time-bound phasing-out strategy. 
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SUMMARY
From 1978 to 1996 a close link existed between one of Tanzania’s 
least developed regions and Norway. Norway provided aid to the 
tune of 400 million kroner, or about 70 million dollar, with the broad 
goal of improving the material wellbeing of the people. By reviewing 
the development situation of the region today, more than 10 years 
after the decision by Norad to terminate the Rukwa Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (RUDEP) this study looks at the impact of 
this aid. Rukwa still ranks among the poorest regions in Tanzania. Yet, 
there is evidence of enhanced living standard during RUDEP in areas 
where transport improved and villages were provided clean water and 
primary health care services. This is also an account of development 
ideas no longer in vogue – “integrated” and “participatory” rural 
development – and the encounter with the realities at the time of a 
country in economic crisis undergoing frequent policy shifts. What 
worked, what didn’t and what lessons for future aid?  
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